



PHD

The politics of democratisation in post-transition contexts: social movement organisations and trade unions in the production of democratic subjectivities in Argentina and Brazil

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**The politics of democratisation in post-transition contexts: social
movement organisations and trade unions in the production of
democratic subjectivities in Argentina and Brazil**

by

Juan Pablo Ferrero

A thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

University of Bath

Department of Social and Policy Sciences

March 2012

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*Dedicated to my father Hilario M. Ferrero and to the people who react
against injustice*

ABSTRACT

The Transition School helped to understand interactions between elites and popular mobilisation both favouring and conditioning the establishment of democratic rule in Latin America. As the reestablishment of authoritarian regimes became no longer a serious risk, the debate shifted towards ideas of ‘regime consolidation’ and the ‘quality of democracy’ highlighting the importance of (consolidated or better) political institutions as primary locus to achieve it. As a consequence, the study of social movement organisations and trade unions remained to a large extent disconnected to the quest for democratisation. In order to advance the latter I engage with Radical Democracy as it provides new elements to unravel processes of deepening democracy, i.e., to reconnects the quest for democracy with egalitarian struggles upon the contingent structuration of antagonistic conflict.

My argument is that the politics of democratisation in post-transition contexts concerns the formation of democratic subjectivities as the production of transformative action and the expansion of equality. More specifically, I suggest that in the context of Argentina and Brazil, the formation of democratic subjectivities was the result of three overlapping though differentiable ‘internal’ dynamics in relation to the institution of two ‘external’ temporal limits. The relationship between the former (self-organising, networking and demanding) and the latter (‘anti-neoliberalism’ and ‘beyond-governments’) explains the displacement from ‘disagreement’ to ‘participation’ resonating both socio-political conflict and its effects on change and continuity in the politics of post-transition (1990s - 2000s).

Methodologically, I explore the discourse and practice of a qualitatively significant number case studies constructed upon trade unions (Central de Trabajadores Argentinos and Central Única dos Trabalhadores) and social movement organisations (Federación de Tierra, Vivienda y Hábitat and Movimento dos Trabalhadores Rurais Sem Terra) and, only indirectly, political parties and other political institutions. Their clear involvement in political mobilisation though less clear engagement on electoral politics justifies the exploration of the democracy question on new sources under a qualitative perspective.

The argument is organised in three parts and seven chapters. I firstly discuss Radical Democracy in relation to alternative interpretations and also present the reasons for the selection of case studies. The second part explains the formation of democratic subjectivities in Argentina and Brazil by drawing on the analysis of first and secondary data. Thirdly, I narrate the ‘politics of democratisation’ in post-transition contexts based exclusively on research findings. Finally, I critically reassess Radical Democracy which has been heavily theorised but insufficiently empirically scrutinised. I aim to fill this gap as well as to further the understanding on the formation of disagreement, where the drivers for further democratisation lie in ongoing contention.

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To Daniela, for the vertigo of life I want to carry on enjoying together.

DECLARATION

Regarding the relationship between MST, agrarian reform and food sovereignty in Brazil this thesis draws on ideas and conceptual elaboration that have proposed in:

[Forthcomming] Dinerstein, A.C. and Ferrero, J.P. (2012), ‘Agronegocio o soberanía alimentaria? La otra reforma agraria. El MST, Brazil’. In Dinerstein, A.C. et al *¿Qué es la autonomía colectiva? Movimientos sociales entre la rebelión y la institucionalización*, Buenos Aires, Capital Intelectual.

In relation the theoretical discussion between Radical Democracy approach and Participatory Democracy, this thesis has benefited from the following collaborative work undertaken throughout 2011 and currently in process for publication:

Dinerstein, A. C. & Ferrero, J. P. (2012), ‘Participatory or radical democracy? Social Movements and the displacement of disagreement in South America’, Bath Papers in International Development and Well-Being no. 16.

Regarding FRENAPO campaign, this thesis draws on empirical material produced in collaborative fashion for the CTA research institute which has not been published:

Ferrero, J.P. & Gurrera, S.M. (2007) ‘El Frente Nacional de Lucha contra la Pobreza (FRENAPO)’, IEF-CTA, Buenos Aires. Unpublished.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ACE:	Antagonistic Contextual Exterior
APYME:	<i>Asamblea de Pequeños y Medianos Empresarios</i>
CCC:	<i>Corriente Clasista y Combativa</i>
CEB:	<i>Comunidades Eclesiais de Base</i>
CGT:	<i>Confederación General del Trabajo</i>
CMS:	<i>Coordenação dos Movimentos Sociais</i>
CONCLAT:	<i>Congresso Nacional Da Classe Trabalhadora</i>
Contag:	<i>Confederación Nacional de Trabajadores de la Agricultura</i>
CSC:	<i>Corriente Sindical Clasista</i>
CTA:	<i>Central de los Trabajadores Argentinos</i>
CGT:	<i>Confederación General del Trabajo</i>
CPT:	<i>Comissão Pastoral da Terra</i>
CUT:	<i>Central Única dos Trabalhadores</i>
FAA:	<i>Federacion Agraria Argentina</i>
FNT:	<i>Foro Nacional de Trabalho</i>
FNL:	<i>Fórum Nacional de Luta, Terra, Trabajo y Ciudadania</i>
FRENAPO:	<i>Frente Nacional Contra la Pobreza</i>
FS:	<i>Força Sindical</i>
FTV:	<i>Federación de Tierra, Vivienda y Hábitat</i>
FUA:	<i>Federacion Universitaria Argentina</i>
FUP:	<i>Federação Única dos Petroleiros</i>
ILO:	International Labour Organisation
IMF:	International Monetary Fund
IMFC:	<i>Instituto Movilizador de Fondos Cooperativos</i>
MCP:	<i>Movimento Consulta Popular</i>
MIJP:	<i>Movimiento Independiente de Jubilados y Desocupados</i>
MST:	<i>Movimento dos Trabalhadores Rurais Sem Terra</i>
MTA:	<i>Movimiento de Trabajadores Argentinos</i>
PCB:	<i>Partido Comunista Brasileiro</i>
PCdoB:	<i>Partido Comunista do Brasil</i>
PJ:	<i>Partido Justicialista</i>
PMDB:	<i>Partido do Movimento Democrático Brasileiro</i>

PSDB: *Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira*

PT: *Partido dos Trabalhadores*

SERPAJ: *Servicio de Paz y Justicia*

UCR: *Unión Cívica Radical*

UNE: *Uniao Nacional dos Estudantes*

WB: World Bank

INTRODUCTION

'From Ancient Greece, we have a name for the intrusion of the excluded into the socio-political space: democracy' (ŽIŽEK, 2009: 55).

i. Researching Democracy

Why am I studying democracy today? Why study democracy in contemporary Argentina and Brazil? My research aims to fill two gaps in the literature on democracy. The first one refers to the gap between Radical Democracy advanced theoretical concepts, on the one hand, and its modest empirical research, on the other. This research puts such concepts in practice in the light of empirical references in turn allowing a critical reassessment of Radical Democracy. The latter represents an important element which justifies researching democracy today. Secondly, this research also seeks to contribute to the debate on democracy in Latin America. In exploring socio-political processes in Argentina and Brazil, it aspires to question existing interpretations on democracy in the region; a debate that, to a large extent, has remained stagnated since transitions from authoritarian rule took place.

As I suggest in Chapter 1, the political sociology perspective that I am proposing in order to look at democratisation includes the ability to re-engage with what it is at stake in the word democracy, namely, self-government and the construction of the demos. I argue in this thesis that the study of democracy should not separate regime from politics but instead explain democratisation within the enactment of politics which I understand with Rancière (1999) as the opening of a previously non-existent space which forces redistribution of given places and functions. Because democracy entails the constitution of an interrupting force by which contentious power claims redistribution of places and functions, democracy entails the enactment of *equality*.

Within this guiding idea of democracy, however, this thesis delves into the particular formations of the demos or, as I propose to call it in this thesis, following Laclau and Mouffe (1985), democratic subjectivities, interrupting the institution of social order in post-transition contexts. It is within the scrutiny of these specific formations that the potentials, effects and limitations of current processes of democratisation can be understood.

In sum, this thesis proposes to fill gaps mentioned earlier by elaborating a model which is inspired in Radical Democracy ideas and equally embedded in empirical references. In order to substantiate a persuasive argumentation about the politics of the post-transition in Argentina and Brazil from a Radical Democracy perspective I needed to a) mark a clear point of departure and b) critically reflect about my proposed theoretical categories. The critique to the 'transition approach' constitutes my own point of departure not only to present my view on democracy but also to justify the need to study democratisation today, beyond its dominant influence. In addition, I develop the construction of each component of my analytical model (organisation, networks, demands, discursive frontier) in relation to specific debates, namely, industrial relations and social movement studies. Although subordinated to Radical Democracy, it is in relation to their competing interpretations of reality that each category I posit in this thesis gain specificity and ultimate meaning. Hence, my thesis aims to contribute to the Radical Democracy debate in the region by undertaking a journey of testing and refining some of its main theoretical ideas in relation to competing theoretical interpretations and complex empirical case studies.

In what follows I introduce the temporal and empirical scope of this model as well as anticipate its essential components.

ii. Temporal Focus

I study democratisation in the post-transition, i.e., from the mid-1980s up to the late 2000s, covering a long period of almost thirty years which I subdivide in three sub-periods: transitions from authoritarian rule, neoliberalism and a 'left-turn' moment. The context of the research is structured in temporal relation to neoliberalism which occupies a key pivotal centre irradiating the (re)construction of the transition and determining the experience in the 2000s.

The structuration of a particular context is constitutive rather than anecdotal in the argument of this thesis. It co-constructs the type of democratic subjectivity because it permeates the forms of solidarity and the depth of the disagreement.

iii. Empirical Focus and Rationale

My empirical focus is not conventional to political science studies on democracy, i.e., it does not focus on political parties and institutional arrangements as primary objects of study. Instead, it looks at formal and informal collective organisations in the form of trade union centrals and social movement organisations. It combines the conventional and the non-conventional, formal and informal organisations, ‘old subjects and new actors’. I am interested in exploring the political identity of subjects (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985) and the formation of (contingent) points of unity or subject positions out of (a state of) heterogeneity. The selection of different types of organisations precisely seeks to research emerging common patterns of collective action within organisations allegedly enacting different societal functions.

Specifically, I draw on first and second-hand data from Landless Rural Workers’ Movement (*Movimento dos Trabalhadores Rurais Sem Terra*, MST) and Unified Workers’ Central (*Central Única dos Trabalhadores*, CUT) in Brazil; and Land and Housing Federation (*Federación de Tierra, Vivienda y Habitat*, FTV) and Argentinean Workers’ Central (*Central de Trabajadores Argentinos*, CTA) in Argentina. The research follows a qualitative design explained in chapter 2 and integrates two countries for validity and reliability purposes rather than for strictly comparative claims.

iv. Research Aims

My research objectives are a) to explore the process of socio-political change between 1990s and 2000s in Argentina and Brazil and b) to understand the form, content, effects and limitations of the formation of the demos/subject behind such process of change. In other words, I am interested in learning how has the internal *articulation* (à la Laclau and Mouffe)

expressing *disagreement* (à la Rancière) been built and also what were the implications of the *new* socio-political consensus emerging from such moment of radical dissensus.

v. Proposed Analytical Model


I suggest that the constitution of the demos, the sounds of disagreement (Ranciere) or the implications of (political) subject positions (Laclau and Mouffe), is better captured in the post-transition context in Argentina and Brazil by the notion of democratic subjectivities. It gives form to the process of formation of contentious collective action and translates its effects in the (re)institution of social order. Their contentious character emerges as a result of struggles against particular forms of domination the enactment of which raises the question of equality and therefore democratisation.

The main two research questions I seek to answer are 1) how was the internal *articulation* (à la Laclau and Mouffe, 1985), that expressed *disagreement* (à la Rancière, 1999), and instituted a new consensus, been built? 2) What effects in terms of transformations and limitations emerged from the development of such specific process?

My argument is that the relationship between new contentious spaces (in the form of three non-territorial dynamics) *in relation to* the antagonistic contextual exterior (ACE) enacted democratic subjectivities in the post-transition in Brazil and Argentina. Moreover, the development of democratic subjectivities was expressed in the formation of two differentiable moments, i.e., a moment of *disagreement* in the 1990s, and a second moment of *participation* in the 2000s.

Rather than a linear trajectory the study suggests that displacement (from disagreement to participation) was the result of interactions involving complex power struggles which have often followed a contradictory path. However, if contradictions seem apparent in the observation of case studies they equally become intelligible when scrutinised through the lenses of *democratic subjectivities*, as this thesis proposes.

Figure No. 1: Democratic Subjectivities in Post-transition Contexts



My thesis suggests that democratic subjectivities are the result of relations of space (non-territorial dynamics) and time (contextual exterior). Territorial actors (such as MST, CUT, FTV and CTA) are constructed (and are being constructed) within three ongoing non-territorial dynamics which are essentially embedded in the practice of societal actors; and also necessarily disembedded from such practice. In other words, they represent cross-organisational dynamics that transform organisational practices as result of their enactment of such a dynamic. As a consequence, the original territoriality marking particular social practices drifts away towards the development of a more universal non-territorial dynamic.

I differentiate three (spatial) non-territorial dynamics: Self-organising: it sets in motion grassroots activation in relation to established corporatist tradition; challenging hierarchical hegemonic arrangements. Networking: it sets in motion the interdependency between autonomous organisations and heteronymous cross-organisational networks. It challenges 'organisational strategic action' as well as 'organisation as vanguard'. It observes instead mechanisms of horizontal, cross-organisational 'deliberation by default' beyond instituted 'deliberation by design'. Demanding: it sets in motion societal action in relation to material demands. It provides the names upon which heterogeneous struggles are constructed, articulation enacted and differentiations established. It challenges the 'delegation hypothesis' and posits the dissolution of the distance between object and subject.

In turn, time in my thesis is expressed by the constitution of the exterior which is 'a relation of exterior' and not an 'independent outside'. It supplements the 'internal' formation of democratic subjectivities expressed by non-territorial dynamics by adding historicity in embracing the effects of radical contingency. Antagonistic Contextual Exterior: it is the result of the intersection between 'struggles from below' and 'policies from above' and because it enacts opposing antagonism between two parts it creates the effect of simplification of the political field. It integrates the role of the states in relation to practices of contestation which in turn institutes a fundamental relational context.

vi. Contribution

In what respect does Radical Democracy actually represent a contribution to the debate on democratisation in Argentina and Brazil in post-transition contexts?

Firstly, this thesis aims to contribute to the debate on democratisation in Latin American, whose democracy debate remains largely stagnated since (or due to) the Transition School. The interpretation this thesis puts forwards also aims to compete with alternative attempts to move the debate forward, as is the case of the participatory democracy approach.

Secondly, it also seeks to contribute to the global debate on democratisation. Within a familiar theoretical understanding on democratisation, that is, assuming the desestructuration

of the modern subject, recent interpretations of democracy in Europe suggested the notion of *politics of simulation* (Blühdorn, 2009). Interestingly, my thesis on democracy in South America posits a substantially different idea (*democracy as enactment of politics*) within a familiar theoretical understanding on democratisation. It proves both the vitality of the Radical Democracy approach and the need to develop a comparative research agenda to understand discrepancies better. In order to undertake the latter, polished theoretical concepts tested against empirical reference are essential and this thesis aims to make a contribution to this understanding.

vii. Structure of the thesis

The thesis is structured in three parts, this introduction, seven chapters and conclusions. The first part of the thesis is devoted to identifying the research problem and my proposed hypothesis in relation to existing literature. Chapter one posits the theoretical underpinning of the argument elaborating on contributions and pitfalls of literature on Transition, Participatory Democracy, Social Movement Studies and Radical Democracy. In chapter two I discuss the context of the research, specific empirical references and how I propose to articulate the former and the latter in relation to the research problem.

The second part of the thesis studies implications of the relationships analysed separately in the first part. It sets in motion every component instituting democratic subjectivities and suggests the development of two differentiable moments holding equally differentiable implications to the democratisation process: disagreement and participation. In my conclusions, I highlight the relevance of research findings, point out limitations and introduce future research explorations.

PART I: Researching Democracy in Contexts of ‘Consolidated Democracies’

The first part of the thesis is centred in explaining the relevance of researching democracy and processes of democratisation in post-authoritarian contexts in which political systems have achieved a significant degree of electoral consolidation. I discuss competing theoretical approaches paying special attention to those dominating the democracy debate in Latin America. In addition, I posit a working hypothesis engaging critically with a Radical Democracy perspective whose assumptions frame this research. Also, I identify limitations within Radical Democracy in particular regarding the distance between its polished philosophical debates and limited sociological analysis; a gap this thesis aims to contribute to narrow.

Part I also introduces the historical period of analysis, regional relevant context information and case studies upon which reflections and rationale are constructed. Moreover, I explain the rationale underlying this thesis in relation to the research questions and methods used for the construction of research data.

I divide the above-mentioned in two chapters. I firstly discuss the theoretical underpinning and secondly outline the context of the research and methods used to undertake this project.

Chapter 1: Interrogating Democracy. From Political Regimes to Politics

'Strictly speaking, democracy is not a form of state. It is always beneath and beyond these forms. Beneath, insofar as it is the necessarily egalitarian, and necessarily forgotten, foundation of the oligarchic state. Beyond, insofar as it is the public activity that counteracts the tendency of every state to monopolize and depoliticize the public sphere.' (Rancière, 2006: 71)

Introduction

The debate on democracy is as rich as it is extensive but in the context of Latin America it gains particular strength in the light of long-lasting dictatorships shaping the socio-political arena of its recent fascinating history. Discussing democracy therefore means discussing also the conceptions of social order, insubordination, economy, politics, the nature of continuity and change, the subject of change and so forth.

Dictatorships are no longer the rule in the continent which has, more recently, enjoyed almost 30 years of free and competitive elections; but social sciences interpretations forged under the dictatorship spectrum continue to dominate the debate. Their foundational analysis, as well as more recent developments, within the same philosophical principles constitutes a necessary point of departure to re-think democracy issues in South America today. Social movement literature has remained subordinated to the principles and development of The Transition Perspective. More recently, studies accentuating participatory democracy challenged the emphasis on 'regime change' and 'regime consolidation' suggesting the importance of integrating subaltern actors into the quest for democracy.

In this chapter I seek to critically explore theories of democracy in the light of the idea of *enacting equality* in order to argue in favour of Radical Democracy as the fundamental debate guiding this thesis. Democracy as enacting equality comes full circle, departing from its narrow sense of representation and moving closer to its foundational meaning of self-government. I follow Therborn (2007: 79) in reading social theory as 'strung between two

poles...as explanatory framework for a set of social phenomena [and] as an attempt to make sense of such phenomena' (el-Ojeili, 2009: 40). I contest that both Transition School and Participatory Democracy perspective posit different theoretical limitations to the analysis of democratisation as transformative socio-political action. My contention is that the narrative of democracy needs to engage with the production of democratic subjectivities in order to give account to potentials and limitations of enacting equality, that is, the production of politics in post-transition contexts.

Firstly, I discuss the spurious relationship between democracy and representation. Secondly, I discuss contributions and limitations of Transition School. Thirdly, I assess Participatory Democracy in the light of its epistemological foundations. Fourthly, I introduce the Radical Democracy approach which ideas inspire the analytical model this thesis puts forward. Final remarks anticipate the task of the following chapter building on reflections presented in this one.

1.1 Representative Democracy

The modern concept of representative democracy is constructed upon a fundamental displacement which Madison describes as being the '*total exclusion of the people in their collective capacity from any share in the latter, and not in the total exclusion of the representatives of the people from the administration of the former*' (Madison, 'Federalist 10': 81 in Manin, 1997: 2).

It was not until the United States of America drafted its Constitution in 1787 that the notion of representative government was created and as a consequence the ancient notion of democracy was paired with the modern notion of representation. Madison, Hamilton and others, all of them authors of the famous journal *The Federalist*, elaborated on what up until then had been thought as antagonistic elements in the formation of the political system: the advancement of universal suffrage (adult, male), on the one hand, and the conservation of private property, on the other. The Federalists were primarily pragmatics in stating, unlike Rousseau, that the idea of self-government was utopia. Democracy was primarily seen as an institutional deterrent from tyranny encompassing the preservation of property rights. Self-

government and equality were, as a consequence, left outside of the equation. Democracy was negotiated through mediation mechanisms between the people and the formation of government that permeated democracy debates ever since: institutions and representation. As suggested by Manin (1993), to a large extent, the foundation of representative democracy not only lay philosophically and historically disconnected to Greek ancient democracy but it essentially withdrew the idea of self-government in return for the notion of representation.

Two competing perspectives of democracy emerged within the liberal tradition in the Twentieth Century, each providing different accounts of the process of liberalisation as well as the understanding of the path towards modernisation. Both (Neo)Corporativism, on the one hand, and Pluralism on the other, support the need for political liberalisation but disagreed on the understanding of the relationship between organisations, politics and society. Robert Dahl (1971, 1982, 2000) is the prominent author of the latter tradition, whereas it is Philippe Schmitter (1974, Schmitter and Lehmbruch, 1979) who most emphatically proposes to revisit the notion of corporatism in the 1970s in order to precisely question some of the assumptions of pluralists ideas. They both want to narrow the gap between democracy theory and existing socio-political arrangements but assess the situation differently. For Dahl (2000) democracy resembles ‘goals that we cannot attain ourselves’ (: 35) which is why he advance an operational notion of democracy that he distinguished by introducing the notion of *Polyarchy*: a political system which is different from ancient self-government as well as from existing oligarchic and authoritarian regimes. Literally meaning ‘the government of the many’ (opposing the ‘government of the few’), the notion of Polyarchy supports rather than questions the notion of representative democracy as conceived by The Federalists. Moreover, Dahl puts forward a set of needed criteria for the generation of egalitarian entitlement to participate and therefore for an association of individuals can therefore be called democratic. These criteria are: effective participation, equality in voting, gaining enlightened understanding, exercising final control over agenda and inclusion of adults (Dahl, 2000: 38). If any condition is violated, members of the association or citizens of the country will not experience the egalitarian political status that is necessary for the establishment of democracy.

Labour organisations make collective action more effective although their effects tend to be detrimental to the administration of public goods, according to the Theory of Collective Action based on the Rational Choice paradigm (Olson, 1965, Buchanan and Tullock, 1962). Followers of the pluralist version of democracy, and influenced by Schumpeter, Olson,

Buchanan and Tullock include proponents of the radical defence of private property, markets, free enterprise, limited government and libertarianism within democracy narratives. Unlike corporatists, their unit of analysis is the individual and they assume an instrumental (therefore neutral) notion of the state. For this tradition the formation of collective action is governed by Game Theory-inspired 'prisoner dilemma' which suggests that collective cooperation endeavour are bound to fail by the same *logic* of individual action, dominated by the maximisation of individual gains (Sartori, 2005: 264).

Institutions, more specifically political institutions, became the centre of theoretical concern as one way to deal with collective action 'dilemmas'. If the logic of individual action was threatened by uncertainties and 'external costs', when individual becomes collective action; as a consequence, and accepting the former as point of departure, uncertainties needed to be reduced and the cost of externalities lowered. New institutionalism of Douglass North (1990) greatly influences the perception of institutions of those concerned about 'transition' and 'consolidation'. They support the notion that the 'rules of the game' governing the formation of society tend to 'reduce uncertainty by providing a structure to everyday life' (North, 1990:1-5). Institutions are, following the same metaphor, different from 'players' (or entrepreneurs) whose aim is to 'win the game' within given set of rules. There are noticeable parallels between Olson and North. The interaction between organisations or agents and institutions therefore becomes an essential aspect in the analysis of institutional development and institutional change. North (1990) suggests that the resultant path of institutional change is shaped by the incentive structures provided by institutions and by the feedback process by which human beings perceive and react to change in the opportunity setting (1990: 7). The innovation in North's perspective on institutions is that he takes into consideration not only the effects of formal institutions but also the importance of informal constraints as a relevant source of *path dependency* (1990: 40).

The emergence of mass democracy needs to be assessed for the Corporatist Approach in relation to processes of industrialisation, global reorganisation of capital and the role of the working class and its organisations as a gravitating collective influencing the depth and direction of the democratisation wave. Corporatism is a form of interest intermediation (rather than representation) rivalling other means of group politics such as the one proposed by the pluralist views of interest group (Schmitter and Lehmbruch, 1979). They question whether formal interest associations transmit the preferences of their members and whether

such representation is a major task of these groups. Corporatists pay attention to the mode of structuration of such efforts in modern societies inscribing its perspective into a Parsonian structural-functionalism. Alongside the political participation undertaken by citizens they notice the presence of centralised groups, corporatist structures which function in practice as representational bodies adding (and eventually replacing) political representational modes. Corporatists (or neocorporatists) restrict the concept of corporatism, in terms of its praxis, to release it from the ideological use (Schmitter, 1974: 86 and 87), primarily associated within fascisms. Schmitter (1974) defines corporatism:

‘as a system of interest representation in which units are organized into a limited number of singular, compulsory, non-competitive, hierarchically ordered and functionally differentiated categories, recognized or licensed (if not created) by the state, and granted a deliberate representational monopoly within their respective categories in exchange for controlling selection of leaders as well as the articulation of demands and supports’ (: 93, 94).

In a nutshell, corporate arrangements reflect the formation of formal and informal institutions which are different from what pluralists called intense minorities.

Studies inscribed in this tradition (Collier, 1999, Collier and Collier, 2002) interestingly integrate not only the relationship between collective formations (proletarian, bourgeoisies) vis-à-vis democratisation but equally highlight the positive role of labour movement organisations in pushing for liberalisation *and* redistribution. In their own language, initial incorporation of the labour movement supposes the presence of *critical junctures* that matter insofar as it cements the institutional framework, which in turn affects democratisation processes (Collier and Collier, 2002). Unlike pluralists the unity of analysis for corporatist is the working class and not the individual. The objective of researching democratisation needs to centre therefore in the role of the working class, as well as the interaction between the working class pressure and elite choice within given scenarios. Although they tend to use the wording ‘bourgeoisie democracy’ their Marxist background is limited by its articulation within the social democratic agenda.

Beyond the many differences between authors reviewed above, all of them share the same understanding of the path from traditional to modern society, i.e., the idea of ‘modernisation’. Democracy represents, in all cases, a dependant variable of established capitalist relationships.

The latter does not guarantee the development of the former but it constitutes a necessary prerequisite:

‘Our theoretical grounds, our assumption is that at least a nontrivial degree of market autonomy and ownership diversity in the economy is necessary to produce the independence and liveliness of civil society so that it can make its contribution to a democracy’ (Linz and Stepan, 1996: 11)

The emergence of the Transition School in Latin America needs to be understood within the debates reviewed above since their ideas ultimately influenced the meanings underpinning its theoretical formulations.

1.2 ‘Transition from...’

‘So when a group of scholars, many of them pro-democracy activists in their countries, gathered at the Wilson Centre in Washington in 1979 to analyse and strategize how this barbarism could be stopped, we thought in terms of “transition from”, from authoritarianism – that is, not “to” anything. Democracy was just what we did not like about authoritarianism. Hence we studied transitions *to* democracy without asking questions about democracy.’ (Przeworski, 2010: xii)

Przeworski’s confession coincides with Nun’s argument (2000: 11) that although oligarchic regimes, populisms and authoritarianism have been thoroughly debated in the Latin American region, this has not been the case with the democracy debate. It is surprising if we consider that the Transition perspective has been the dominant theoretical lenses used to look at democracy over the past 30 years. Avritzer (2002) seems correct on his observation about the theory of the transition to democracy when he points out:

‘Democratic elitism’s evident inability to explain Latin American authoritarianism using the tools it developed to analyze democracy in North America and Europe led some of its representatives to explain this failure through the introduction of a third element, an economic variable able to explain what its theoretical assumption could not’ (Avritzer, 2002: 25)

Avritzer’s critical view on the Transition School explains what I propose to review as the configuration of ‘two moments’ within the contribution of the Transition School. The first one centres its attention on the issues of transition and consolidation from authoritarian rule

on the bases of a procedural definition of democracy. The second moment formed in the late 1980s and early 1990s shows a tendency to displace its focus towards issues regarding the 'quality' of existing democracies. The configuration of the first moment was dominated by the use of a minimal definition of democracy understood as political liberalisation but was as equally influenced by Dependency Theory (Cardoso and Faletto, 1979) as the counter-narrative of mainstream modernisation discourse (Valenzuela and Valenzuela, 1978). The configuration of the second moment, however, seems to return to the traditional conception of modernity encompassed by a closer formulation to Democracy as Polyarchy.

It is useful to illustrate the configuration of the first moment by looking at two studies about the transition in Brazil, i.e., 'Entrepreneurs and the Transition Process: the Brazilian case' (Cardoso, 1986) and 'Challenges to Democratization in Brazil' (O'Donnell, 1988). These articles were published one and three years correspondently after Tancredo Neves¹ was elected by the Electoral College marking Brazil's political liberalisation in Brazil. Also, they propose different assessments on the transition in Brazil which makes them particularly relevant articles from which to assess the transition literature within this first moment.

Cardoso's (1986) article studies the role of entrepreneurs in Brazil's political liberalisation granting particular attention to the behaviour of the private sector between the 1964 coup and the 1985 political liberalisation. Within the private sector he refers to the industrial sector as the leading actor within the Brazilian business community. The core of the argument suggests that political democratisation was the result of substantial shifts in the behaviour of industrialist towards democratic liberalisation. Transition was the result of shifts in 'sectors of the vanguard of the industrial bourgeoisie' (Cardoso, 1986: 140) who understood that they had to change attitude to secure economic development and secure their own interests. Cardoso criticises understanding industrialists as the institutors of the progressive national bourgeoisie whose entrepreneurial role consisted in taking control of the state to put it at the service of economic development. In this respects he relies on his own previous work (Cardoso and Faletto, 1979) by suggesting that the entrepreneurial role of the national bourgeoisie in dependent countries is limited (Cardoso, 1986: 138). However, his argument implies a degree of separation of the industrialist bourgeoisie from the state in which core authoritarian elements are reduced to the military and the abstract notion of the bureaucracy.

¹ He never managed to take presidential oath as became severely ill. Jose Sarney, his Vice-President, took office instead and lead transition to the 'New Republic'.

Democratisation for Cardoso was the effect of military policies the private sector did not like (Cardoso, 1986: 143). In sum, political coexistence seems secure for Cardoso because the bourgeoisie gradually recognised its own historical role, put it in practice and triggered a controlled liberalisation of Brazil's political regime.

Cardoso's interpretation of political liberalisation constitutes an implicit critique to the ideas supporting O'Donnell's Bureaucratic-Authoritarian State (O'Donnell, 1982), a system which has as its main feature the political exclusion of a previously activated popular sector. O'Donnell extends the idea of authoritarianism into the analysis of Brazil's political liberalisation (O'Donnell, 1988) suggesting that transition from military rule was undertaken despite, rather than in spite, of the Brazilian national bourgeoisie, which he does not hesitate to qualify as 'profoundly authoritarian' (O'Donnell, 1988: 294). He suggests that democratisation was more the result of labour political activation (although weak at organisation levels) which forced the bourgeoisie into negotiations and concessions rather than the result of autonomous-behavioural shifts of the bourgeoisie. The existing level of suppression of citizenship and political exclusion in Brazil turned Brazil's democracy into *Democradura*: 'civilian government controlled by military and authoritarian elements' (O'Donnell, 1988: 282). O'Donnell thought that Brazil's apparent advantage in experiencing greater political and economic prosperity and less repression under military rule actually turned into an obstacle for democratisation. It made people less enthusiastic about democratic rule and, above all, guaranteed the influence of old actors in new institutions. In turn, the latter created two effects a) disaffection of the population with democracy and b) reproduction of elitism under democratically constituted institutions. Because transition to democracy rule was less traumatic, Brazil did not have to 'reinvent the state' (O'Donnell, 1988: 287) which actually continued to be governed by the same practices and eventually by the same sectors. Enduring patronage relationships, on the one hand, and the existence of archaic labour relations (with workers lacking legal backing for the right of representation at the plant level) on the other, seriously downplayed the consolidation of democracy in Brazil.

The point of disagreement between the two authors seems apparent and relates to the role played by the bourgeoisie in Brazil's liberalisation process. Despite Cardoso's recognition of the preponderance of corporatist practices, he argues that the private sector commanded liberalisation in Brazil. It remains unclear, however, why they preferred 'uncertain' autonomy from the state rather than 'secure' corporatist trade-offs under the military. O'Donnell in turn

maintains that it was precisely the reactionary businessmen who tightly controlled liberalisation and ultimately undermined further democracy consolidation. The weak and fragmented working class prevented Brazil's political opening from the necessary interlocutor in the structuration of democracy. As a consequence, the bourgeoisie did not encounter the working class as 'other' with whom they had to negotiate with but as an 'inferior' object of domination (through patronage relationships).

They both agree, however, in two substantial matters: 1) Democracy corresponds to a critical idea of modernisation and 2) the operational definition of democracy remains minimal. As earlier suggested by Przeworski (2010) the founders of the Transition School were basically concerned about understanding the causes of authoritarianism. O'Donnell and Cardoso agree on the idea that the development of political tolerance and coexistence need to be put in complex relationships with broader notions of modernisation of society. Cardoso uses Gramsci and O'Donnell uses Weber to suggest that a more complex society is likely to become democratic. However, the tension between the two remains arguably without resolution which I think represents the most important contribution of the Transition in this first moment. In addition, they also use a minimal or 'procedural' (Linz and Stepan, 1996) definition of democracy basically constructed upon opposition to dictatorships which is why O'Donnell suggested a different concept (Democradura) to name the Brazilian case. This ambiguity is further stretched during the 'second moment' which informs Transition scholars' contribution to the debate in the 1990s as well as raises fundamental theoretical problems that justify the need for a reassessment.

I posit that in the 1990s 'Transitologists' shifted towards the 'mainstreaming' of modernity (opposed to alternative modernity) as well as in the emphasis on 'literal democracy' (opposed to procedural democracy dominating the 1980s). These shifts configure a second moment within Transition contribution to the debate on democracy in the region. I argue that the second moment is marked by the complete separation between the social and the political. It stresses the importance of political institutions aligning the meaning of democracy to 'stability' rather than 'self-government', ultimately conveying conservation rather than progressive movement.

This second moment is featured by the multiplication of democracy labels such as transitional democracies, delegative democracy, democracies of low intensity, relative democracies,

uncertain and even, authoritarian democracies (Nun, 2000: 11). I briefly review first and discuss next the article ‘Delegative Democracy?’² (O'Donnell, 1994) which has had important repercussion on academic literature as well as in policy making and helps to illustrates the shifts I am talking about. The article focuses on Latin America although its theoretical implication goes beyond the region and it was published six years after O'Donnell's article on Brazil reviewed above.

The article addresses what O'Donnell calls a ‘new species’, a type of existing democracy different from the representative, that he calls Delegative Democracy (DD); and which specificity is not strictly related to the type of transition they emerged from. It concerns newly installed democracies (Argentina, Brazil, Peru, Ecuador, Bolivia, Philippines, Korea, and many postcommunists countries), that is democracies effectively meeting Robert Dahl's criteria for the definition of polyarchy, yet do not seem to be on the path towards becoming representative democracies (O'Donnell, 1994: 56). They are democracies undergoing the ‘second transition’ and according to the author the ‘crucial element determining the success of the second transition is the building of a set of institutions that become important decisional points in the flow of political power’ (O'Donnell, 1994: 56). Influenced by Neo-Institutionalism *à la* North (1990), O'Donnell says that democratic institutions are those in direct relationship with decision-making, more specifically, political parties, congress, judiciary and fair elections. Institutions are essential in this second transition because they tend to aggregate and stabilize the aggregation of the level of action. Rules established by institutions affect actors' strategic decisions and therefore stabilize expectations. He defines DD as:

‘Delegative democracies rest on the premise that whoever wins election to presidency is thereby entitled to govern as he or she sees fit, constrained only by the hard fact of existing power relation and by constitutionally limited terms in office’ (O'Donnell, 1994: 59)

He admits that representation entails a degree of delegation but the difference within DD lies in the lack of accountability. In consolidated democracies representatives are held responsible for their actions by those they claim to be entitled to speak for (O'Donnell, 1994: 61). In DD things are different because of institutional weakness. Although DD entails vertical

² I return to the discussion of this paper in Chapter 5.

accountability (fair elections) it does not hold horizontal accountability, namely, competing autonomous powers, which according to the author are crystallised in institutions independent from government. He recognises that an additional degree of complexity is given by the inherited socioeconomic problems in which newly democracies operate. The combination of economic crises, institutional weakness and distrust in the government's capability to resolve the situation leads actors to short-term decision making strategies which produces a 'prisoner dilemma' scenario. He concludes that the only way out to avoid repetition of the *delegative* cycle lies on the leadership rewriting the terms under which they compete and govern (O'Donnell, 1994: 68).

There are three elements emerging from O'Donnell's article which need to be critically assessed: modernisation, participation and elitism. Firstly, although in the past he has been a strong sceptic of the modernisation theory (economic modernisation erodes 'traditional' social institutions and ultimately brings Western liberal democracy) DD partly reproduces modernisation fundamentals in the separation between the political and social sphere. According to Panizza (2000: 737) modernisation in Latin America meant the transformation from state-centric matrix of economic development models towards free-market economies. His argument is that the massive penetration of 'modernity' (free-market reforms) in Latin American societies in the 1990s needs to be explained precisely by enduring 'old politics', i.e., remainings of traditional society. The causal interrelationships between enduring political practices (patronage and clientelism) and the changing economic realm explain governments' effectiveness and rooms for manoeuvre. It challenges, as a consequence, the 'erosion' hypothesis and suggests actually the opposite idea.

Secondly, the DD was criticised as 'one-sided' (Peruzzotti, 2001) because it does not account for innovative processes of participation parallel to the 'consolidation' of political institutions. 'While the model rightly highlights cultural and structural variables that conspire against democratic consolidation, it fails to recognise those dynamics that might be leading those societies away from praetorianism and authoritarianism' (Peruzzotti, 2001: 139). Peruzzotti seems correct when he argues that transition literature shows disenchantment with recent political processes (Peruzzotti, 2001: 134). Within transition years civil association processes from below challenge the idea of civil society underdevelopment (O'Donnell, 1994) as well as the narrow understanding of political culture primarily as patronage relationships and clientelism (O'Donnell, 1994, Panizza, 2000). The role of social movements, human right

groups and civil associations in shaping political identities, in turn instituting norms and democratic behaviour are underscored if not ignored by the DD model. Contrary to what the DD model suggests, in Argentina for instance, political democratisation resulted in massive revitalisation of civil mobilisation and the institution of previously inexistent ‘public opinion’ (Panizza, 2000: 140).

Thirdly, DD model reproduces an elitist conception of democracy, something that permeates the Transition School throughout the second moment. The definition of democracy remains elitist because it ‘shares the view that democracy is dependent on the institutional rules for competitions between elites’ (Avritzer, 2002: 28). Differentiation between masses and elites lies beneath O’Donnell’s view on who should rewrite the rules to avoid repetition of the dependency cycle. Why would elites, as privileged actors in the design of democratic rules, feel compelled to act if not to guarantee their privilege position? In fact the ‘first O’Donnell’ contrasts plainly with the ‘second O’Donnell’. Transition School lacks the theoretical instruments to deal with changes from below, to theoretically digest dramatic changes occurring at the societal level that no longer resist the subordinated encapsulation into concept like ‘masses’ or ‘clienteles’. Democracy literature in the region, to some extent, encountered a process of ‘normative literality’ insofar as it aimed to forge the establishment of abstract models rather than to interpret the emergence of innovative practice. The contribution of Participatory Democracy draws attention to the twilight zone between innovative practices from below and democracy addressing in turn some of the critiques reviewed above.

1.3 Participatory Democracy and Complex Societies

Over the past 40 years and in the light of increasing social complexity, the democracy debate has been reassessed, rethinking processes through which communities govern themselves beyond the narrow terms of mainstream Political Science. Under the terms Participatory or Deliberative Democracy an array of different traditions, drawing on new theoretical frameworks as well as studying alternative actors and practices, revisited forms of production of the public sphere as vital socio-political space to discuss democracy and democratisation. Despite arguably enduring limitations, the process of reengagement of Critical Theory with the democracy debate represents a major contribution not only in the rediscovery of the

political implications of societal practices but also the reintegration of excluded issues vis-à-vis deepening democracy.

Habermas and the notion of the public sphere, on the one hand, and New Social Movement Theory (NSM), on the other, represent two interrelated though differentiable approaches in the contemporary debate about democracy. While the work of Habermas broadened the democracy debate by stretching theoretical horizons, NSM approach elaborated a useful repertoire of concepts for the understanding of collective action in general and contentious action in particular. Despite recognising the importance of their contribution I will argue in the review that follows that emphasis on the creation of ‘negotiation’, ‘participation’ and ‘consensus’ rightly integrates excluded subjects into new ‘dialogical spaces’ but incorrectly displaces the production of incommensurable disagreement and antagonistic conflict. As a consequence, democracy goes full circle from an issue concerning elites to a bottom-up process displacing power and the production of politics, i.e., the needed background to understand democracy as enacting equality.

1.3.1 Democracy and the Public Sphere

Habermas develops the notion of the public sphere in connection to his understanding of the formation of contemporary social world, i.e., a constructivist, non-linear theory of modernity resulting from the complex interaction between *system* and *lifeworld* (Habermas, 1987). In this work in particular Habermas suggests that the historical constitution of the bourgeoisie as a subject was not the result of direct action against the state but instead the effect of a process in which individuals were made equals in their capacity to demand from their rulers some public accountability. The transformation of the system (ancient regime) was the consequence, in Habermas’ terms, of the constitution of a new lifeworld (bourgeoisie) which in turn colonised the system. Lifeworld is a concept of Habermas’ ‘Theory of Communicative Action’ in which truth and rationality are constructs of communication, i.e., elements reachable through processes of dialogue and discussion between subjects (intersubjectivity). Action is for Habermas ‘mastery of situations’ (Habermas, 1987: 135) and mutual understanding refers to the consensual definition of a situation, that is the mutual agreement reached by participants in relation to the validity of an utterance. Lifeworld, thus, is related to the construction of participation through interaction aiming to forge mutual understanding.

It follows from the latter the elaboration of the notion of a public sphere (Habermas, 1989) as space relatively autonomous from the state and structural forms of domination in which new identities, cultures and subcultures as well as social movements can emerge and eventually challenge 'systemic' or dominant status quo. This understanding of the public sphere expands the horizon where to look for democracy and democratisation insofar as it integrated face-to-face interaction differentiated from the state. In the words of Avritzer, a follower of Habermas, who applied his ideas in the study of contemporary democracy in Latin America:

'In this space, individuals interact with one another, debate the actions taken by the political authorities, argue about the moral acceptability of private relations of domination, and make claims against the state. The concept of the public sphere incorporates into democratic theory the republican drive for participation without making it a form of administration. Individuals within a democratic sphere discuss and deliberate without political issues and adopt strategies for making the political authorities sensitive to their discussions and deliberations.'
(Avritzer, 2002: 40 and 41)

The public sphere becomes, as a consequence, a space for horizontal interaction not necessarily embedded in multiple forms of domination; which can actually defy the latter as the result of deliberative participation. This conception is interesting because of two reasons: firstly, it unravels democracy from liberal modernisation. The constitution of lifeworld or new social movements remains open and hence not necessarily bounded to reproduce patterns of interaction or teleological functions. Although Habermas is pessimistic regarding the actual room for emancipatory struggles in the current context of globalisation (Edwards, 2008), his theoretical contribution implies that history remains an open process subject to struggles and conflict rather than the history object; from traditional (and 'backwards') society to modern (and 'civilised') regime. In other words, it recognises the increasing levels of complexity in contemporary society although rejects the Weberian 'iron cage' as inevitable result of it. Secondly, new issues can become political as result of deliberation and participatory practices. Politisation of new issues is not the result of voluntary action but rather the effect of the theoretical desacralisation of public sphere. Deliberation and participation channelled through alternative means, namely, social movements (and not necessarily political institutions) can create innovation by diffusing new problems into the public sphere. Political issues are the result of struggles and disputes and not the consequence of functionalists' determinations.

The work of Habermas inspired studies in the region which had the virtue of connecting new territories to the debate of democracy and democratisation; albeit showing an attempt to formalise a debate Habermas rightly leaves open. A recent influential example is the proposed notion of Empowered Deliberative Democracy (EDD) (Fung and Wright, 2001), a model proposed through the study of empirical experiments of ‘deepening democracy’. Looking at experiences like Participatory Budgeting in Brazil, among other experiences of direct democracy, they find the following commonalities: 1) they hold ‘practical orientation’, that is they are not organically linked to either political parties or social movements and, as a consequence, they tend to deliberate over specific problems. 2) They propose mechanisms of bottom-up participation, increasing in turn accountability between decisions and decision-making process; and 3) they tend to focus on finding solutions to ‘real-world’ problems. It gives participants a ‘good reason’ to get involved in collective action.

By the same token, this model proposes a reassessment of the Transition debate in delving into the constitution of a public sphere as something different from the political society; in the supposition that the expansion of the former increases accountability in the latter (Avritzer, 2007, Avritzer, 2002, Melucci and Avritzer, 2000). They claim that societal actors like human right organisations contribute to weave the fabric upon which demands are constructed and accountability processes eventually emerge, deepening democratisation in the region. This conclusion challenges Transition School that posited the problems of the ‘second transition’ precisely in the gap created between the recently empowered political society and the enduring disempowered civil society. Methodologically, the work of Avritzer as well as Fung and Wright suppose a significant contribution to democracy theory. As Avritzer points out:

‘My method in this chapter is the reverse of that adapted by Linz...Instead of departing from the likelihood that practices that emerged at the public level will be integrated by political society (parties, parliament, and the state administration), and hence that political accountability is a necessary consequence of democratisation, I assume that the relation between public social actors and the reconstituted political society has to be derived directly from the logic of the transition itself and the specific means by which political society was reconstituted’ (Avritzer, 2002: 106)

The hypothesis behind deliberative democracy lies on the likelihood that new participatory experiments and societal innovations colonise state power instituting, in turn, incremental democratic governance. The coexistence of discussion-based democracy alongside existing state power was readdressed under the notion of ‘enclave participation’ (Karpowitz et al., 2009). Karpowitz et al conclude that deliberative democracy has successfully moved democracy debate beyond the rigid norms of consensus. The issue of equal participation within heterogeneous groupings remains an unresolved problem insofar as the powerful, for instance, tend to prevail over the less powerful reproducing, as a consequence, existing inequalities (Karpowitz et al., 2009: 601- 604). However, it is suggested that the instrumentation of civic forums within homogenous groups may result in political inclusion of the marginalised as it implies developing a space for ‘equal foot’ deliberation.

The tension cutting across ‘real world’ deliberative experiments vis-à-vis institutions, state and institutionalisation dynamics has also received a critical assessment. Although in line with the need to question democracy ‘broken promises’ (Bobbio, 1987: 16) hypothesis, it was suggested that ‘in some cases, ‘invited spaces’ have been translated into institutional landscape in which entrenched relations of dependency, fear and disprivilege undermine the possibility for the kind of deliberative decision making they are meant to foster’(Cornwall, 2004: 2).

A more fundamental critique of the Habermasian conception of public sphere was posited by Nancy Fraser (1990) who disagree with thinking that the public sphere is one and universal. For Fraser, Habermas idealises the formation of an official public sphere therefore undermining the coexistence of competing publics in what represents an indirect attempt to abstract deliberation from the effects of societal inequalities. Yet Fraser finds the idea of reconciliation of values through undistorted communication more problematic, because this resolution would implicate the abolition of conflict and therefore politics. The emergence of parallel discursive arenas where members of subordinated social groups invent and circulate counter discourses allows, for Fraser, the formation of subaltern counter publics, essential for democracy. Insofar as these materialise in response to exclusions within dominant publics, they expand the discursive space by making assumptions that were previously exempt from contestation, now able to be publicly argued out (Fraser, 1990: 66 and 67).

On a similar wavelength Laclau (2001a) states that democracy is built upon the following paradox: it asserts an unmediated universality which, however, can only be obtained on the basis of universalising some particularity within the community (Laclau, 2001a: 4). Such tension needs to be embraced rather than suppressed because it constitutes democracy condition of possibility. This reasoning rejects as a consequence ‘foundational universalisms’ (*à la* Habermas) as well as particularism which denies the possibility of any kind of mediating logic between incompatible language games (Laclau, 2001a: 5). It represents the understanding of democracy that this thesis is built upon and what I put forward in the final section of this chapter. Before, I need to explore fundamental contributions and limitations of New Social Movements Theory.

1.3.2 Democracy and New Social Movements

During the 1970s and 1980s an academic movement embarked in the process of rethinking state-society relations that they thought were ideologically trapped within the Liberal and Marxist grand narratives. The contribution of the New Social Movement (NSMs) literature highlighted the limitations of a state-centred system of governance, raising awareness of the importance of looking at alternative means to explain agency in social sciences. The importance of NSM literature to the field of democracy and subaltern studies rests on the successful reconnection between otherwise ‘dysfunctional’ social action and the quest for democracy. Equally, movement actors are critical of liberal democracy and the party system and propose alternatives to parliamentary democracy (Martin, 2004: 29). It represents a bottom-up, grassroots version of democracy rather than a top-down approach whereby participants in collective action must themselves, ‘assume direct responsibility for intervening in the political decision-making process’ (della Porta and Diani, 1999: 242 in Martin, 2004: 29) .

The influential work of Alain Touraine, Alberto Melucci, Claus Offe and Jürgen Habermas, among others, contributed to shape the contours of this new approach in social sciences. Original formulations of social movement studies added the adjective *new* in order to emphasise the need to research socio-political change beyond the constitution of *old* subjects, namely, the labour movement. The influence of post-war alternative groupings (women’s

movement, Black Power movement, peace mobilisations, green movement, students' campaigns, etc.) remained subordinated to the overwhelming concentration on workers' organisations (Faulks, 1999: 88).

Touraine (1981) opened the book *The Voice & The Eye: An Analysis of Social Movements* by stating:

‘Men make their own history: social life is produced by cultural achievements and social conflicts, and at the heart of society burns the fire of social movements...society is the drama, it is a play not of situation or intent, but of action and social relations’(: 1).

Touraine considers that social movements are something different from class, as for Marxist thinkers. Social movements struggle against movements for the control of *historicity* structured upon different value systems rather than different material positions in a given structural order. Culture, identity and symbolic mediation represent for Touraine non-deterministic elements in the organisation of collective behaviour and the production of conflict. These elements cannot be reduced to antagonisms over the material means of production. In a similar line, Melucci (1996) says that social movements represent signs that anticipate pathways before their content becomes transparent. Against this situation social scientists can either try to ‘solve’ them or to ‘listen to them’ (Melucci, 1996: Introduction) in what represents a clear NSMs epistemological and methodological contribution to the field of political sociology. Induction of first-hand accounts therefore becomes essential for the interpretation of social action which cannot be deduced from abstract theoretical narratives but reconstructed (interpreted) from specific situations.

John McCarthy, Mayer Zald, Charles Tilly and Doug McAdams developed in the US a perspective on social movement which became known as *Resource Mobilisation* due to its emphasis on ‘external’ drivers to explain similar phenomena to European counterparts. For Tilly (1978: 7), for instance, who studies social movements in relation to the political process, collective action is the result of the complex interrelation within interest, organisation, mobilisation and opportunity. It would be wrong to argue that collective action is the result from the presence of *one* of the latter. There are no self-evident interests, organisations, mobilisation processes or opportunities that could explain agency alone but, instead, it is the particular interaction of these elements that explains the development of social movements

(Tilly, 1978: 14). The rise and fall of social movements explains for Tilly the expansion and contractions of democratic opportunities. Interestingly, he calls social movements a 'distinctive form of contentious politics':

'contentious in the sense that social movements involve collective making of claim that, if realised, would conflict with someone else's interests, politics in the sense that government of one sort or another figure somehow in the claim making, whether as claimants, objects of claims, allies of the object, or monitors of the contention' (Tilly, 2004b: 3).

Beyond the initial division in NSMs literature between the 'American' tradition, focused on the single issue movement, and the 'European' tradition, focused on major societal changes, identity and class formation (Olofsson, 1988), both perspectives tended to converge towards the common understanding of a few key theoretical formulations. An example of the latter was the participation of both American and European scholars to the publication of *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements* (McAdam et al., 1996). The attempt to produce a unifying synthesis is based on three pillar ideas: political opportunities, mobilising structures and framing processes. Political opportunities involve institutionalised politics, social movements and revolutions. The latter is activated in response to changes in the former, namely, the politico-institutional level (McAdam et al., 1996: 2 and 3). Mobilising structures represent a concept that, at a meso-level of analysis. It refers to both formal and informal vehicles through which people mobilise and engage in collective action and speak about the dynamics of movements. More specifically, it involves groups, organisations and informal networks that comprise collective building blocks of social movements and revolutions as well as informal grassroots mobilisation structures (McAdam et al., 1996: 3 and 4). Finally, framing processes make references to symbolic meaning-creation and sharing resulting from either feeling aggrieved by something or happy to participate in a collective endeavour. Developed originally by Smelser, Goffman and Snow, framing processes makes reference to the cultural and ideological practices articulating a growing discontent (McAdam et al., 1996: 5).

NSMs literature, Resource Mobilisation approach and Political Opportunity Structures, as new social science reflections that emerged in the late 1960s and 1970s, successfully helped to interrogate the formation and development of collective action in post-industrial societies, expanding the empirical understanding of political processes (Van Cott, 2005). Its impact has

irradiated many disciplines influencing positively theories of democracy in at least one fundamental respect: NSMs literature has produced theoretical interpretations to an interesting array of different, and to some extent new, empirical phenomena. It brought back to the centre the problematisation of empirical issues such as networks, organisations, demands, social protest, campaigns, petitions, etc. Social protest has moved from a sporadic feature of democratic politics, to become a perpetual element in modern life, in the formation of ‘social movement society’ (Meyer and Tarrow, 1998). Likewise, it has been argued that networks as the relationships across organisations and groupings have moved from metaphor to substance (Diani and McAdam, 2003, Castells, 2010). Researching into the presence and influence of such elements has become a necessity to understand democratisation practices occurring in post-industrial societies.

However, I see two important flaws in some aspects of NSMs literature: firstly, the tendency to theoretically over-conceptualise by aiming to ‘capture’ every nuance of collective behaviour is counterproductive. It is within the movements and changing dynamisms of the social world where innovation and creativity flourish and not in the mind of social scientists. As a consequence, in epistemological terms, a theoretical framework needs to be sufficiently critical but equally sufficiently open to allow data to speak and not to make it speak through closed abstract formulations. Thus, NSMs literature in its actual advanced state presents the risk of what it originally aimed to overcome.

Secondly, despite Tilly’s attempt to relate the literature to the production of political processes, there is a fundamental disjunction between cultural, civil society behaviour and institutionalised politics. The inference is that the power of contemporary social movements is likely to be ‘ephemeral’ (Tormey, 1995: 378 and 379) because the focus on functionalist and empirical characterisation emphatically displaces attention to emancipation and radical transformation. ‘A social movement is not the movement of a sociological group. It is a movement of subjects, of people who try to find or apprehend an identity as fighters through the very dismissal of their sociological identity, the identity given to them by a social order’ (Rancière in Huyssen et al., 1992: 80). In other words, social movements are not necessarily revolutionary but neither exclusively societal. It is through the interrogation of politics as presented by the Radical Democracy perspective, through the formation of democratic subjectivities, by which democracy and democratisation research successfully integrates complexity without displacing emancipation.

1.4 Radical Democracy

A group of authors, sharing the post-industrial hypothesis that assumes greater complexity and fragmentation of society but without ruling out the question of emancipation; and interrupting a long history of separation between left-thinking and democracy, proposed to revisit the notion of democracy in the light of practices and processes of enacting equality. The work of Laclau, Mouffe, Castoriadis, Deleuze and Guattari, Rancière, Heller, Derrida, Bauman, Žižek and Badiou, among others, suggest a tradition that departs from Marx-*ism* but not from the *spectre* of Marx (Therborn, 2008, Tormey, 2001). It departs from evolutionists' vision of society, and proposes re-engagement with emancipatory struggles in the context of post-fordist system of accumulation (Gorz, 1998).

In what follows I first summarise important features common to the Radical Democracy tradition, secondly, I point out specific nuances as revealed through Ranciere, Laclau and Mouffe in relation to the construction of the analytical framework underpinning this thesis. Thirdly, I address critiques and suggest there is a gap in the analysis of Democracy in Latin American in post-transition contexts. I highlight the gap in the literature by raising a counter-point in relation to democracy in Europe, interpreted as *simulation* (Blühdorn, 2009), on the one hand, and my thesis on democracy in South America that posits a substantially different approach although within a familiar theoretical understanding on democratisation, on the other. It recognises both the vitality of the Radical Democracy approach and the need to develop a comparative research agenda to better understand discrepancies.

1.4.1 Global Transformations vis-à-vis Radical Rethinking

Historical factors led to major rethinking of formerly stable categories of political theory. Under the influence of what the literature labelled as post-structuralism and post-Marxism³, changes on ideas about history, class and state, i.e., modernity, subject and power, became

³ I personally dislike the label post-Marxism and agree with Perhaps Beilharz (2007) in saying that 'in the long run, postmarxism will surely be known as Marxism' (el-Ojeili, 2010: 263).

among the most significant dominating philosophical shifts⁴. I briefly mark three major transformations and their subsequent implications in political theory.

Global transformation 1: The world experienced multidimensional changes during the 1960s and 1970s, and these marked an end of a period of capitalist unprecedented expansion and growth. The oil crises led to the end of a period of stable monetary system which signalled a new moment of global interdependence dominated primarily by financial exchanges and the consequent increasing separation between the financial and industrial capital. The rise and expansion of multinational Companies (MNCs) alongside the instrumentation of production systems based on downsizing and flexible working conditions led to shifts from mass production (fordism) to ‘lean manufacturing’ of zero stock (postfordism or toyotism).

Global transformation 2: There was a general decline of the nation states as pivotal regulatory bodies governing the administration of social order at the expense of global interdependent dynamics of domination. Collapse of ‘really existing socialisms’ based on massive centralisation of control and planification. Crises of Eurocentrism led to a widening sense of generalised loss of faith in the state.

Global transformation 3: A range of insurgent movements emerged expressing heterogeneous social grievances and discontents. The May 1968 movement in France marked a turning point. Ethnic conflicts, separatisms, peace movements, student revolts and green organisations were among the many expressions of discontent that gained public visibility alongside workers’ protests. It marked the appearance of a new stable feature, such as the protest movements, in the context of transformation of the landscape of disagreement.

The above-mentioned global transformation in turn inspired radical philosophical and theoretical rethinking which could be observed in the revision of notions such as history, class and state. I signpost only briefly here some broad transformations in which Radical Democracy debate is inscribed, in order to discuss their implications later within the RD issues relevant to this project.

⁴ Assuming generalised consensus would be incorrect. However, I synthesise three general changes to set the general context in which a more specific discussion regarding my understanding of democracy is inscribed and that follows next.

‘bureaucracy made the Holocaust. And it made it in its own image’
(Bauman, 1989: 105 in Clarke et al., 2002: 121)

Radical rethinking 1: how could the Hegelian notion of history remain unchallenged after the Holocaust? The Holocaust happened not only in the mid the 20th century but also at the heart of Europe, in territory that hosted the both scientific Enlightenment and a faith in unstoppable technological progress in the light of the Industrial Revolution, both pillars of the Modernity underlying Western civilisation. Thinking of the Holocaust *inside* rather than *outside* modernity led many scholars (Bauman, Touraine, Castoriadis, Arendt, Castells, Hardt and Negri, Giddens, Gortz) to revise, criticise and challenge the notion of history as following a specific path, one predetermined by the purposeful movement of Spirit or class struggle through time. Concepts such as risk society, reflexive modernity, globalisation, post-modernity, post-development came into play when aiming to explain major socio-political transformations. The latter produced a moment of crises of metanarratives as ontological interpretations regarding the course of history. Fukuyama’s ‘end of history’ also expressed this debate but in the light of a reactionary hypothesis. On the other hand, history was interpreted as an open process rather than evolutionist and subject to the effects of radical *contingency*, namely, to ‘opaque’, ambiguous, open to contestation and new interpretations (Tormey and Townshend, 2006: 92). It is an open history without ultimate meanings. Against redemptive politics of radical universalism Castoriadis ‘rejects the ontology’s equation of being with ‘being determined’, underscoring instead the Abyss or groundlessness of being, insisting on the fundamental creativity entailed in the production of meaning and society, and the radical historicity and particularity of the forms and figures of social formations’ (Castoriadis 1987, 1997a; Howard and Pacom 1998 in el-Ojeili, 2010: 269). History remains undetermined, as an open system of relations within which ‘ultimate meaning’ is open to contestation.

Radical rethinking 2: contemporary world order is built upon networks rather than nation-states. The decentralisation of the state permeates the core of three competing and equally influential books such as ‘Empire’ (Hardt and Negri, 2002), ‘Change the World Without Taking the Power’ (Holloway, 2002) and ‘Hegemony and Socialist Strategy’ (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985). If nation-states played the central role in the development of imperialisms throughout the 19th and 20th centuries, the new millennium displaced the centrality of the state at the hands of networks of power working in a collaborative fashion and creating forms

of domination beyond old state structures. Nation-states do not disappear but instead interact alongside transnational corporations and global NGOs in the institution and conservation of the new world order. There is therefore a decentralisation of the role of the state, which acquires managerial functions through the production of complex systems of governance and multiple forms of domination but not necessarily determining the institution of social order.

Radical rethinking 3: the notion of class tended to lose the dominant ontological status as the privileged actor in social transformation (Critchley and Marchart, 2004: 3). Although there is no clear replacement, the notion of New Social Movements gained acceptance in the literature aiming to capture struggles taking place beyond/outside/underneath/relatively autonomously from the economy. The consequence of the latter is paramount for thinking about the terms through which the left conceive the notion of emancipation. The question that lingers would be emancipation from what? There are obviously a variety of responses to this question according to the authors I am working with. They tend to agree, however, on the necessity to think in the light of the multiplication of spaces for transformation as well as in the integration of culture/hegemony/symbolic/recognition as key producers of struggles for change, in turn subverting the old subject/object divide.

1.4.2 Democracy as Politics

The notion of *democratic subjectivities* I am proposing to use as analytical framework is inspired by Radical Democracy authors, who in turn belong to the tradition building their thinking upon the cleavages mentioned in the previous section. In what follows I specify the links between such vision of the world and implications to the understanding of democracy.

In the illuminating article *Democracy and the Question of Power*, Ernesto Laclau (2001a) synthesised the Radical Democratic project in the formulation of four complementary theses towards his understanding of democracy as:

‘dominated by an essential ambiguity: on the one hand democracy was the attempt to organise the political space around the *universality* of the community, without hierarchies and distinctions. Jacobinism was the name of the earliest and most extreme of these efforts to constitute *one* people. On the other hand, democracy has also been conceived as the expansion of

the logic of equality to increasingly wider spheres of social relations – social and economic equality, racial equality, gender equality, etc. From this point of view, democracy constitutively involves respect for differences. It goes without saying that the unilateralization of either of these tendencies leads to a perversion of democracy as a political regime’ (Laclau, 2001a: 4)

Laclau relates democracy to the mediation of an irresolvable tension between two opposing trends (universalisation and particularisation) which instead of limiting sets the condition of possibility for democracy. Democracy refers therefore to the realm emerging from the existence of such mediation. The first thesis refers to asymmetry and power and the ‘resolution’ of the mediation through *hegemony*: ‘a type of political relation by which a particularity assumes the representation of an (impossible) universality entirely incommensurable with it’ (Laclau, 2001a: 5). The notion of hegemony is central and represented a major contribution of *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Project* (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985) which rediscovered Gramsci by rethinking his legacy and moving the logic of the ‘representation of the universality’ from the periphery to the centre of things. Pairing hegemony and democracy proves the implications of the radical deconstruction and anti-foundationalism for political life (Dallmayr, 2004: 35). It deconstructs, as it assumes that there are no preconstituted subjects, hence deconstructing the notion of class. It is anti-foundational because it rejects Hegel’s rational determinism. Instead, hegemony posits the notion of flux of contingency and not purely logical relationships (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985).

The second interrelated thesis refers to ‘incompleteness and renegotiation’ (Laclau, 2001a: 8). Hegemonic operations never succeed in achieving what they attempt, namely, the total constitution of the (universal) communitarian space. In other words, because democracy is constructed upon an internal split of its own identity, Laclau suggests that democracy is a ‘notorious crime’ (Laclau, 2001a: 9). Democracy refers to an object without literal content because the subject is the subject of a split. Similarly, Rancière⁵ (2006) in *Hatred of Democracy* uses the form ‘democratic scandal’ in saying that ‘there will never be, under the name of politics, a single principle of the community, legitimating the acts of governors

⁵ Despite minimal differences in between Laclau and Rancière (See ‘Ranciere and the Discovery of the People’ in Laclau, 2005b) their commonalities in the understanding of the construction of subjectivities and notion of the political (Muñoz, 2006) enrich rather than prevent research on democracy. I think that a controlled level of theoretical ambiguity is not only possible but necessary to undertake interesting empirical research.

based on laws inherent to the coming together of human communities' (: 51). Democracy as incomplete and subjected to renegotiation is hence ontologically paired to the question of political identity and forms of identification. The subject of democracy is the subject of the split, different from the notion of the abstract citizen of liberal democracy. The subject of democracy can only be expressed in subject positions and contingent forms of identification articulating the plurality of the social (Mouffe, 1992a, Mouffe, 2007). Through such processes of articulation mechanisms of horizontal recognition are opened and forms of domination challenged. But, unlike postmodern views, the political moment for RD tradition assumes also a moment of antagonism between two camps which ultimately structures the process of increasing simplification of the political field. A *relation of exteriority* is constitutive to social identities (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985: 51) and it is because of its presence that political identities create contingent totalising effects. In other words, political identities can be partially sutured *in relation to* external elements which are constitutive to them.

The third thesis refers to the matter of democratic politics as the production of empty signifiers and undecidability. Society is formed by a plurality of particular groups and demands. The moment of unity underlying the constitution of the political subject results from processes of *equivalence* of a plurality of demands. Different from the *logic of difference* which constitutes the relation of exteriority mentioned above. The former organises the positivity of the social whereas the latter introduces negativity and social division (Laclau, 2005a: 7). It is what, in other words, has been referred to as *politics* and *police* or the division between the part and the part that has no part (Rancière, 1999). Politics is not an aggregation of consent but the interruption of the tangible configuration allowing such aggregation. In a more abstract line, it has also been suggested that the contingent moment of unity can be viewed as the creation of *multiplicity*: 'every rhizome contains lines of segmentarity according to which it is stratified, territorialized, organized, signified, attributed, etc., as well as lines of deterritorialization down which it constantly flees' (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 9). Equivalence means that demands cannot be dealt with in isolation, in an administrative way. It is the presence within a chain of equivalences with other demands which gives each relation its political character. The mutual contamination between universal and particular suggests that the formation of social and political identities is dominated by a radical constructivism. To put it bluntly, democratic politics means the 'production of tendentially empty signifiers which, while maintaining the incommensurability

between universal and particular, enable the latter to take up the representation of the former' (Laclau, 2001a: 11). This point is crucial as it raises the question of *name* and *naming* or the gap between content and procedure, explained in the forth thesis.

The fourth thesis refers to the complexity of *representation* in performing hegemonic relations. It is what Laclau called the 'retroactive effect of naming' (Laclau, 1992) and what deconstructs the duality object/subject and its collateral 'subjective' and 'objective' interpretation of the social and the political. The elimination of *total* representation (purely objective) is an illusion like the notion of *total* emancipation (purely subjective). Hegemony as mediation implies representation, that is there is not transparency in the relationship between governors and governed. He draws on linguistics, and Saussure's interpretation in particular, to understand the distance between sign and signified given by the unfixed signifier. Laclau translates this into the difference between concept and name (Laclau, 2001a: 12). The meaning of the concept is literal (could be legal for instance) whereas the process of naming implies struggle over the content of the name. Name implies struggle and concept administration. Hegemony operates through acts of naming endlessly recreating the gap which is the condition of possibility for democracy.

Radical democracy aims to expand egalitarian effects into more and more areas of the social (Critchley and Marchart, 2004: 4). Thinking Democracy from Radical Democracy perspective therefore supposes hegemony (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985) or in other words the endless production of disagreement (Rancière, 1999).

'We should take disagreement to mean a determined kind of speech situation: one in which one of the interlocutors understands and does not understand what the other is saying [...] Disagreement is not a misconstruction [...] Nor is disagreement some kind of misunderstanding stemming from the imprecise nature of words [...] Disagreement clearly is not to do with words alone [...] It concerns the tangible presentation of his common object, the very capacity of the interlocutors to present it. An extreme form of disagreement is where X cannot see the object Y is presenting because X cannot comprehend that sound uttered by Y from words and chain of words similar to X's own. This extreme situation – first and foremost- concerns politics' (Rancière, 1999: xi and xii)

The opposite of disagreement means administration (Laclau) or police (Rancière). In other words, it is seen as set of procedures resulting from the aggregation of consent. Democracy is associated with the opposite, to the production of politics, to the emerging interrupting force

of ‘parties that did not exist prior to the conflict they name and counted as parties’ (Rancière, 1999: 27). The study of democracy is political because it is foundational of new relationships previously inexistent. It is about researching the processes through which the tangible configuration of parties and parts, or the lack of them, is defined and eventually subverted. It is not the foundation of a new universal sense of community but the contingent structuration of universalising effects where power defies relations of domination. It represents a transgressive moment, the moment of the extraordinary, of creativity and new beginnings (Kalyvas, 2008). Democracy aligned with the political proposes not only the scrutiny of the progressive agenda of redistribution and participation but, more importantly, forces us to research processes of enacting equality (May, 2008), challenging dominant formulations of, less extraordinary and more common, ordinary politics built on passive equality.

1.4.3 Critiques and the Need of Case Studies

In what follows I address briefly two critiques of the Radical Democracy project one of which I contest and the second I argue needs to be answered by the type of empirical research this thesis posits.

The first critique refers to the ‘autonomisation of identity’, or to the implications of assuming an ‘opened and indeterminate’ subject position, which I think encapsulates the bulk of the criticism against the radical democratic project. It means the rejection of the basic assumption underpinning radical politics.

‘Such deconstructionist theorizing leaves politics without roots in social forces. Laclau strives to anchor his belief in the democratizing potential of NSMs in the vague ‘objectivities’ of reaction to commodification, bureaucratization and state authoritarianism, but has little theoretical justification for doing so.’ (Gledhill, 2000: 193)

The author is concerned about what he understands is the negation that any common orientation can be imputed by virtue of sharing a common life situation. The criticism rests on the actual radical constructivism of Radical Democracy which rejects any ontological relation permeating the constitution of the political identities. Similarly, Frederic Jameson

accuses post-marxism of being the ‘the cultural logic of late capitalism’ (Sim, 2000: 45). Current transformations are just another system modification of (boom and bust) capitalism itself and not the consequences of a new social order. Social classes cannot disappear as long as the capitalism is also finished. New social movements are the expression of late capitalist societies which have destroyed working-class industries but cannot become working class substitution. The working class has simply been displaced and social movements are not a fundamental substitution of working class, they cannot posit a real threat to the dominance of capitalism. Finally, far from the ‘return of the political’ new social movement contention expresses the marginalisation of the political under late capitalist societies (Sim, 2000: 46).

There is a general contention permeating this discussion in relation to the type of society we are living in. Is it modern, postmodern or something else? As I argued in 4.1 in this chapter major socio-economic changes forced fundamental rethinking in political theory categories. On the contrary, the critique discussed above although recognises global, societal changes, denies fundamental transformations in the structuration of society and, therefore, rejects the radical theoretical revision of the critical thinking developed for modern times. In addition, in the critique, there is an extra element within which insufficient differentiation has led to generalised confusion: the simplistic assimilation of radical democracy with postmodernism. Postmodernism has been accused of the ‘cultural turn’ and social movements ‘the cultural logic of late capitalism’. Such critique needs to penetrate beneath the surface of the radical democratic agenda in order to understand the implication of elaborating on social movements in relation to the performativity of ‘antagonistic conflict’. The notion of representation constitutive of the mediation between the universal and the particular is nothing like plural liberal democracy. In fact it is the opposite. The semantic of the word democracy should not distort the political battle occurring beneath which is precisely the struggle for real things. The ‘return of the political’ does not mean ‘political democracy’ replacing ‘economic democracy’ but the emergence of the political as the only form of structuration of the social. It is where I note the sources for transformation occurs in contentious relationships. It seems sensible to conclude that ‘far from invoking classical liberalism, it implicitly, as well as explicitly, seeks to develop a Marxian inspired left critique of capitalism together with the development of radical democratic ‘regimes’ recognisable, in essence, to the demand of an earlier generation of libertarian Marxist thinkers (Luxemburg, Pannekoek, Gramsci, etc.)’ (Tormey, 2001: 120 and 121). It does not argue that they are the same. I have discussed in greater detail key elements that mark substantial differentiations in 4.2 in this chapter.

Radical Democracy departs from Marxism (teleological, necessarian, deterministic) but, like many subscribing to this tradition, I accept the ‘spectral’ influence of Marx as suggested by Derrida, an absent presence, serving as a constant reminder of the necessity for an uncompromising radicalism in the face of domination, exploitation and hierarchy (Tormey, 2001: 121).

The second criticism is more pertinent for the purpose of the chapter than for the critical substance it conveys. It raises the regional / developmental variable in relation to democracy which is relevant because it builds the necessary transition to the following chapter.

‘a second problem with Laclau’s perspective is that ‘popular democratic’ and ‘popular liberal’ political cultures were already present in regional social movements in Latin America in the nineteenth century...He argues that the last twenty years in Latin America have broken the older patterns represented by liberalism and populism, with the advent of popular mobilizations no longer based on a model of ‘total society’ divided into two camps. He accepts, however, that return to civilian rule could ‘lead to the reproduction of the traditional spaces, based on a dichotomy which reduces all political practice to a relation of representation’ (Laclau 1985: 42).’ (Gledhill, 2000: 194)

In agreement with the latter observation, Laclau differentiates societies according to their complexity which in turn makes them bound to the development of certain types of demands at the expense of others. This discussion is analysed in extensive detail in ‘On Populist Reason’ (Laclau, 2005b). Different degree of institutionalisation and the type of colonial legacy, among other factors have an influence on the configuration of societies. It represents an empirical-historical observation rather than a point of ambiguity in his theoretical edifice insofar as the logic of demands governing the contingent formation of the political subject remains unchanged. That is to say, it would be naïf to expect similar socio-political formations in societies whose historical development have been fundamentally different.

This final point suggests the need for empirical research in order to test and challenge theoretical formulation with evidence. In what respect does Radical Democracy actually represent a contribution to the debate on democratisation in Argentina and Brazil in post-transition contexts? This thesis aims to contribute to the debate on democratisation in Latin America, where the democracy debate remains largely stagnated since (or due to) the debate

of the Transition School⁶. This thesis also aims to make a contribution to the global debate on democratisation. The Europe - Latin American cross-regional comparison, for instance, becomes even more interesting when viewed against more recent interpretations of democracy in which the deconstruction of the modern subject instituted a *politics of simulation* (Blühdorn, 2009) rather than processes of deepening democracy, raising uncertain though interesting questions to engage with.

I think that the Radical Democracy debate has a substantial contribution to make to the debate on democracy. However, as this chapter explained, 'stagnated' does not mean dead. The debate is vigorous although contentious. What I mean by 'stagnated' is the need to reengage with democratisation in the light of emancipation, to challenge the notion of regime and institute the notion of politics.

1.5. Final Remarks

In this chapter I critically reviewed the most salient debates I decided to engage with, as well as outlined the conceptual lines underpinning the rationale of this thesis. I critically assessed the literature and pointed out existing gaps, my critiques and likely contribution of this thesis. The most important question, that gave structure to this chapter, was the proposal to move the study of democracy from passive regime (as understood by the Transition School) to active democracy (understood as politics by Radical Democracy). This is why I chose the latter in order to study the politics of democratisation in the context of the post-transition. It provides a suitable framework to interrogate the reasons behind stability as well as the elements challenging the structuration of politico-institutional order, illustrating, in turn, the radical openness of social order.

In the following chapter I draw on the particular context of study that this research takes place in, introduce case studies and the methodology I used. In addition to articulating the context, case studies, methods and theory, I set out the research problem this research aims to address. Subsequently, I anticipate my thesis in the form of the analytical model.

⁶ My critique to the Transition School constitutes a necessary but contextual point of theoretical departure in this thesis. The core and fundamentals of the argumentation lie predominantly within Radical Democracy theory which is the debate I want to contribute to.

Chapter 2: Text and Method in Context. Trade Unions and Social Movement Organisations Within and Beyond Neoliberal Times

‘My entire scientific enterprise is indeed based on the belief that the deepest logic of the social world can be grasped only if one plunges into the particularity of an empirical reality, historically located and dated, but with the objective of constructing it as a “special case of what is possible”, as Bachelard puts it, that is, as an exemplary case in a finite world of possible configurations’ (Bourdieu, 1998: 2)

Introduction

Over the past 10 years or so Latin America has experienced transformation which effects broadly challenged the hegemonic dominance of neoliberalism in the region. Scholars assessed this process as ‘Latin America’s left turn’ (Castañeda, 2006, 2005) as well as the formation of a ‘post-Washington consensus era’ (Panizza, 2005). These studies reproduce old ‘left’ and ‘right’ divide in analyses which tend to ponder the centrality of governments as fundamental drivers in the (re)structuration of political order. In other words, 30 years later, they reproduce Transition School problematic assumption that market economy and liberal democracy are the only means to deepen democracy.

Although they contribute to understand some of the effects of transformations currently apparent in the region, the ‘left turn’ hypothesis says little regarding the multiple roots shaping the form, substance, limits and pace of change. Moreover, it does not contribute to explore the itinerary of actors who participated in such processes. Why and how has change come about? Who and under what circumstances was such process of transformation enacted? What transformations have actually been posited? What limitations does this process actually face? Was it spontaneous or organised? Was this a deliberate conscious decision, and from whom? Why some transformations and not others? Who was the collective ‘we’ that enabled contestation and challenged established order? How did this ‘we’ come to share a collective self-understanding that ultimately enacted the opening of a ‘coherent’ (new) path? How did this ‘we’ understand the process itself?

Within the answers to these questions lie the understandings of current transformation. However, in order to capture the depth, significance, as well as the limitations the research inquiry needs to move beyond technocratic approaches drawing on empirical references primarily (if not exclusively) relating to governments and policies. Likewise, as suggested in chapter 1, old theoretical matrixes need to be revisited in the light of approaches which allow engagement with actors and events otherwise considered dysfunctional or peripheral. To put it bluntly, the analysis on democracy and democratisation in the region today, needs not only to put in motion (to ‘test’) new theories but also to advance methodological innovation which can produce data relevant to the understanding of democracy beyond the spheres of government in the strict sense of the word.

Thus, the function of this chapter is twofold: firstly, I aim to characterise the context of the investigation, namely, the post-transition years in the region with emphasis in Brazil and Argentina. I argue that the context is a necessary though limited element to gain full account of significant transformations. Secondly, I also seek to explain the rationale underpinning the argument of this thesis, the text within the context. I do that raising fundamental questions in what constitutes the research problem, elaborating on the research methodological approach and methods used for data collection and, finally, introducing a descriptive outline of case studies in which in-depth analysis builds the argument of this thesis.

The structure of the chapter follows the order of the objectives presented above. The chapter focuses on the context in the first part (2.1) and in the research methodological strategy (2.2). Although the longest chapter of the thesis its presentation under its current form is vital to understand the research problem vis-à-vis the context of the investigation.

2.1 Research Context: Neoliberalism, Point of Arrival and Point of Departure

Argentina and Brazil represent comparable case studies for the exploration of post-transition politics for reasons which are well-known, they tend to emphasise the role of the state, and are usually highlighted by mainstream literature. But they are also comparable for reasons either underscored or insufficiently elaborated in relation to politics and democracy which

includes the gaze over the production of new spaces usually assessed in terms of ‘effect of’ and only rarely as the ‘cause of things’. I do not aim to posit a radical rewriting of history but instead the need to integrate elements of complexity within existing literature; to raise new elements of analysis emerging from social practices which although remain embedded in specific economic and political contexts their influence cannot be purely extracted from analysis of the latter. Argentina and Brazil are comparable because a) despite its different colonial legacy and ethnic composition they have followed similar developmental patterns throughout their history; b) transition to democracy took place with three years difference; c) they both championed neoliberal reforms in the 1990s and d) they have shifted at similar pace in questioning neoliberal legacy in the form of discourse and public policies. The second cluster of reasons that make Brazil and Argentina comparable lie on the similar process of increasing complexity and visibility gained over the year by social movement organisations. They include workers’ organisations but go well beyond them competing in weight and significance depending on context and circumstances. Human rights, indigenous, landless, housing organisations, among others, have added diversity to the composition of the social and enrich the complexity of collective action which effects on processes of democratisation I argue remain largely underscored. In what follows I present in the form of a synthesis the configuration of the context of this research in the formation of what I understand as three differential moments, structured *before* and *after* the neoliberal moment which operates as a pivotal period within and against which the other two gained special signification.

2.1.1 Economic Stagnation and Transitions to Democracy Rule

Transitions to democracy took place in Brazil (1985) and in Argentina (1983) in a context of crises of the development model which had governed and organised socio-political relations for the past 40 years. This model was based on two central pillars, industrialisation by import substitution (ISI) and a state-centric regulation of relationships between civil society, government and the private sector.

The ISI model was the result of the complex interrelation between global capitalism, international relations and domestic nation-states room for manoeuvre. It was the model adopted by most Latin American countries between 1930 and 1980 to achieve economic growth and socio-economic modernisation. Import substitution consisted of establishing

domestic production facilities to manufacture goods which were formerly imported. Import-substitution included institutional barriers to the free mobility of land, labour, and capital, to the benefit especially of domestic capital but, in limited ways, also workers and sometimes the peasantry (Eckstein, 2001a). It represented ‘an attempt by economically less-developed countries to break out of the world division of labour which had emerged in the nineteenth century and the early part of the twentieth century’ (Werner, 1972: 95). It follows that under this world division of labour Latin America as well as Asia and Africa specialised in the production of raw materials importing in return to manufactured goods from Europe and US. The Great Depression that followed the 1930s crises contributed to create the opportunities for the establishment of ISI in the region. It was, however, only after the end of World War II when the industrial sector showed the sharpest increase in relation to the formerly dominating primary sector and ISI became a deliberative policy tool for economic development (Werner, 1972: 97).

Large internal migration from rural to urban centres and the consequent expansion of suburban areas surrounding the outskirts of Buenos Aires and São Paulo were among the most significant impact of the ISI in the topography of the population in Argentina and Brazil. It resulted in major shifts in the landscape and conditions upon which the agro-export oligarchy had instrumented an essentially elitist political system. Getúlio Vargas in Brazil (1930-45) and Juan Perón in Argentina (1945-55) expressed the reconfiguration of factors and the subsequent emergence of new interests and sectors associated to the development of a novel status quo. They gave industrial workers a new political status (trade unions) through the instrumentation of a state-centric regulatory system which organised, administered and responded to new demands. It equally resulted in the demobilisation of activated new segments of the population as the conquest of benefits represented an incentive to comply to an instituted dependency relationship with the state. *Peronismo* in Argentina and *Varguismo* in Brazil represented the incorporation of the new industrial masses with welfare benefits and political representation which explains the institution of an enduring symbolic legacy. In addition, they epitomised the historical establishment of what an Argentine scholar called the state-centric socio-political matrix (SPM) (Cavarozzi, 1992). It was defined as the relationships among the state, the political system of representation (the party system), and the socioeconomic base of social actors and cultural relations, all mediated institutionally by the political regime. The model prevalent between 1930s and 1980s was characterised as statist-national-popular, that is to say, the institution of an inward-looking, state-centric SPM,

associated, undoubtedly, to the context of the semi-closed economies (Cavarozzi, 1992). Beyond differences Latin American countries shared a common statist-national-popular domestic system of governance within the specific configuration of the international economy post- World War II (Garretón et al., 2003: 7).

The ‘military party’ expressing interests of foreign and domestic oligarchies either strongly conditioned elected governments or took direct control of the executive in Brazil (between 1964-85) and in Argentina (between 1955-83). It represented a long historical period with poor record on human rights and civil liberties that would deeply mark the identity of democratising forces in both countries. Under this period Argentina experienced four major military coups (1955, 1962⁷, 1966, and 1976) and countless minor ones. In the case of Brazil, the military coup of 1964 that overthrew Vargas’ former labour minister, President Goulart, inaugurated the longest era of authoritarian rule in the country’s history. Unlike their Argentine counterpart, the Brazilian military instituted a restricted though existing level of political institutionalisation in the creation of two-party system, viz. the government party ARENA (*Alianza Renovadora Nacional*) and the opposition party MDB (*Movimiento Democrático Brasileiro*) (Lamounier, 1997: 133 and 134). In Argentina on the contrary between 1955 and 1983, political instability reached critical levels largely due to the military decision to directly ban *peronismo*, the majority party. There were eighteen presidents, and all of those elected were overthrown except one, Peron, who died shortly after his election (Waisman, 1997: 76). Brazil achieved economic growth between 1969 and 1974 in what became known as the ‘Brazilian economic miracle’ (Lamounier, 1997: 135) due to the generalised context of economic stagnation experienced by the rest of the region, including Argentina. In addition, the scale of the repression in Argentina largely outweighed repression in Brazil all of which signalled the configuration of a differential historical legacy in relation to the military. They both shared, however, the historical lengthy burden of authoritarian rule against which democratising forces eventually developed strong commonalities.

The external shock of the ‘debt crises’ of the early 1980s was likely the most dramatic expression of the world economic reconfiguration in the region. This transformation anticipated the end not only of the military rule but also signalled the radical reconfiguration of global capitalism and subsequently influenced drastic transformation of the state-centric

⁷ This was technically a civil coup (José María Guido) although largely steered by the military who deposed Arturo Frondizi (Radical Intransigente Party) after lifting the ban from Peronism (imposed in 1955) to compete again in free elections.

SPM which the military governed without radically displacing it. It represented the beginning of a new socio-political cycle within which transition to democracy needs to be inscribed. Historian Halperin Donghi (1999: 630-632) argued that developed economies had been growing faster than the resources to sustain it which was translated into an incremental rise in the prices of primary goods. The concomitant spectacular increase in the price of oil generated a large amount of financial resources subsequently transferred to primary good producers in the form of very low interest rates. The military developed an accumulation model based on unprecedented amount of debt. Latin America absorbed nearly half of the loans available due to the spectacular liquidity after the oil crises (\$350 billion) (Walton, 2001 : 301). After years of relatively controlled inflation, by the end of the decade, the US government, following orthodox monetary policy, increased interest rates sharply in order to stabilise the economy shrinking both incomes and employment. Interest rates soared, the dollar, in terms of which most foreign debt was nominated, appreciated; the price of commodity exports collapsed; and the market for non-commodity exports shrank. The sustainability of the Latin American growth model tumbled instantly. Budget deficits grew, inflation accelerated, foreign borrowing exploited, and in consequence debts accumulated faster than the ability to pay them. In August 1982, Mexico ran out of reserves and because it was unable to borrow more was forced to declare a moratorium of debt service. Within weeks the whole region was immersed in what became known as the 'debt crises' (Kuczynski, 2003: 22).

US-Latin American relations that had been marked by the US government direct involvement and support to military coups, changed by the end of the cold war. The State Department now recognised that Communism represented no longer a threat. International agencies such as IMF, WB, Inter-American Development Bank and the American government foreign assistance programmes became increasingly important in shaping the economic policies of governments in the region (Pearce, 1982: 44). These institutions gained importance and power against governments in South America as they offered loans at lower rates than the private sector to alleviate public finances experiencing huge imbalances. But in order to access these temporary relief schemes governments had to agree with 'stabilisation' plans worked out in advance by the IMF which became known in the 1980s and 1990s as 'Structural Adjustment Programmes' (SAP).

The why and how elected governments overturned military regimes in the South Cone are intertwined. The routes of change were diverse depending on each country but cases such as Argentina and Brazil where democratisation took place with only three years difference fell under what was called the democratisation 'third wave' (Huntington, 1991), initiated in the mid-1970s, and involving to a great extent the entire Latin American region. The political liberalisation in Brazil (like in Spain) was the result of 'gradual, slow and sure process planned and administered by the military over many years in what it was featured a process of liberation from above' (Huntington, 1991: 125). The control of the government over the process was never seriously challenged. On the contrary, the establishment of elected government in Argentina was less the result of a controlled plan and more the effect of the military defeat in Malvinas/Falkland war at the hands of the British in 1982 (Beeson and Pearce, 1984: 116 and 117). However, the 'early' democratisation of Argentina in turn encouraged democratisation in neighbour countries such as Uruguay, Chile and Brazil and reportedly discouraged military coups against new elected government in Peru and Bolivia (Huntington, 1991: 103).

Raúl Alfonsín (1983-1989) in Argentina and José Sarney (1985-1990) in Brazil were the first elected presidents of the (re)democratisation wave. Their room for manoeuvre and degree of autonomy was probably most clearly illustrated by their economic policy initiatives to face hyperinflation in a context of regional 'debt crises'. President Alfonsín introduced the *Plan Austral* in 1985 whereas President Sarney introduced the *Plano Cruzado* in 1986, as a stabilisation plan including monetary reform as a key feature to regain public confidence in the economy and rebuild their weakened political authority. They managed to stop inflation momentarily at the expense of an unsustainable price freeze which in turn led to explosive demands for consumer goods of all kinds (Lamounier, 1997: 171). Businesses reduced supply speculating with price thawing ending in a *cul-de-sac* explosive combination. They represented heterodox policy initiatives which signalled a modest but existing degree of autonomy from dominating financial agencies like the IMF who had suggested different stabilisation strategies based on public spending cuts. In turn, these Plans also indicated governments' little room for manoeuvre against corporate domestic interests who were not willing to bargain their privileged position consolidated under military rule.

The establishment of elected governments represented a landmark in the socio-political context of Brazil and Argentina, ruled by repressive dictatorships for too long. Because of the

long military rule, the suppression of civil and political liberties as well as repression and assassination of political opposition, both the legacy of authoritarianism as well as the institution of elected governments necessarily permeates every analysis of democratisation processes in Argentina and Brazil. They are not, however, the exclusive realm of democracy. The dominant discussion about transition and consolidation of democracy have systematically underscored the influence of ‘popular movements’ (Cardoso, 1989) whose dynamics and effects to a great extent have remained either in the peripheries or disconnected from mainstream democratisation debates. The mainstream literature tended to highlight the negative effects of colonial legacy in the reproduction of enduring patronage relationships. It was rightly argued that traditional clientelist forms of control go against modern (empowered) forms of citizenship, the building stone for democracy consolidation. However, the latter should not undermine the examination of multiform and multi-territorial groupings within and beyond labour relations; inside, outside and within governmental structures; more and less visible, heterogeneous and complex.

‘The movements’ weakness became their strength, for their very local nature was interpreted as indicating a participatory process that stemmed from the society’s grassroots. Building autonomous associations and endowed with a new role, local neighbourhood groups made their demands in ways that showed their ability to bypass traditional mechanisms of political cooptation’ (Cardoso, 1989: 3)

In Brazil, within the final years of the military in the late 1970s and early 1980s an array of different popular struggles voiced issues concerning sectors which had remained invisible. Mothers Clubs fought for day-care centers, the neighborhood committees or the SABs fought for urban improvements, the favela movements struggle for housing, while the health groups demand that health clinics be built and managed. The latter formed an emerging network of urban movements struggling for better living conditions (Gohn, 2010: 332). The metal workers’ strike of 1978 initiated one of the largest waves of strikes which opened ‘an enormous space in the field of ideas and in the political imagination’ (Hipsher, 1998: 163). It was the emergence of a process that resulted in the creation of the CUT and PT a few years later and determined the configuration of the most gravitating urban movement in Brazilian democratic transition. The progressive Catholic Church base level communities (CEBs) provided inspiration and resources not only to the development civil society movements in cities but also in rural Brazil. The MST primarily but not exclusively gave organisational form to accumulated grievances resulting from enduring unequal land distribution and the

contingent military decision to displace rural population in the implementation of 'agribusiness modernisation' (Harnecker, 2002, Branford and Rocha, 2002). Urban and rural movements joint forces in national mobilisations and campaigns (*Diretas Ja!, Constituinte*) leaving a mark upon the transition process in Brazil which significance remain understudy.

Similarly, in Argentina, transition from military rule expanded opportunities to voice disagreement. However, association dynamics, collective action and silenced processes of opposition were apparent in the late 1970s and early 1980s. While the literature tended to emphasise the importance of the labour movement (Collier and Collier, 2002), it equally underscored the meanings emerging from social practices within collective experiences in the field of human rights, neighbourhood initiatives, women's organisations and youth movement (students organisation and the emergence of rock music) (Jelin, 1986). The human rights movement in Argentina illustrated a case in which kinship bonds were turned into contentious public relationships (Jelin, 1986: 26). Associations claiming for houses and better neighbourhood conditions, on the contrary, structured their collectivisation upon the formulation of a common demand rather than pre-existing kinship relations. Neighbourhood stakeholders, like in Brazil, received logistical support from the Church as well as political parties. The institution of neighbourhood associations implied the development of mechanisms of horizontal cooperation beyond traditional family networks. As a result they petitioned as a collective one and not as dispersed clienteles. But, ultimately, why are these experiences significant in relation to democracy? Firstly, they raise the importance of heterogeneity in the constitution of the social and therefore behind the formation of social movement organisations. Secondly, they do not argue against the hypothesis of the 'absence' of the state but in favour of integrating the 'presence' of activation dynamics from below to the democratisation narrative which primarily relies on the consequences of arrangements at the top. The passive institutional gaze at democratisation needs to be enriched by the ongoing process of endless (re)activation of democratising forces.

2.1.2 Consolidation *with* Exclusion (The Neoliberal Turn)

‘The new historical cycle is characterised by the conjugation of democratisation of the political regime, that tends to be politically inclusive, and the process of state modernisation that tends to produce social exclusion’ (Calderón and Dos Santos, 1990: 56)

The creeping transformation of the development model initiated in the 1970s which permeated the transition years gained renovated force in 1990s, now encompassing the ‘consolidation’ of elected governments in the region. The new scenario depicted institutional stability and parallel crises of traditional solidarity mechanisms (notably, trade unions), resulting in, as suggested in the quotation above, political democratisation *with* social exclusion (Acuña and Smith, 1994). This image reflects only a partial account, however, if, again, democracy is not further interrogated in the light of the complex and heterogeneous dynamics of resistance involving multiple actors and spaces within, against and beyond the state apparatus and its institutional framework *in relation to* the structuration of a new context.

The Institute for International Economics in Washington convened a conference in November 1989 under the title ‘Latin American Adjustments: How much has happened?’ It intended to identify those policies that Washington mainstream institutions like the United States Treasury, the IMF, the WB, and the Inter-American Development Bank agreed to be key to the restoration of growth in Latin America (Kuczynski, 2003: 24). John Williamson (1990), who mentored the event, later edited a book identifying policy areas that needed reform and contributed to cementing the development of an influential paradigm, so-called ‘Washington Consensus’, that gained dominating influence upon policy reform in the region. By 1989 the US government instrumented the ‘Plan Brady’—named after US Treasury Secretary Nicholas Brady- in order to solve the so called debt crises. It led to the implementation of policies with strong common elements, i.e., trade liberalisation and promotion of foreign investment, privatisation of state enterprises, deregulation of markets, fiscal reforms, macroeconomic equilibrium, and so on (Smith and Acuña, 1994: 1). The solution proposed from Washington to solve the debt crises was therefore based on two interdependent pillars: a) access to debt refinancing within the ‘Brady bonds’ and b) agreeing in return to undertake structural reforms theoretically based on the ‘Washington Consensus’ and closely supervised by the IMF officials.

Governments in Latin America joined the neoliberal bandwagon albeit with differences depending on domestic resistances and governments own priorities. Reforms were designed

to privilege market forces and minimize the role of the state in the economy. The import-substitution model came to an end and it was now replaced instead by a new type of liberalism which intended to reduce market 'fetters' associated with the discredited previous economic forms (Eckstein, 2001a). In Argentina reform gathered pace under President Carlos Menem (1989-1999) and in Brazil under President Fernando Enrique Cardoso (1995-2003) as well as Fernando Collor de Mello (1990-1992) and Itamar Franco (1992-1994) who preceded him in office. Menem weathered the 'crises of representation' that Collor de Mello could not and had to leave office after the Parliament's successful impeachment due to corruption allegations. His vice-president, Itamar Franco, completed the term in office. Institutional consolidation at institutional level resulted apparent in Argentina and Brazil as governmental crises did not cause authoritarian regression. At the point the Argentine crises in 2001 further contributed to emphasise.

Menem undertook reforms in Argentina in a swift and unequivocal manner during his first three years in office becoming an IMF 'poster child'. Collor de Mello encountered more boundaries in what resulted in a slower, more protracted, and incomplete affair (Panizza, 2000: 740). Economic and institutional development in Argentina and Brazil during the late 1980s and 1990s showed, however, many characteristics in common:

Table No.1: Brazil and Argentina Common Policy Events (1985-1999)

	Argentina	Brazil
Economic performance 1980s	‘Lost decade’: low and negative growth	
GDP fall	GDP fell 6.2 (1989)	GDP fell 4.4 (1990)
Heterodox stabilisation Plans 1	<i>Austral</i>	<i>Cruzado</i>
Constitutional Amendments	1994 (included Presidential re-election)	1988. New Constitution 1998. Constitutional amendment which included Presidential re-election
Orthodox Monetary Policy (Stabilisation Plan 2)	<i>Convertibilidad</i>	<i>Real</i>
Privatisation	Economic Emergency and State Reform laws paved the way for labour reform, privatisation of public utilities (including petroleum, telecommunications, airports, post office, pension funds, and state airline.)	Barriers lifted to private capital participation in petroleum exploration (state remains the majority stakeholder), labour reforms and privatisation including coastal navigation, natural gas distribution and telecommunications.
Economic Performance 1990s	Historic low inflation. Economic growth. Rise in poverty and inequality.	
Labour	Flexibilisation of working conditions. Record high unemployment and informalisation.	
Social Policy	Creeping conditionalities and means-tested programs introduced (specially in health and education) Decentralisation Integration of NGO and ‘participatory ethos’ in policy delivery	

Source: My elaboration based on (Panizza, 2000, Walton, 2004, Molyneux, 2008, Mollo and Saad-Filho, 2006).

The context of sweeping neoliberal reforms encountered differential institutional structures in Argentina and Brazil. Although both nations hold presidential systems, Brazil presents a highly fragmented party system and institutional power is in practice largely shared between the executive and federal government (Mainwaring, 1997). In Argentina, on the contrary, the presidential system is built upon an institutional system which tends to concentrate attributions in the executive at the expense of provincial governments. Furthermore, the Radical and Justicialista Parties survived dictatorships giving electoral politics a functioning party structure strongly embedded in the nation's history, society and culture (Levitsky, 2005). The monolithic and hierarchical structure of the Justicialista Party endowed Menem with the electoral tool to govern without the need to compromise on government coalitions which was the case of Cardoso in Brazil. One of the consequences of this historical institutional setting was reflected in the different capability of the executives in putting reforms in place.

Reforms were neither lineal nor applied in full scale not only because of institutional barriers but also because of a) existing corporatist structures that endowed workers' organisations with enduring bargaining power and b) the emergence of an unprecedented wave of mobilisation which had remained 'underground' in the 1980s and occupied the foreground in the 1990s.

The incorporation of the working class –however precarious, subordinated and controlled– into the national political arena through the import-substitution development model deeply influenced the structuration of state-society relations in Argentina and Brazil. The political importance of workers' organisations in the socio-political configuration was reflected in O'Donnell (1982) conceptualisation of the Bureaucratic-Authoritarian State (or EBA). The initial incorporation of the labour movement represented a critical juncture (Collier and Collier, 2002) that signalled distributive coalitions in the 1940s and 1950s and equally influenced the scale of the military repression afraid that such empowerment could lead to socialism. In practice labour organisations were more heterogeneous and showed different prevailing behaviour in different historical contexts. Corporatists, communists, classists, anarchists, socialists and peronists were among the many affiliations existing in the labour movement in the South Cone. Pragmatists prevailed during the dictatorships and consolidated

strong trade union structures at the expense of internal democracy and grassroots activation (De la Garza, 2001: 10). The corporatist system was the main pattern of integration of trade unions in stable relationships with the state (De la Garza, 2001: 11).

The partial continuity of this pattern of relationship between the state and trade unions posited paradoxical limits and ambiguous contributions to neoliberal reforms and the implementation of structural adjustment programs. Labour organisations, on the one hand, played an instrumental role in the implementation of reforms like, for example, the flexibilisation of work, revealing the fact that trade unions could enhance mobilisation but also demobilisation. The corporatist nature dominating the trade union movement both in Argentina and Brazil played a key role in the development of government coalitions which instrumented neoliberal reforms (Acuña and Smith, 1994). On the other hand, in exchange for their support, they held control over critical organisational matters (Murillo, 1997).

However, expressions of ‘new syndicalism’ resisted the reform process more vehemently. In Argentina the emergence of the Argentinean Workers’ Central (CTA) challenged not only the unionism’s mainstream response to the neoliberal reforms but also the monopoly of workers’ representation, a historical legacy of the corporatist arrangement. In Brazil, in turn, where labour organisations recognise a weaker tradition, the expansion and strengthening of CUT posited similar challenges (Radermacher and Melleiro, 2007). Encompassing the emergence of heterodox trade unionism a multiplicity of loosely institutionalised discontent gained the public realm raising a fundamental question against the democracy consolidation hypothesis: *what went wrong* (Dinerstein, 2004: 226).

The past two decades have seen an upsurge of social movement organisations gaining visibility in the production of contentious collective action in Brazil and Argentina (Eckstein 1989; Auyero 2002; Avritzer 2002; Dinerstein 2002; Svampa and Pereyra 2003; Petras and Veltmeyer 2005; Almeida Paul 2007; Issa 2007; Stahler-Sholk et al. 2007). Also attention has been put on the transformation of ‘old actors’ and the development of ‘new’ type of organisation (De la Garza, 2001, Alves, 2000, Radermacher and Melleiro, 2007, Marieke, 2004, Gurrera, 2005). This literature has enriched the sociological and industrial relations debates in relation to neoliberalism and the desestructuration of traditional forms of solidarity in the region. My assessment of democracy and democratisation builds on their contribution which is problematised in relation to specific issues emerging from case study analysis

throughout this thesis. I argue, however, that the relationship between the interconnectivity between social movement organisations, new unionism and the quest of democracy in the post-transition context remains, yet, underscored, not in relation to neoliberalism but in the light of a diachronic view that also integrates the formation of a third historical juncture opened in the 2000s.

2.1.3 The ‘Left Turn’ and the Need to Research Unanswered Questions

Both the Argentina crises of 2001, the largest default declared on sovereign debt in contemporary history, and Lula da Silva’s (2003-10) presidential victory in Brazil, the first working class and trade union leader to become president of a Latin American nation, signalled a multidimensional turning point in the reconfiguration of a third distinctive moment of the post-transition context. Although changes are recent and its consequences are still unfolding, I would like to briefly raise a few significant marks within four camps that justify its differential consideration in relation to preceding moments: international relations, economy, social policy, and state vis-à-vis social movement organisation.

In the field of international relations, the period opened in 2003 introduced at least two new elements suggesting differentiation from the preceding years: 1) decreasing influence of international agencies such as IMF and WB in the design and implementation of domestic policies and, 2) the parallel increasing gravitation of regional multilateral integration processes at the expense of lowering countries’ bilateral agreements with the US. In 2003, the year Lula was elected President of Brazil, he made an appearance in the World Social Forum as well as in the World Economic Forum. Nestor Kirchner (2003-07) in Argentina paid off IMF debt in full, something the Brazilian government had done weeks earlier. In 2005 in Mar del Plata, Argentina, a key agreement needed for the advancement of the FTAA in the region missed its 2005 deadline putting a halt to the summit. The coordinated action of Brazil and Argentina was critical to make that happen. Both countries have diversified their export markets to China, India and Russia. They joined forces at the WTO raising a common voice against North-South divide governing unfair world trade rules. Brazil became part of the international group (BRIC) together with fast-growing economies Russia, India and China.

Argentina and Brazil joined the international group G20 which gathers the twenty largest world economies.

In addition to the increasing participation of Brazil and Argentina in international forums not directly controlled by the US (and which can actually counter act US influence in world stage), they, like most South American nations, have shown great determination in the support of existing regional integration agencies (Mercosur) as well as in the creation of new ones (Alba, Unasur). They have received mixed reception in international relations specialists insofar as competing regional spaces (old and new) posit divergent positions against the role of the US in the region which could ultimately undermine the ground of commonalities needed for a successful integration process to take place (Gardini, 2010). However, it has also been suggested that regional initiatives like the Unasur mark an important contrast in relation to the monolithic alignment to the Washington Consensus (and the 'inevitable' FTAA path) prevailing in the 1990s (Chaves García, 2010).

In an influential article revising the hypothesis of a book published fifteen years earlier (*Utopia Unarmed*) a Mexican intellectual argued that the entire Latin American region was 'turning left' (Castañeda, 2006). He suggested that the end of the cold war and the subsequent fall of the Soviet Union would imply Washington could no longer accuse the left-of-centre political initiatives of being a 'Soviet beachhead' (Castañeda, 2006: 2). He also suggested that there were preconditions (poverty, inequality, concentration of wealth, power, land, resources) to believe that the left was bound to govern the region. In a nutshell, he argued that similar preconditions led to left-of-centre governments in Western Europe a century ago and therefore something of the kind was reasonably expected to happen in the context of Latin America.

I remain sceptical of the 'inevitability' hypothesis and think that change is embedded in social practices which in turn impact in the (re)configuration of social order. I subscribe, however, to the idea that the region is undergoing a moment of complex change which has also been characterised as 'post-liberal' (Arditi, 2008). Notwithstanding, in order to further understand the complexity that nominations sometimes avoid, a glance at the developments at the economic level is needed.

It is in the field of the economy where the frontier dividing change versus continuity remains less clear and therefore ambiguity and complexity constitute better describers of the current state of affairs. Both Lula and Nestor Kirchner built their presidential campaigns in opposition to ‘neoliberalism’, ‘flexibilisation of labour’ and ‘IMF intrusive intervention in domestic economic policy’. They also fought trade liberalisation initiative and privatisations of public strategic interests. On the contrary, they recognised themselves as Keynesians or (neo)Keynesians criticising spending cuts and arguing in favour of state intervention and public spending for achieving economic growth and job creation. Lula won the election building on this stance whereas Kirchner gained public support on similar rhetoric after narrowly winning the presidential election. It was argued that in the case of Brazil the latter developed high expectations contrasting with low practical governmental performance (Hunter and Power, 2005: 128 and 129). In the case of Argentina it could relationally be argued that high performance contrasted original low expectations.

Nestor Kirchner, a little known governor, took office in 2003 after winning elections from narrow margins. Four years later, he left office as the outgoing most popular president in Argentina’s history (Levitsky and Murillo, 2008: 7). Within his government’s actions the most significant economic initiatives commentators agree to count are the following:

- Debt renegotiation following 2001 default won public support and improved fiscal situation: it represented the largest debt ‘haircut’ in history (a debt swap worth about 30 percent of the defaulted debt)
- Union collective bargaining were encouraged, pushing through a series of minimum-wage increases (70 percent increase in real wages)
- Unemployment (from 20 percent in 2002 to 9 percent in 2007) and poverty (from 50 percent to 27 percent) were halved

The above mentioned initiatives and achievements were undertaken in the context of an export led-growth, conservative fiscal policy, competitive exchange rate and soaring commodity prices. As a result the economy grew 9 per cent a year between 2003 and 2007. Unemployment also represented the PT government’s number one priority but, unlike Kirchner, Lula followed orthodox monetary policy, built on high interest rates and fiscal tightness, to pursue the same goal. What is more, Lula’s government increased the fiscal

surplus target agreed between Cardoso and the IMF (Saad-Filho, 2007) this signalled his government's real commitment to market-led reforms and resulted in critiques from historical allies. PT government also encouraged collective agreements and favoured increase in the minimum wage (75 percent, from US\$117 in 2003 to US\$154). Although both Brazil and Argentina in principle show similar positive variations in key economic indicators, it was argued that Argentina's policy resulted more heterodox than Brazil's insofar as the former founded policy on growth and not on inflation targets, which remains Brazil's central economic policy concern (Mollo and Saad-Filho, 2006). Finally, the once 'chronic' regional dependency based on heavily indebted economies has also showed signs of transformation. The external debt of Argentina central government in 2002 represented 93 percent of GDP and by 2007 it was reduced to 23.9 percent while Brazil reduced its public sector debt to less than 20 percent of GDP by 2007.

In the area of social policy government action challenged the 'fiscal discipline paradigm' dominating the 1990s via significant increase in social spending. This change, however, does not represent a direct return to universal welfare provision. Conditional Cash Transfer Programs (CCTs) represented the neoliberal flagship in terms of radically shifting social intervention from supply to demand; from protection based on universal access to means-tested assistance targeted to 'vulnerable groups' (Barrientos and Santibáñez, 2009). Change in the paradigm of social protection introduced not only the notion of targeted assistance but also the idea of conditionalities. In this line, for instance, WB-sponsored anti-poverty programmes gave cash to poor households who in exchange had to ensure their children's school attendance, health checkups, etc. (Sewall, 2008, Hall, 2006). It represented a radical shift inasmuch as the state withdraws from critical functions in the light of a tendency towards individualisation of responsibility (in the form of individuals or families).

Both Brazil and Argentine governments established high-profile income transfer social programs. What is new under this new period is the scaling up of social assistance as well as the incremental withdrawal of preconditions (or the inclusion of new groups of beneficiaries) to gain access to programme benefits. Lula's government instrumented a new repertoire of social schemes of which *Fome Zero* (literally, Zero Hunger) and *Bolsa Familia* (Family Stipend) gained particular attention. The former distributes food stamps and in-kind disbursements to qualified families whereas the latter, despite alleged bureaucratic

inefficiency and local corruption (Hunter and Power, 2005), seeks to provide low-income families a minimum income, to encourage them to enrol their children in school, and to afford them basic medical care. Initiated in 2003, it has become the largest social policy in the world. Its four sub-programmes (educational stipends, maternal nutrition, food supplements and domestic gas subsidy) benefit some 30 million of Brazil's poorest people (Hall, 2006). Households are the unit of support as it targets the poorest using a mix of selection techniques. In Brazil's Bolsa Familia, the targeting mix involves a comparison of per capita household income with the national poverty line. This is combined with category-based indicators, such as a minimum age of entitlements (Barrientos and Santibáñez, 2009: 14). The program reproduces though the emphasis on the demand side reflecting the perception that 'strengthening the supply of education and health care, important as it is, may not be sufficient to reach the poorest' (Barrientos and Santibáñez, 2009: 11).

In Argentina, throughout Nestor Kirchner first and Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner (2007-ongoing) next also introduced initiatives that signal both departure and continuity from neoliberal social policy. Social security reform extended access to unemployed and informal sector workers under the first Kirchner administration, bringing more than a million new people into the system, from less than 100,000 in 1996 to a record 2.2 million in 2003 (Garay, 2007: 302). After a decade of poor performance of the private pension system (AFJP) introduced by Menem, the Argentine Parliament (re)nationalised the pension system in 2008. But it was the implementation of initiatives such as *Argentina Trabaja* (Argentina Work) and *Asignacion Universal por Hijo para la Proteccion Social* (Child Allowance) which better catalyse recent transformations. The former aims to innovate in social provision insofar as it defines cooperatives as its unit of support and integrates from above a participatory ethos constructed from below. Formally seeking to integrate 'self-organisation from below with genuine job creation' (Lo Vuolo, 2010a: 5) it provides funding opportunities for the implementation of productive, and ideally also sustainable, projects. It innovates in the sense that it funds cooperatives and not individuals or families and it reproduces neoliberal arguments in the imposition of conditionalities, in this case, in the form of work. The Child Allowance Program (AUH) was introduced in 2009 by the government of Cristina Kirchner. The Program has been qualified as a 'hybrid' (Lo Vuolo, 2010b: 18) because it mixes elements of both social security insurance and social assistance.

However, it is precisely the elements of hybridisation present in contemporary social schemes (specially the Child Allowance and Family Stipend) in Brazil and Argentina which led commentators to suggest a positive correlation between the scaling up of conditional cash transfer programs, on the one hand, and reaching (re)universalisation and more radical redistributive effects (Citizenship Income⁸ type) of social protection in the region (Lo Vuolo, 2010b: 24). They signal a new emphasis though not built on the radically undoing of neoliberal paradigmatic changes of the 1990s.

Finally, the state vis-à-vis social movement organisations also show signs of transformation during this third moment. If the 1990s found most of the popular movement against the state seen as literal encapsulation of the neoliberal project, over the recent years, on the contrary, Brazilian and Argentine states receive a different characterisation due to, among many other reasons, their permeation against ‘the left’s agenda setting capacity’ (Arditi, 2008). The substance of this final point is answered by this thesis as a whole which is why here I only present a general characterisation rather than a detailed account. The election of President Lula, long-standing friend to MST, was greeted with enthusiasm and a sense of relief by the MST. The Workers Party no longer sought to criminalize the movements’ protest (Carter, 2010: 161) despite repeated demands by right-wing politicians and the conservative media establishment. The government of Nestor and Cristina Kirchner also adopted a similar approach towards social protest which showed significant decrease after 2001 (Schuster et al., 2006). Kirchner’s administration promoted the nullification of Alfonsín-era Final Point and Due Obedience laws which had limited the scope of human rights trials; as well as Menem-era pardon to top generals responsible for the Dirty War (declared unconstitutional by the renewed Supreme Court). Rather than building a government coalition based exclusively in agreements with political parties, Kirchner founded the ‘transversal movement’, integrating social activists to the forefront of electoral politics. Equally, Lula’s administration appointed an MST militant to the agrarian reform ministry in Brazil.

The relationship governments vis-à-vis social movement organisations has also been shaped by the reactivation of collective agreements between unions and the private sector as primary means to discuss wages. Trade unions that opposed neoliberal policies in the 1990s gain organisational control becoming the dominant trade union stream both in Argentina and

⁸ For the development on CI global project and its degree of implementation in different parts of the world, see <http://www.citizensincome.org/> (Accessed: 16.01.11).

Brazil. As a result, this period elicits a shift from social protest to strikes. Union-led conflict becomes again the dominant form of working class contestation (Etchemendy and Collier, 2007: 370) with a caveat, however. Strike increase correlates, in the case of Argentina, for instance, to the number of collective agreements celebrated between unions and businesses under state consent (Tomada, 2007: 80).

This process is far from lineal. Notwithstanding greater room for dialogue with popular movements, in Brazil, Lula's government failed to pursue a more audacious agrarian reform. The mechanisms put in place by the Argentina state to force movements into NGOs in order to be subject of social policy has been interestingly characterised as 'contested institutionalisation' (Dinerstein, 2010), i.e., as expression of an achieved partial agreement on the bases of unstable and ongoing dynamics of disagreement.

2.2 Research Text: On Researching Trade Unions and Social Movement Organisations⁹

Against this background, in this second section I seek to define methodologically what specific case studies would facilitate my qualitative exploration to gain insights upon broader processes. I undertake this objective by introducing organisations' history and characteristics in relation to epistemological rational and research methods used throughout the research.

My argument, as anticipated in the introduction, is that the contextual path enacted in the formation of three differential moments remains insufficient to answer questions posited in the introduction and that could be summarised as:

How was the internal *articulation* (à la Laclau and Mouffe, 1985) that expressed *disagreement* (à la Rancière, 1999) and instituted a new consensus been built? What effects in terms of transformations and limitations emerge from the development of such a specific process?

⁹ It should be noticed the difference between 'empirical references' and 'objects of study'. Radical Democracy is the object of study of this thesis whilst trade unions and social movement organisations represent empirical references against which the argument of this thesis is constructed.

The answer to these questions exceeds institutional analysis and it is embedded within the practice of social actors that enact and are being enacted by actions that both reproduce and challenge forms of domination. The social, social actors, social movement organisations, i.e., practices instituted in the social become therefore central for the study of democracy insofar as it is the space where social relations encounter its foundational moment. In this respect, therefore, my argument contradicts Transition School interpretation of social movements as ‘a temporary outgrowth of the suppression of conventional politics by bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes, a trend that would weaken with the return of electoral democracy’ (Stahler-Sholk et al., 2007).

Instead, I propose to look at the process of democratisation as the ongoing movement ‘where liberty is to be exercised, the place where the power of the demos that brings off the part of those who have no part is to be exercised’ (Rancière, 1999: 66). The *demo* is then broken down into its members and order is established, consensus instituted and disagreement displaced. But we know with Laclau (2001a) that democracy is built upon a paradoxical ambiguity between precisely the tendency to institute the universal (*one* demos) and the tendency to produce particularities (differentiation); or the logic of difference vis-à-vis the logic of equality. Because the unilateralisation of either of these tendencies results in the death of democracy as a political regime, democratisation in the post-transition context in Argentina and Brazil needs to be researched along this paradoxical movement and not within a static framework that sets an empirical point of departure (traditional-delegative democracy) in relation to an illusionary point of arrival (modern-representative democracy).

2.2.1 Hypothesis

My thesis posits the exploration of democratisation through the configuration of democratic subjectivities. I argue that in the post-transition context in Argentina and Brazil, democratic subjectivities are the result of three interlocked and contentious no-territorial dynamics (self-organising, networking and demanding) *in relation to* the formation of a changing ‘contextual exterior’. Over the past thirty years of post-transition democratisation in Argentina and Brazil, I suggest that it is observable the development of two differentiable moments (or different democratic subjectivities) which effects indicate a shift from ‘disagreement’ to ‘participation’.

The latter expressed, following the terms used in the question raised earlier, a specific type of formation of internal consensus (or liberty, or demos, or universal) which enacted antagonism (politics) in turn affecting the (re)institution of new consensus¹⁰.

This hypothesis is constructed upon the interaction of four differentiable relations which in turn are embedded in two critical sociological dimensions, i.e., time and space.

Relations of Space(s)

Social movement organisations and trade unions are permeated by a ceaseless process of territorialisation and de-territorialisation. I suggest that territorial actors are constructed (and are being constructed) within three ongoing non-territorial (and contentious) dynamics. They constitute spatial references because they are essentially embedded in the practice of societal actors. They are expressed in the form of cross-organisational dynamics which transform organisational practices as a result of their enactment of such dynamic. As a consequence, the original territoriality marking particular social practice drifts away towards the development of a more universal (and common to heterogeneous actors) non-territorial dynamic.

I differentiate three (spatial) non-territorial dynamics:

Self-organising: it sets in motion grassroots activation in relation to the established corporatist tradition; challenging hierarchical hegemonic arrangements.

Networking: it sets in motion the interdependency between autonomous organisations and heteronomous cross-organisational networks. It challenges 'organisational strategic action' as well as 'organisation as vanguard'. It observes instead mechanisms of horizontal, cross-organisational 'deliberation by default' beyond instituted 'deliberation by design'.

¹⁰ The identification of two moments, i.e., a moment of 'disagreement' and a moment of 'participation', aims to mark a conceptual differentiation between the type of democratic subjectivity constructed in the 1990s and the one produced in the 2000s. In other words, this part of my hypothesis has descriptive pretensions, to note the process of displacement and change caused by precisely the generation of disagreement against neoliberalism. Because democracy is understood in this thesis as an ongoing movement of permanent reconfiguration of socio-political conflict, it would be wrong to understand participation (as I understand it) as a point of arrival. Instead, participation, as clearly explained elsewhere in this thesis (see Chapter 6), is defined in opposition to disagreement, that is to say, it holds phenomenological rather than ontological connotations.

Demanding: it sets in motion societal action in relation to material demands. It provides the names upon which heterogeneous struggles are instituted, articulation enacted and differentiations established. It challenges the ‘delegation hypothesis’ and posits the liquidation of the distance between object and subject.

Relations of Time

Time in my thesis is expressed by the constitution of the exterior which is ‘a relation of exterior’ and not an ‘independent outside’. It supplements the ‘internal’ formation of democratic subjectivities expressed by non-territorial dynamics by adding historicity in embracing the effects of radical contingency, different from subscribing to a teleological narrative of history.

Contextual exterior: it is the result of the intersection between ‘struggles from below’ and ‘policies from above’ and because it enacts opposing antagonism between two antagonistic parties it creates the effect of simplification of the political field. The contextual exterior integrates the role of the states in relation to practices of contestation which in turn institutes a fundamental relational context.

2.2.2 Qualitative Design

In order to investigate the above posited argument I have designed a qualitative research strategy primarily following the epistemological/methodological approach suggested in ‘The Craft of Sociology’ (Bourdieu et al., 1991). Qualitative and quantitative opposing paradigms have largely dominated the epistemological discussion in social sciences since Auguste Comte’s formalisation of the sociological enquiry more than a century ago. Qualitative versus quantitative approaches have to a large extent reproduced philosophical dissensus over the definition of reality expressed by positivism versus constructivism. Beyond the ‘methodological monotheism’ at the root of epistemological divisions, Bourdieu et al indicate, following Comte, that ‘methods’ should not be studied ‘apart from the research in which it is used’ (Bourdieu et al., 1991: 1). In the words of Silverman (2001: 21) the value of a research method should properly be gauged solely in relation to what it is trying to find out. That is, a

methodological approach cannot be explained independent from philosophical formulations or from empirical observations. Instead, it is the ‘craft’, the research put in practice, of going from principles to facts and from facts to principles, what elicits the logics underlying our thinking and ultimately shapes research methods.

Thus, in what follows, I comment on methods *applied to* this research in particular aiming to express the reasoning behind my argument. In doing so I point out what I perceive as the advantages of following this path, in the light of given strengths of the argument and, equally, I warn on field work difficulties as well as general disadvantages primarily in relation to research limitations in scope which, however, may be overcome with further research.

The qualitative character of my research approach is given primarily by the fact that I did not start this research with a clear hypothesis in mind which affected the way I finally designed, planned and undertook observations. I started my research with a clear interest in learning about the relationships between contentious collective action, politics and democracy. Also, I had the impression that sociological understandings of social movements were going to one direction while political science interpretations on the same subject were going to a different one. I started my PhD research with a topic though vaguely defined, a sceptical attitude towards the dominant paradigm on democracy in the region, and with concerns about the problematic lack of dialogue between sociological and political science traditions with regards to democratisation. Thus, my research represents to a great extent what textbooks qualify as ‘qualitative design’ as it is a quest for competing meaning(s) rather than an attempt to test a hypothesis set in advance (Silverman, 2005: 112).

But in addition, my research results implicitly comparative inasmuch as they holds three differentiable elements: a) there are at least two case studies under examination (Bryman, 2008: 58); b) the analysis aims to understand ‘a process’ by measuring cases in their different socio-cultural settings, eliciting similarities and differences (Hantrais, 1996 in Bryman, 2008: 58) and c) time constitutes a criterion structuring the formation of case studies and the selection of empirical references. It is only implicitly comparative because the research question seeks to explore the development of ‘a common democratisation pattern’ rather than to explain different paths or different results. However, research projects relying on small-n case studies and holding qualitative and comparative cross-national approach ‘benefits from engagement with different contexts, which facilitates the conceptualisation of core common

features of particular processes, experience or event, without any loss of rigour' (Rueschemeyer 1991: 32 in Carmel, 1999: 143).

2.2.3 Selection of Case Studies

As Bourdieu (1998: 2) in the chapter quote insinuates, the logics of the social world can be captured through the construction of case studies that because they are historically located and dated illustrate a possible configuration of the social world. In this research I draw on case studies understood as 'configuration of factors' (Bryman, 2008: 53) insofar as they are the result of the intersection between selected empirical references and guiding theoretical concepts. That is, empirical references inform case studies but they do not represent simple empirical illustrations of theoretical assumptions. This is important because although qualitative designs in social sciences try to distance from the quantitative cause-effect scientific modelling, the latter tends to prevail when defining the object of study largely relying on a variable-based approach. 'Triangulation' or 'mixed methods' (Bryman, 2008: Part 4) which in theory aim to overcome the qualitative / quantitative partition ultimately fail in deconstructing empiricist assumptions underpinning the construction of research objects as the consequence of a predetermined set of variables.

My original research aim was to explore processes of democratisation in the past 30 years in Latin America and not only in Brazil and Argentina. For reasons of feasibility I decided to concentrate my attention in two of the largest South American nations whose historical development dynamic has to a large extent shaped the regional pattern. I undertook this trade off in the understanding that I would be able to substantiate a scientific argument where results and implications could eventually be further studied in other countries in the region. This is the reason why this research concentrates exclusively in Brazil and Argentina and reflections and results therefore have to be read within the Argentinian and Brazilian context of the past 30 years.

I was also interested in researching processes, involving multiplicity of actors throughout a significant period of time. How to undertake the latter from a qualitative research perspective? I was haunted by this puzzle over and over again along my PhD. I constructed a solution to this problem inspired in recent New Social Movements' literature on methods (McAdam et

al., 2008, Tilly, 2004a, Tilly, 2000) which decisively influenced my decision to focus my attention not only in two countries but also in specific organisations within Brazil and Argentina. They introduced the idea ‘mechanisms’ as processes-based strategy seeking to study complex and multi-level socio-political processes beyond variable-based approach. Mechanisms-explanation go beyond ‘x follows y story’ (McAdam et al., 2008: 308) challenging the classical positivist-experimental model of correspondence while elaborating on the analysis of alternative elements such as episodes or ‘transforming events’. The conceptual innovation seems useful because it brings to the centre of analysis ‘objects’ whose importance tend to be displaced by ‘stable’ elements like , for instance, political institutions. Also, it leaves room for interpretation, that is, in Bourdieu’s words, for the practice of sociology to take place. There is a distance between an event, an episode, and a variable. While the former involves complex hermeneutics the latter imposes simple causation.

Where to look at the relationships instituting the emergence, production, intersection of mechanisms of democratisation? My answer to this question was: in organisations which ex-ante appraisal concluded in high levels of societal activation though not apparently direct involvement in issues of democracy. In other words, I decided to look beyond political institutions or how these political institutions were instead enacted, challenged, produced within societal actors. My research question led me to study the politics of democratisation beyond the traditional established spaces of politics. As the study demonstrates, the latter did not undermine attention to traditional spaces of politics but instead reassessed them in the light of data emerging from where it had been displaced.

Also, because one of the key themes coming through the theoretical framework of this project relates to the interrelation of *equivalences* and *differences*, or the processes and dynamics forging contingent unity positions out of heterogeneous positions, I studied two different types of organisations, organically separate from each other and holding different degree of institutional formalisation. The second selection criterion led me to choose social movement organisations (less institutionally formalised), on the one hand, and trade union organisations (more institutionally formalised), on the other. Subsequently, I identified two organisations in each country coming from different organisational type according to the established criteria. Finally, as the first part of this chapter made clear, the 1990s represented a pivotal time within the three differential post-transition years. As a consequence, the last criterion was that they should have been visibly involved during the establishment of neoliberalism.

Although trade unions and social movements organisations have been for a long time considered separate entities enacting essentially different type of collective action (contingent, issue-based movements versus stable, corporatist institutions); academic interest in researching the effects of their interaction is now apparent (Kelly, 1998, Moody, 1997). I propose to study the socio-political effects of their interactions from a Radical Democracy perspective as valid means to move the discussion beyond the ‘industrial relations’ - ‘social movement’ dichotomy. For a detailed discussion regarding the former see chapter 3 and regarding the latter see chapter 4. In brief, Radical Democracy perspective contributes to overcome conceptual overstretching as its epistemological foundations reject the idea of a pre-existing privilege locus of collective action, either in the form of trade unions or social movements. The type of action that concerns politics, instead, is the result of hegemonic struggle between equivalences and differences. This process of articulation ‘is a practice and not a name of a given relational complex’ (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985: 93). In other words, the moment of unity (politics) is the result of the articulation of fragments and not the expected outcome of moments of totality that transcends them. Without an assumed moment of totality we are forced to study organisational forms, like trade unions and social movement organisations, as fragments rather than somehow privileged locus of contentious collective action. It is the approach I follow in this thesis.

As a result I selected as organisational empirical references the following:

In Argentina:

1. Argentine Workers’ Central (*Central de los Trabajadores Argentinos*, CTA)
2. Land and Housing Federation (*Federación de Tierra, Vivienda y Hábitat*, FTV)

In Brazil:

3. Unique Workers’ Center (*Central Única dos Trabalhadores*, CUT)
4. The Landless Rural Workers’ Movement (*Movimento dos Trabalhadores Rurais Sem-Terra*, MST)

Table No. 2: Descriptive Information of Empirical References

	Brazil		Argentina	
	CUT	MST	CTA	FTV
Foundation	1983	1984	1992	1980s
Members	7 m 3299 affiliated institutions	1.5 m (estimated)	1 m 240 affiliated organisations	100 thousand (estimated)
Membership	Organisational affiliation only	Direct affiliation	Organisational and direct affiliation	Direct affiliation
Mission	To represent private and public workers To struggle for socialism	To struggle for land reform / food sovereignty	To Represent employed, informal and unemployed workers (the working class) To become a political movement	Improve the condition of life in poor neighbourhoods and settlements
Structure	<div> Worker ↓ Union ↓ Federation ↓ Confederation ↓ State CUTs → National CUT </div>	<div> 'nucleo de base' ↓ Settlement/encampment meetings ↓ Regional representatives ↓ National Coordinating Body </div>	<div> Worker ↓ Union ↓ Federation ↓ Confederation ↓ Provincial CTAs ↓ National CTAs ↑ Worker </div>	<div> Neighbourhood internal commission ↓ Coordinating commission ↓ Provincial FTVs ↓ FTV National table </div>

The interest in these organisations lies on the fact that they fulfil the selection criteria, that is to say, I am not interested in providing an organisational history or individual accounts of internal organisational dynamics. Instead, I aim to use these organisations to explore the broader set of relationships, solidarities, contestations, alliances, etc., permeating their action and hence expressing insights of the general post-transition democratisation picture.

2.2.4 Methods and Field Work

The methodological rationale underlying my research project was constructed upon a interlocked chain of decisions influencing and conditioning each other. The fact that I

decided to concentrate my focus on two specific types of organisations in turn affected the nature of data-collection techniques used. Before moving towards explaining research methods, I need to make a brief comment on the notion of ‘data collection’. My research strategy consumed different methods of data ‘making’ or ‘generation’ (Baker, 1997: 131), a notion I prefer to use, instead of the positivist resonance of the idea of ‘data collection’. The latter takes for granted the fact that data is something the researcher can find ‘out there’, namely, independent from researcher’s subjective influence, by using the appropriate methodological tools. Instead, I understand research methods are part of the process of data building, making or generation. In this sense, truth is not found neither pursued in this research outside the object of knowledge but engaging with the ‘researched’ (Pearce, 2010a: 35 and 36). Selected methods shaped as a consequence not only the type of data (qualitative in our case) to be produced but also the nature of the data itself. In other words, the selection of methods that I comment upon next were influenced by the interlocked decision-making chain including theory, epistemology, topic, type of research question as well as geographical and organisational focus. They played, as a consequence, a functional role in relation to decisions made beforehand. In turn, field work results influenced the nature and orientation of subsequent decisions, most importantly, the form of data analysis.

In order to gather data from selected empirical references I drew on both primary sources and secondary data. In addition to the literature review on academic material related to case studies, I undertook extensive document analysis on non-academic material produced by organisations themselves. This included multiple work days at the CUT document centre in São Paulo; MST *Escola Nacional Florestan Fernandes* in the outskirts also of São Paulo as well as CTA and FTV research institute and documentation centre in Buenos Aires city. I undertook these tasks while on field work in South America between August 2009 and January 2010. Although I travelled to São Bernardo do Campo and Guararema to undertake interviews and to visit MST national school correspondently, both located in São Paulo metropolitan area, field work was primarily undertaken in the cities of São Paulo in Brazil and Buenos Aires in Argentina. This decision was based on the grounds that it is where organisations’ headquarters actually operate and could result in better ‘field work productivity’ in the context of limited time frame and financial resources available.

Mass-media outputs and internet resources were my second important source of secondary data. I searched for specific as well as general information in the following online newspapers. In Argentina I primarily looked at Clarín, Página/12, La Nación and Diario Perfil. In Brazil, I looked at O Estado de São Paulo, Folha de São Paulo, O Globo and Brasil de Fato. I used newspapers online search engines using key words for theme searches and dates for relevant episodes. One chapter of this thesis (Chapter 4), for instance, is constructed mainly upon the development of two specific mobilisations or campaigns. Researching mass-media output became an important element for this chapter as it helped to gather not only additional information on campaigns themselves but also reactions expressed by supporting and competing actors somehow related to the development of these specific actions. It was therefore a critical input in the construction of actions' broader picture. Selecting the campaign or mobilisation in this case was critical as it provided two essential elements to properly use newspapers' online search engines: concrete dates and specific themes.

In addition to secondary data this research project benefited from 'insiders account' or first-hand data produced mainly through two interrelated methods: ethnography and interviews. In many respects ethnography is the most basic form of social research based on observational work in particular settings (Hammersley and Atkinson, 1995). It is, however, the most sensitive method to understand a *different* group of people (Silverman, 2005: 49). The notion of 'different' is only used here for the purpose of indicating other national belonging from the researcher which in turn supposes a different environment and general common sense instituting the social world. I used ethnography as means to gather better understanding of organisations in the context of Brazil. I am Argentinean and although can understand the language and had been in Brazil before, I needed to check the validity of accounts on the ground interpreting and decodifying, for instance, the sense attributed to normal practice and extraordinary event. It represented, however, a functional and not essentialist use of ethnography. I spent three months in Brazil, a too short period of time that probably does not qualify as proper ethnography for an orthodox anthropologist perspective. My response to the latter is twofold: firstly, I undertook not 'random ethnography' but 'event ethnography'¹¹

¹¹ Because I do not develop specificities regarding access, I would like to briefly mention the following. In the case of this research access to organisations, gatekeepers, key informants and events, was the result of a combination of planned action together with 'luck and serendipity' (Bryman, 1988: 10). I established a broad network of contacts before arriving in Brazil and Argentina including specialist scholars working in local universities. Through snowballing techniques I managed to reach an interesting variety of actors who were willing to talk to me and some of them passed me on invitation to attend organisational events due to take place.

which resulted in gaining access to the density of the fabric permeating the socio-political relations of the organisations I was interested in looking at. Secondly, I supplemented ethnographic account with in-depth interviews that allowed me to cross-check and double-check my first accounts with interviewees' impressions on similar issues. I count as ethnographic accounts a) my participation in the two-day national meeting in São Paulo corresponding to the Coordenação dos Movimentos Sociais (CMS), 23rd and 24th of November 2009; b) two-day participation of different activities at the MST national school, 10th and 11th of October 2009.

I used interviews as additional method to gather primary data both in Argentina and Brazil. In the practice of this research, the border between ethnographic accounts and interviews remained fuzzy especially in relation to counting the number of interviews. I held countless conversations recorded only in my notebook which have enriched and inspired significantly different components of this project. To what extent were these 'informal conversation' on the field ethnographic accounts and to what extent they should be counted as 'interviews'? It is a question I cannot answer but leads me instead to raise awareness on the crucial importance that informal interviews have had in this project. Notwithstanding, a number of formal interviews were undertaken throughout the second half of 2009 in Argentina and Brazil. After the selection of case studies, I followed purposive samplings (Silverman, 2005: 129) to establish the type and estimate number of candidates I wanted to interview which in the course of the research I needed to adjust, though only slightly, for purposes of convenience and accessibility. Bryman (2008) rightly argues that qualitative research follows a theoretical rather than statistical logic which is the reason why purposive sampling should be treated as synonym to 'theoretical sampling'. In essence, the latter states that the selection of interviewees is carried out by purpose and not by chance which was clearly the case (as thought in advance as well as in practice) in this project. In order to construct the purpose informing the sampling I established the following criteria:

- Government officials (regional or national level)
- Social movement organisations' grassroots activists
- Social movement organisations' leadership
- Rank and file trade union activist

I have to confess though that at certain point during field work I lost track of what had happened due to 'planned action', what had 'snowballed', or what had occurred as result of pure 'luck and serendipity'.

- Trade union leadership

The intention behind the criteria was to integrate in-depth interviews as reflexive mechanism to think through socio-political issues concerning primarily the past two decades. For this reason, interviews questionnaires were semi-structured to facilitate the construction of dialogue and fluency in the relationship between the researcher and the informant. That is why it was suggested that the difference between ethnographic and quantitative interviews relies on the fact that the former are reflexive whereas the latter are standardised (Hammersley and Atkinson, 1995). I developed specific questionnaires according to the candidate I was about to interview. They all shared, however, a common part based on the following themes:

- Transition to democracy
- Neoliberalism vis-à-vis government
- Neoliberalism vis-à-vis popular organisations
- Perception on social and political institutions
- Social Protest vis-à-vis public policy
- Criteria for alliances
- Memories and reflections on specific events: for instance, 1995 oil strike (Brazil), 2001 revolt (Argentina).
- Criteria for contentious action
- Levels of territorial action
- Ventures / success / limitations / problems
- Perceptions of change / perceptions of continuity
- Organisational current and future agenda
- Pending national agenda

A total number of 32 formal in-depth interviews were undertaken. The number is significant only to point out how the saturation criterion was reached for the purpose of this research. I thought I had reached that level after going through interview number 25, i.e., after covered, more or less thoroughly, the pre-established theoretical sample. No more substantial information was being achieved through additional respondents. It indicated that I reached the (theoretical) ‘saturation point’ as no new data were produced through inclusion and analysis of new units (Sarantakos, 1998).

Table No. 3: Distribution of Interviews

	Government officials	Social movement organisations' grassroots activists	Social movement organisations' leadership	Rank and file trade union activist	Trade union leadership
CTA				4	2
FTV		3	1		
MST		6	3		
CUT				5	3
Argentina	2				
Brazil	3				

2.2.5 Data Analysis

‘making a lot out of a little’

(Silverman, 2005: 125)

Data analysis was an equally complex and fascinating process. The complexity of the process was given by the amount and diversity of data collected from primary and secondary sources. Interview transcripts, organisations' foundational statements, mass-media output, policy documents, organisations' national congress resolutions, etc., constituted text which although coming from dissimilar sources and corresponding to different historical moments had been collected for the 'purpose of this investigation'. Translating such quantity of data, through qualitative analysis ('purposely collected'), into a coherent analytical narrative represented a massive (and sometimes overwhelming) task. In order to find 'order out of chaos' the use of the computer-based software Nvivo became of paramount importance. Using Nvivo was extremely useful for two main reasons: data management and general organisation of different sources and types of data, on the one hand, and also for processing data encompassing the analytical exercise of interpretation, on the other. This was undertaken during the period of twelve months, throughout 2009.

But data analysis was also the most fascinating aspect of undertaking a doctoral research project. Although it would be technically incorrect to suggest that this stage constituted the moment of ‘discovery’¹², it did in fact represent the moment of great analytical innovation. I understand by innovation two interrelated issues. Firstly, it was only during and throughout data analysis that I finally encountered the meso-level categories filling the gap between theoretical presuppositions and ‘raw’ primary and secondary sources. Conceptual innovations like the ones this thesis puts forward (demanding, self-organising and networking) are the original result of this process. Secondly, I understand innovation as finding my own voice. To a great extent, discovering the argument of this thesis encompassed the thrilling endeavour of finding ‘my way to talk’. It became more visible in the narrative style but, more importantly, in the confidence given by the ability to engage with complex debates from an autonomous stance. *The* thesis became *my* thesis and the plural discursive *we* turned into a more assertive *I* (Galindo, 2011). Needless to say, a research project is never an individual endeavour but an ontologically collective one which fails, however, if the researcher is not aware of his/her own relative position in relation to the broader intellectual community. Discovering the *self* researcher became therefore as important as recognising inscription within existing relations of intersubjectivity.

Data process and data analysis were in this project two research tasks undertaken to a great extent in the space of one. After transcribing interviews, collating documents and organising the information into various clusters and folders, using Nvivo flexible and ample repertoire of tools, I undertook a first level of codification (‘free nodes’ in Nvivo language) seeking to translate as much information available as possible into manageable codes. Theory at this stage remained at the background rather than in the foreground aiming to make data ‘speak by itself’, or ‘moving from the particular to the more general’ (Bryant and Charmaz, 2007: 15). Writing memos and annotations was something accompanying this first layer of coding. Once the whole data had been codified a second tier of process/analysis was carried out in the form of associating codes into what the software calls ‘tree nodes’. The creation of tree nodes was something that happened ‘naturally’ or without too much interference of the researcher. It was, for instance, to a great extent the result of common sense that nodes such as ‘strike’ or ‘popular referendum’ were associated to the tree node ‘protest’. It was association by what Wittgenstein called ‘family resemblance’ and Grounded Theory takes to resist the

¹² The notion of discovery relates to hard sciences test-based experiments which differs from the epistemological standpoint suggested in (Bourdieu et al., 1991) and structures this thesis’ methodology.

preponderance of theoretical assumptions over empirical observations (Bryant and Charmaz, 2007: 15)

The emergence of *themes*, the third tier of data process/analysis, however, did imply greater intervention of the researcher. Tree nodes, grouping various free nodes from different sources, necessarily gained a more abstract connotation as they needed to express a greater diversity of empirical things. It was in the production of this hinge that innovation emerged in the context of this research. Clustered empirical data, only permeated by background theoretical assumptions, resulted in producing conceptual innovations inasmuch as it posited meaningful connections within previously disconnected issues. A coherent narrative (this thesis) resulted, as a consequence, out of the accumulation of meaningful connections (tree nodes) which surfaced primarily from within foreground empirical evidence and, secondarily, from background theoretical presuppositions.

My methodological stance share with Grounded Theory (GT) the mechanisms of data analysis needed in order to produce ‘theory building’. In fact, as already mentioned, this project relies on Nvivo software whose underlying rationale is built upon Grounded Theory’s main presuppositions. My stance departs, however, from the GT broader epistemological understanding as it assumes the radical separation between theory and data collection. I instead think the production of knowledge is the result of the intersection of theoretical presuppositions, epistemology and research methods (Bourdieu et al., 1991). The latter clearly rejects the possibility of constructing a-theoretical approaches to ‘reality’ because it assumes the latter as co-constructed between empirical data, researcher presuppositions and research methods, in the light of ongoing ‘epistemological vigilance’ (Bourdieu et al., 1991: 74).

Finally, data analysis is only differentiated in this project from data processing because, in its more narrow sense, the analysis only concluded with this PhD last sentence. In other words, writing up implied in practice extending and polishing analytical themes timidly emerging from data. I kicked off the writing up phase in December 2010 with a clear idea of the structure and logical connections cementing such structure. It was only within the writing up process, however, that I managed to unfold broad themes into more precise concepts in turn broken down into constituting elements. Beyond final analysis, the writing up phase also implied a space of confined limits and powerful freedom. The validity and reliability of a

qualitative research piece is given by the transparency shown in the process of decision-making influencing the researcher's interpretations (Silverman, 2005: see Part III, Chapter 14). It posits limits in the form of the narrative as the latter needs to be rigorously accountable. Notwithstanding, writing up represented also a space of powerful freedom. A space for arguing as rigorously as strongly for reasons found 'out there' eliciting urgent contradiction, often silenced in the name of safe complementarities.

2.3 Final Remarks

In this chapter I have identified what, when, where and how I am looking at democratisation. I have dated and named the context of the research, introduced empirical references and hypothesis, and put forward the research rationale. The following part (chapters 3, 4 and 5) elaborates on the reasons why democracy needs to be studied not as a goal attained but as a campaign implying antagonistic movements of disagreement and participation. The next section explores the production of democratic subjectivities in post-transition contexts.

PART II: Non-territorial Dynamics vis-à-vis 'Constitutive Outside'. Radical Conflict and Real Limits

The aim of the second part is to hear the voice of the actors and provide a first level of interpretation of emerging and competing meanings. Methodologically, it relies on first-hand accounts collected through interviews, document analysis and participant observation. Secondary data and relevant literature is used supporting the latter. The rationale underpinning the layout of the following chapters is twofold; a) to cluster the most common themes emerging from the analysis and b) to reconstruct relevant meaning by identifying relationships, commonalities and patterns of collective action, present in events, mobilisations, discourses and practices. The chosen strategy responds to the quality and type of findings produced by data analysis which is why chapters are structured according to themes rather than cases, viz. data is retrieved and assessed across case studies in order to look for the emergence of common patterns of interaction.

The argument underlying Part II could be summarised as follows: evidence suggests the emergence of three analytically different non-territorial dynamics (self-organising, networking and demanding) shaping the action of territorial actors and expressing, in the form of three different dimensions, a common lateral process of contentious activation. In addition, this section also explores the development of a fourth differentiable element (antagonistic contextual exterior) whose specificity lies in the definition of time insofar as it determines the configuration of historical moments. In sum, this part of the thesis unravels the different components instituting democratic subjectivities in post-transition contexts in Brazil and Argentina, i.e., the formation of contentious *space* (non-territorial dynamics) in relation to the contingent structuration of *time* (antagonistic contextual exterior).

Chapter 3: Self-organising. Grassroots Activation

‘Há sempre um grande grau de insatisfação... nós nunca estamos suficientemente organizados’ [There is always a major degree of dissatisfaction ...we’re never sufficiently organised]
(Claudia, CUT advisor, interviewed by the author, São Paulo, 28.10.09)

Introduction

Social protest, actions of discontents and alternative practices are frequently studied as result of opportunities opened up by the dynamic of socio-political cycles (McAdam et al., 1996, Tarrow, 1998); as the effect of grievances experienced because of durable inequalities (Tilly, 1978, Tilly, 1999) or, finally, as the consequence of state withdrawal from its regulatory functions (Munck, 2002, Garretón et al., 2003). In other words, most accounts of social protest tend to explain processes including mobilisation and social protest by applying existing theoretical narrative to emerging socio-political phenomena, confirming theoretical assumptions and only rarely giving an account of processes of either creation or innovation. In contrast, the aim of this chapter is to delve into the array of meanings emerging from, primarily, different forms of social protest, on the one hand, and alternative forms of doing¹³, on the other, in order to understand the meaning of unexplored hidden patterns of relationships within apparently dissimilar forms of actions.

¹³ The expression was used before as follows: ‘the subject of power and the state dissolves into other, more basic question...the way in which human activities are organised, the subjection of our doing to the logic of the social cohesion of capitalist society, what Marx called the subordination of concrete to abstract labour’ (Holloway, 2002: xi). The use of doing in the context of this chapter differs from the status of the concept in Holloway’s theoretical edifice. He understands doing as essentially embedded in multiple forms of abstract labour which basically reproduce existing capitalist forms of concrete labour. I also understand doing as obvious human activities but aligned with a more modest theoretical implication. The meaning of doing in this chapter expresses bottom-up forms of work which represent ‘alternative forms’ inasmuch as they have been self-generated outside formal employment or direct state intervention.

I introduce the argument of this chapter by positing the following two questions: How can we explain the enduring process of mobilisation that took place in the 1990s in Argentina and Brazil? What was this process of mobilisation and social protest actually expressing or, in other words, what was actually at stake behind the production of mobilisation broadly understood? In short, I argue that one of the key elements underlying the enduring process of mobilisations was the hidden presence of a non-territorial dynamic I call *self-organising*. I suggest that self-organising is a rhizomatic and nomadic type of ceaseless interconnectivity (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987) whose contentious character lives not only in the fact that it is driven and forged by grassroots activation but, even more crucially, in the contestation of a broader corporatist tradition, dominant in the South American socio-political order.

The chapter is organised in four sections. Firstly, I briefly reflect the line of inquiry of this chapter in relation to the industrial relations debate. In the second section I focus on the exploration of empirical data. More specifically, I study the meanings underlying what I synthesise under the name of ‘objective deterrents’ and ‘organisational forces’. Thirdly, I propose a preliminary conceptualisation of self-organising as useful typology to capture processes and mechanisms underlying adversarial socio-political action in moments of apparent turbulent fragmentation and missing common emancipatory narratives. Final remarks close the present chapter and anticipate connecting links with the next one.

3.1 Enduring Dissent vis-à-vis Restructuration of Industrial Relations

It is in the field of industrial relations literature that has explored most thoroughly the process of change happening within three interlocking areas such as, work, identity and collective action. There is an element of this debate discussed earlier in this thesis (Chapter 1) which recollection at this point is relevant for the purpose of the current chapter. To put it bluntly, the debate matters because this chapter suggests the presence of something (a non-territorial dynamic) which concatenation with other elements (discussed later in this thesis) explain the manifestation of contentious collective action in the form of the partial constitution of a democratic subjectivity. The logical question that needs to be assessed at this point is not empirical but primarily theoretical. What categories of analysis are informing the interpretation of ongoing dynamics at the empirical level? And why are they relevant?

The industrial relations debate theorised the relationship between employers and workers or labour and capital as a relationship primarily dependant on the capitalist nature of nation states (Upchurch et al., 2009, Kelly, 1998)¹⁴. One of the dominant lines of enquiry in the field of industrial relations understood the relationship between state and trade unions based on trade offs and resulting in the regulation of conflict. It is the principal claim of corporatism:

‘Corporatism (or more correctly, neo-corporatism) can be defined in terms of a political structure within advanced capitalism which integrates organised socio-economic producers groups through a system of representation and cooperative mutual interaction at the leadership level and mobilisation and social control at the mass level’ (Panitch, 1981a: 24 in Upchurch et al., 2009: 10).

Corporatism was the dominant political arrangement permeating social democratic regimes in post-war Western Europe and it supposed a specific type of interaction between unions, employers, political parties and the state. In a famous article Philippe Schmitter (1974) defined corporatism as a modern system of interest representation compatible with different political regimes.

‘Corporatism can be defined as a system of interest representation in which the constituent units are organized into a limited number of singular, compulsory, noncompetitive, hierarchically ordered and functionally differentiated categories, recognized or licensed (if not created) by the state and granted a deliberate representational monopoly within their respective categories in exchange for observing certain controls on their selection of leaders and articulation of demands and supports’ (Schmitter, 1974: 93 and 94)

Without reviewing the subtypes of corporatism, its general definition as system of interest representation is relevant for the purpose of our argument for two reasons. The first one is that although suggested as an ideal-type conceptualisation the empirical case of Brazil came rather close to the theoretically developed ideal-type, as Schmitter (1974: 94) highlights it. Similarly, the system of representation established in the 1940s by Peronism in Argentina has also been assessed in close reference to corporatism (Buchanan, 1985, Patroni, 2001, Levitsky, 2004, Torre and De Riz, 2001). The strong relationship developed over time

¹⁴ The debate within industrial relations exceeds corporatism and it could be approached from as many angles as existing theories in social sciences. I deliberately choose to build the argument in relation to corporatist approaches as it implications synthesise well the dominant pattern of interaction between workers, employers and the state in Latin America during the second half of the twentieth century. Needless to say, *in relation to* does not imply developing the argument *within* such framework.

between trade unions, a political party and the state in Argentina and Brazil proved to have an enduring historical legacy long after the time when they were first established. The second reason is related to the fact that the empirical data collected from trade union experiences as well as social movement organisations in Brazil and Argentina suggests a process of radical contestation and partial departure from corporatism as dominant system of regulation of industrial relations. As a consequence, the vocabulary and conceptualisation echoing theoretical assumptions about corporatism present important limitations on capturing the nature of new processes and dynamics involving trade unions, social movement organisations and the state.

The crises of the 1970s represented the most significant dislocation in global capitalist relations since industrialisation times. Scholars saw that the effect of the latter triggered at least two historical processes fundamentally transforming social relations and political representation. On the one hand, the process of deterritorialisation, as an expression of the general decline of the power of nation states, and on the other the process of informalisation, as not only the loss of labour rights but equally the crises of trade union organisations (Munck, 2002: 2 and 3). Despite interesting attempts to capture the reorganisation of trade unions, political parties and the state in the new environment both theoretically (Moody, 1997) and empirically (Collier and Collier, 2002), the discussion tended to remain trade-union centred leaving unexplored a vast array of alternative actors now equally participating in the creation of collective action.

John Kelly (1998) delves into the debate that discusses whether the labour movement is in terminal decline or on the threshold of resurgence. Remaining partially loyal to the core of the old industrial relations debate, Kelly introduces the mobilisation theory pioneered by Charles Tilly (1978) in order to reassess the question of how workers come to define their interests in collective or individual terms. He makes a substantive contribution through the exploration of workers' 'willingness to act' due to a shared sense of social injustice. His work successfully challenges scholars who see in the crises the conditions to explain trade union's 'moderate behaviour' as well as the tendency to offer concessions to the employer as part of the new 'social partnership' between labour and capital (Kelly, 1998: 14).

My argument in this chapter endorses Kelly's (1998) contestation of the idea that we are living in a context of 'general decline of collective action' (1998: 26) and, furthermore, I also

consider important his attempt to move collective action beyond the workplace, a common limitation on industrial relation studies. However, I think that his attempt to reconcile his Marxist approach to industrial relations together with social movement theory ultimately fails mainly because of two reasons. Tilly's departure from Marxism is radical and as a consequence there is no evidence in Tilly's work that could lead to his notion of 'interest' with the notion of social class as thought by Marx himself. Tilly (1978) defines interest as 'gain and losses resulting from the group interaction with other groups' (1978: 7), namely, there is no reference to the ownership of means of production. Kelly's analysis on the role of the 'capitalist state' (1998: 55-59), in turn, implies not only that the notion of 'interest' belongs to labour but also that 'proper' collective action is the one coming from workers and confronting employers. The latter as a consequence leaves room for ambiguity and it proves insufficient to capture the eventual emergence of new dynamics and contentious collective action.

Instead, as anticipated in the introduction, in this chapter I argue that the study of different practices (or 'doings') and forms of contestations in Argentina and Brazil show the presence of an ongoing dynamic I called self-organising. Its content is better captured by the image put forward by Deleuze and Guattari (1987), namely, *rhizomatic* and *nomadic*, for reasons I briefly discussed here, and which will be later tested in the analysis of empirical data.

Firstly, there are movements, articulations and solidarities whose development to a great extent is difficult to conceptually correlate to the development of capitalist relations. 'Labour movements follow predictable patterns that are closely synchronised with the rhythms of the capitalist economy', argues (Kelly, 1998: 1). It is a valuable point although it seems to be 'jumping' one analytical level insofar as it does not provide the empirical connectors to link ground empirical observations with grand theoretical narratives. On account of the latter, empirical data suggests the emergence of a dynamic which, although sharing some of the features highlighted by the industrial relations debate, also suggests specific elements which need to be addressed and interpreted.

Secondly and in connection to the above, although not directly related to capitalist relations per se, the formation of self-organising contributes to a highly relevant discussion currently permeating 'post-development debate' (Escobar, 1992). Challenging the historic division between 'revolution', on the one hand, and 'development', on the other, Escobar and others

anticipated the need to critically further elaborate crossovers between what he calls ‘the demise of development’ and ‘the problematization of protest’ (Escobar, 1992: 20). The contentious character of the self-organising comes precisely as result of the clash between ‘objective deterrents’ and ‘organisational forces’. In other words, by suggesting the conceptual (or typological) innovation of self-organising, I am proposing a particular type of connectivity between, on the one hand, macro-transformations of work plus the existence of competing framing narratives and, on the other, actions of protesting as well as actions of alternative ‘doing’. Thus, it is an attempt to recapture and interpret material not usually connected to the production of contentious collective action challenging the hitherto dominant differentiation between objective and subjective relationships.

3.2 Multiple and Contradictory Roots of an Emerging Rhizome

My argument in this chapter is that multiple forms of ‘protesting’ and ‘doing’ *in interaction with* ‘transformations of work’ and ‘competing framing narratives’, result in the production of a dynamic that in turn transforms relationships creating new contentious solidarities. The production of this *moment of structuration* (Laclau, 1993, Laclau and Mouffe, 1985), needs to be explored as the effect of what I generalise as the interaction of two camps, namely, ‘organisational forces’ vis-à-vis ‘objective deterrents’ (see figure no. 3 in this chapter).

In what follows I study the evolution of four different components behind the emergence of self-organising. It represents an exploration in hindsight tracing back loose sediments present in the moment of assemblage, namely, the formation of a non-territorial dynamic. Drawing on data from case studies I interrogate the meanings and relationships suggested by 1) the dese structuration of work as main governing mechanisms of industrial relations, 2) the effect of competing collective action framing narratives, 3) the increasing complexity of protest repertoire and, finally, 4) the meanings of setting in motion alternative forms of doing from below.

3.2.1 Labour Reforms, Representation Crises and Seed of Change

The context in which the formation of new organisations for the representation of workers in Brazil and Argentina (in the 1980s and 1990s respectively) took place could be characterised as a paradoxical intersection of both hope and dystopia. The 1970s witnessed a shift in global capitalism from what was broadly put as a shift from industrial to ‘post-industrial’ capitalism. This change which was encompassed by the subsequent predominance of speculation and finances over factories and production rightly led many commentators to warn about 1) increasing heterogeneity in the workforce, 2) decreasing trade union membership and 3) a clear loss of the power of trade unions as workers’ main socio-political organisational forms (Invernizzi, 2006, Levitsky, 2004, Lawrence and Ishikawa, 2005, De la Garza, 2001). The dystopian picture regarding workers’ prospects of collective action became apparent observing the relatively uniform and parallel implementation throughout the region of the famous SAP (Structural Adjustment Programmes) which in practice channelled deregulation policies, state withdrawal from universal benefit provision and radical openness of the economy through the removal of trade barriers; ideas inspired in the so-called Washington Consensus (Williamson, 1990, Basualdo, 2001, Acuña and Smith, 1994, Huber and Solt, 2004).

The context of global capitalist transformations, domestic neoliberal policies, debt crises and unemployment, a dystopian feature in my terms, was simultaneously co-produced by a ‘moment’ of ‘hope’ mainly attributed to the political democratisation which was overturning long years of dictatorships. Leaving aside the specific condition that finally triggered this process, what it is important to highlight here is the importance of the ‘imaginary’ of political democracy as locus of hope and possibility as the first Argentinean post-dictatorship elected president famously put it in a memorable speech in 1983: ‘with democracy we eat, with democracy we educate, with democracy we cure...’ (Pigna). In sum, it could be argued that expectations were higher than a form of government could actually deliver. However, it should be noted that in the case of both Argentina and Brazil living under democratic rule had been the exception and not the rule throughout their contemporary history.

So, it is in the context of complex ‘neoliberal democracy’, produced by the intersection of dystopia and hope, in which, for instance, the CUT agreed common aims in one of its founding documents, namely, the 1st CUT national congress of 1984:

‘CUT versus conservative (*pelego*) regime union structure

- Breaking the practice of trade union connected to the Ministry of Labour represents a victory. It is an achievement obtained by force.
- The CUT leads struggles against the government, the Electoral College, employers.... The CUT is a pole of resistance, of independent politics of workers.
- With the creation of the CUT, there was a demarcation in the field of association. On the one hand militant unionism and on the other the trailer (*atrelado*) of *pelegos*.

The CUT at the grassroots

- The CUT should develop an effort to take root in the bases, putting in practice the foundational principles *a CUT pela base*...taking into account important difficulties such as: military repression; existing union structure; lack of material resources; the fact that we are the opposition in many unions, etc. This work should consider the need to intervene at the grassroots level of every union including those of the Conclat.’ (CUT, 1984)

Also in Argentina, not too many years later, in something that further asserts a parallel regional pace in socio-political transformation, a few trade union organisations followed a similar path, breaking their affiliation with dominant CGT, and embarking on the creation of a new trade union central: The CTA. Two important points need to be highlighted after revising what CTA states in the Chapter II, the section for aims and objectives, of its novel statute, agreed in 1992. It aims:

‘to enforce trade union democracy, promoting secret and direct vote of members in choosing local, regional and national elections’
 ‘to integrate the organic participation of other workers organisations expressing popular sectors’ multiple demands and which also reflect the reality of pensioners, unemployed, and cooperatives sectors’ (ATE, 1992: Chapter 2, article c and d)

‘Article 4: Affiliation to the CTA is a voluntary and free act of workers older than 14 years of age...without further limitation than to be subjected to the current statute’ (ATE, 1992)

Despite the eight-year difference between the birth of the CUT in Brazil and the CTA in Argentina my contention is that they belong to the same historical moment and that is why I propose to look at selected extracts of their founding documents together. I acknowledged in

chapter 2 the most important difference between them. It is the similarities that count for the purpose of this section and that methodologically justify this use of the data.

The most relevant questions that this section raises is how can we explain the reproduction of unionisms as a practice in contexts in which trade unions were meant to ‘lose power’ not gain it, i.e., the creation of new organisations in a context full of disincentives (increasing unemployment + informality) for the development of ‘more’ trade unionism? The answer I propose is threefold: 1) as the question puts it, cases like the CTA and the CUT show a degree of ‘reproduction’ of practices insofar as they express ‘more trade unionism’. However, 2) despite ‘reproducing’ basic principles, CTA and CUT also suggest innovation through a) formally or informally extending membership to informal workers and b) empowering the grassroots in the decision-making process via the introduction of various statutory principles. And, finally, fundamentally and strictly connected to the latter, 3) the regeneration of solidarity bonds is built upon confronting corporatist arrangements and by doing so it names the causes of the conflict lying underneath this historical moment. This, as a consequence, turns this process into a contentious conflict insofar as it challenges disintegration (through the regeneration of solidarity bonds) and questions corporatists’ hierarchies (through the empowering of the grassroots). Let us explore the above in greater detail.

‘Mobilisation and negotiation is our trademark’ (BRA:TU:N3). CUT’s leader’s first-hand testimony helps to introduce my first point of contention, namely, that the emergence of CUT and CTA expressed to a great extent ‘continuity’ in the form of reproduction of trade union practices. If we read the mentioned testimony in connection to the first point of the quoted CUT first national congress (above), it could be deduced that there is no search for the eventual radical replacement of trade union organisational forms. Instead, they seek to ‘break’ with existing practices which make trade unions dependent from labour ministers; that is seeking a form of organisation with greater room for manoeuvre, with greater autonomy for decision-making and action.

‘...you have leaders in front of unions for more than 20 years who transform the union into an extension of their own home. A group of pretty old trade unionists set up the *Foro Sindical de Trabajadores* which in practice gather all of those against reform...against changing the trade union structure however small’ (BRA:TU:N1)

In other words, they see that trade union structures have been ‘colonised’ by a bureaucracy not only resistant to change but also enforcing the causes behind trade unions losing power within the labour movement. That said, it should be clear by now that they look to transform but not to eliminate workers organisations. As CUT’s leader put it, it is about ‘mobilisation and negotiation’, i.e., it is about keeping it within the established boundaries of trade unionism, i.e., as a mediation structure between workers and the state, though not of corporatist trade unionism, i.e., a dependency structure tout court. It is in this respect that I argue it is important to highlight change within the presence of elements of continuity.

Secondly, looking at CUT and CTA statutes quoted above there are elements of qualitative significance indicating apparent innovation in at least two respects, viz. a) the expansion of membership and b) the empowering of the grassroots. I should insist in saying that they do not represent facts but elements expressing innovation in relation to existing and dominant trade union structures. The expansion of membership is literal, comprehensive and expressed in the letter of article 4 in the case of the CTA whereas, in the case of CUT, although figuratively expressed in the narrative of the Congress memoirs, it does not form part of its normative framework. Regardless of the formal or informal fashion under which such extension took place, however, I argue that, whether said literally or figuratively, the implication of extending membership representation to workers outside formal employment carries a symbolically significant meaning because it represents an attempt to build a collective beyond the established borders of industrial relations. It represents an attempt to ‘reactivate’ (politically) what it has been ‘deactivated’ (economically) or, in other words, it is an attempt to (re)connect what has been disconnected, both through the regeneration of solidarity and mechanisms of representation.

In addition to this second point, my argument suggests that a process of ‘grassroots activation’ forced innovation via the introduction of various institutional mechanisms and organisational practices. The question would be why these new organisations bring ‘the enforcement of trade union democracy’ (CTA) and *pela base* (CUT) to the forefront of their organisational strategies? To what extent are they expressing something new in relation to existing trade union structures which were in turn the result of historical grassroots (*pela base*) waves of mobilisations? Is the need to emphasise what on paper already exists expressing the lack of what happens in practice? In relation to these questions one of my interviewee commented:

‘- In your opinion, what changed between the 1990s and the 2000s, that is to say, after 20 years of existence of the CUT? How would you assess its contribution?

- In the 1990s this thing happened separately. Today we have cross-organisational discussions where we debate with other centrals and movements and we undertake a collective work. It is not corporatism, namely, differentiated by working category. But, the most important thing for the union movement is not about the central itself, the union, [*the most important thing*] are the workers, the grassroots who are at the base working...and now leaders understood that we have to work not only together but alongside what happens at the grassroots, we have to respond to that...’ (BRA:TU:N3)

Corporatism was seen as a superstructure essentially cut off from the grassroots, a structure fundamentally dissociating elites from workers at the shop level. But this assessment of the trade union structure that they wanted to change had a more fundamental implication in relation to trade unions and conflict. The virtual separation between the grassroots and elites or, the process of segmentation and bureaucratisation, led unions to, on the one hand, a process of gaining unaccountable resources through trade offs (Etchemendy, 1998, Fernández, 2002) and negotiations and, on the other, to a parallel process of exclusion from the frontiers of socio-political conflict. In other words, it turned trade unions from socio-political organisations to efficient administrators of order (and resources). The importance of the former for the purpose of the argument is explained further in the following point.

Thirdly, the final analytical point I want to make to interpret the emergence of ‘more unionism’ regards the transformation of anti-corporatism into a contentious issue. This third point undoubtedly builds on the second mentioned earlier but it aims to highlight the process through which I argue ‘new’ unionism contributes to the expression/co-generation of contentious action. The regeneration of solidarity bonds that new unionism is proposing is built in opposition to existing corporatist type of relationships. In this sense, new unionism illustrated in the form of the CUT and CTA not only expressed (formal and informal) institutional innovation but, more importantly, the enactment of a contentious practice. The production of the contentious practice is the result of precisely a) giving the situation a name (democratic versus corporatist unionism) and b) enacting a mobilising practice questioning negotiations and trade off at the top, excluding the bottom. In other words, it was not the essential action undertaken by either CUT or CTA but instead its intersection with a moment

that combined ‘hope’ and ‘dystopia’ what resulted in the transformation of ‘union democratising’ action into ‘anti-corporatist’ contentious mobilisation.

Finally, the above leads to the following preliminary conclusion: within the field of work and the representation of work emerges an element that integrates both reproduction of order and the seed for change. Put it in very simple words, within the context of increasing unemployment and general loss of labour rights, there were actions and movements contesting the ‘natural’ unfolding of things. It was action which to a certain extent reproduced existing trade union practices adding as a consequence to the already diverse labour universe in Argentina and Brazil. However, I showed that such process came together with the drivers to name the conflict of the times and therefore to the potential to become political.

Departing from similar accounts others draw different conclusions seeing either a straightforward path from corporatism to clientelism (Levitsky, 2005) or the ‘defeat’ of organised workers at the hands of capital (Almeyra and Suárez, 2009). I disagree with both interpretations as their analyses exclude trade unions from the production and regeneration of conflict under ‘neoliberal democracies’. For them, trade unions lie outside the sources of production of conflict. My proposal is that the transformation of work and union representation should be read as the production of a ‘fragment’ of a bigger conflict that needs to be articulated with other fragments in order to become a (‘coherent’ because contentious) rhizome.

But up to this point it has been a partial account of things, one loose fragment of a more complex set of fragments constructing a significant relationship. There are other elements to consider before assessing *self-organising* as a full-fledged contentious dynamic in relation to the case studies under consideration, at a particular moment in time.

3.2.2 Competing Framing Narratives

The second set of elements whose meanings and effects in relation to contentious collective action need to be analysed refer to ideas and guiding principles framing movements’ actions. In this section I aim to interpret the construction process behind different movements’

approaches to collective action. As anticipated in the introduction, I argue that the effects of the transformation of work (2.1) together with the existence of competing framing narratives within and across social movement organisations co-constitute negative deterrents in the form of ‘competing narratives’ for the development of collective action¹⁵. Also, as suggested above, they do not constitute closed and final deterrents but open and indeterminate. Regardless of existing drivers for the creation of solidarity bonds, regarding these two subfields in particular, the prevalence of signals that deter the development of contentious collective action rather than encouraging a unified and common front is apparent.

A traditional way to look at this dimension of socio-political life has been by drawing on object/subject polarity. The tendency, especially in the field of industrial relations, has been to study action as epiphenomena of systems or class structure. This view has permeated both Marxisms and structural-functionalism in turn leaving little room for the constitution of ‘agency’. ‘For Lenin, for instance, the trade-union movement was defined as a pure economic actor subordinated to political action and political theory’ (Touraine, 1981: 78). Leaving naïf behavioural interpretations of social life, my theoretical stance highlights the importance of not only interaction but, more importantly, historicity and contingency for the production of which action is a constitutive part. In this sense I share the following thought of one of the key pioneers of social movement studies: ‘the separation of social practices from metasocial order, which shifts the meaning of the greatest struggle to a different level than that of their inherent action, has made it impossible to conceive of society in terms of social movements’ (Touraine, 1981: 79)

The production of agency within ‘objective’ constraints was at the centre of social movement studies: ‘Naturally, there are all kind of nuances in the practice of social movements..., but, quite fundamentally, their principle of self-definition, at the source of their existence represent a break with institutionalised social logic’ (Castells, 1998: 383). To put it briefly I agree with the constitution of the *self* as suggested by Castells as long as this constitution is taken as partial and incomplete and never as a totality and essential being. Indeterminacy and openness (Willmott, 1994: 90 and 91) alongside moments of structuration (Mouffe, 1988) (and not structural positions) need to be at the centre of the analytical lenses. The latter means


¹⁵ The basic assumption is that different prevailing ideas of change, revolution, social order, etc. lead to the design of different strategies in turn favouring or undermining processes of collective action.

a scale below the heights of new project identities and the search for the crystallisation of ideal/objectual subjects.

Another way of approaching ‘framings’ came from a Political Science perspective. Drawing on the political distinction between left and right Bobbio (1996) convincingly suggested that while Left tends towards equality the Right in turn tends towards inequality. This analysis could prove useful for the empirical detection of ‘extremists’ and ‘moderates’, ‘progressives’ and ‘conservatives’, etc., but it fails to capture the process leading towards the formation of ‘left’ and ‘right’ positioning. The empirical data I collected during field work and the analysis that followed, found the presence of competing narratives within and across movements themselves. In addition, I found subtle as well as significant differences when comparing framing narratives ‘on paper’ with ‘interactional’ framing narrative resulting from practice. The effect of the latter was that they did not entirely fit into overarching, pre-existing categorisations.

Thus, beyond economic and sociological reductionism, as well as not just seeking plain empirical categorisation, I propose instead to ‘look for practices in order to see what actors do, not simply what they say they do’ (Silverman in Parker and Hassard, 1994: xi). It is precisely because my argument, although inspired by theoretical ideas, is heavily based on empirical observations that I developed a typology that interprets the latter suggesting meaningful observations in relation to the former. What is more, the typology that follows focuses not only on unravelling elements significant to the argument but, more importantly, it responds to empirical analysis and therefore aims to provide an explanation but seeking primarily to remain loyal to empirical data. Although it is my original way to illustrate the existing competing framing narratives; the model partially borrows Therborn’s (2008: 5) idea to explain ‘social patterning of actors’. More specifically, I borrow the *x*-axis notions of ‘deference’ and ‘irreverence’ referring to existing inequalities of power. On the contrary, I replace the variable ‘collectivism’ and ‘individualism’, used by Therborn in the *y*-axis, for the ‘grassroots’ and ‘corporate’ as referring to compliance with existing state-organisations arrangements.

Figure No. 2: Sketching Competing Framing Narratives



Source: my elaboration based on (Therborn, 2008), my own analysis resulting from data collection during field work (October – December 2009) and secondary data in the form of newspaper articles (Folha de São Paulo, O Estado de São Paulo, Brasil de Fato, Página12, La Nación) and organisations' documents.

2 ('deferential grassroots'): this is a 'default' option neither of my case studies falls into. The combination of grassroots (ideas and practice) and deferential attitude towards existing power inequalities result in two types of relationships in which 'subjects' are either clienteles or citizens. The difference between the two lies in their degree of socio-economic integration. It represents a default box in our model because it expresses individuals or groups of individuals expressing a basically passive attitude whose effect is, under the formation of either type of subjects, the lack of production of actions of contestations.

More specifically, a) the behaviour of organisations and their members I am studying in this thesis (FTV, CTA, CUT and MST) are not characterised by exchanging 'favours' for votes (Auyero, 1997). What is more, b) they lack the 'founding favour' (Auyero, 1997) upon which such relationship is constructed because all four organisations actual 'founding marker' was constructed in actions 'against' a particular situation and not 'negotiating with' mediators. The founding marker varies according to each particular case: CUT and CTA's primary mission was to challenge corporatists' arrangements which were curtailing organised labour to confront neoliberalism. The CTA demanded 'trade union democratisation' and the CUT in turn called for the abolition of compulsory union tax. The MST was born against peasant eviction from their land and, as a consequence, in favour of agrarian reform. Finally, the FTV in Argentina was also born in resistance to a process of eviction of landless settlers during

dictatorships. In sum, broadly speaking, the case studies under consideration could not be easily characterised as mediators asking for state intervention in order to return a favour in the form of electoral support. The founding marker does not determine organisations' ultimate behaviour but it establishes though a limit to the orientation of such action.

The dominating value governing these situations is an atomised individualism whose effect is the unlikely formation of solidarity mechanism but occasionally spasmodic reactions to very specific situations. In addition, there is no rapport between organisational structures, narrative principles and the behaviour of their members. Members tend to use organisations (if any) as simple means but are not transformed by their engagement or participation in them. In other words, there is no production of organisational ethos, i.e., an imaginary that could transform both members and organisation as the effect the ongoing practice of acting together.

1 ('irreverence grassroots') vis-à-vis 4 ('irreverence corporate'): I explore these two categories together because the framing narrative of case studies precisely are better explained *within* the frontiers established between 1 and 4. The mathematical equation intersecting defiance to current (unequal) distribution of power and empowerment of the grassroots (namely, box 1) results in the production of the required ideological surface for contentious action *in relation to radical questioning of dominant corporatist tradition*. In turn, the intersection of the same irreverence against status quo but this time alongside the reproduction of 'corporatist' practices (namely, box 4), suggest the formation of a framing narrative supporting actions of renovation and opposition but not of contentious action insofar as its effects echo more to contentious continuity than to contentious transformation.

The above expresses a theoretical formalisation in which the practice of case studies only partially fits in; showing in turn a degree of increasing complexity that needs to be taken into account. The process determining the opening of 'framings' for radical contestation (box 1), on the one hand, *in articulation* with actions of dissent expressing partial continuity (box 2), on the other, proves the point regarding the 'detering' effect of existing competing narratives in the formation of contentious collective action. In what follows I briefly illustrate this point with empirical data extracted from each case study.

CUT

The strong grassroots component in the case of the CUT was not only expressed in the discourse but also in its practice. However, with PT in government the CUT also showed signs of pragmatism which in turn tempered grassroots activation. It was the union militancy of the early 1970s that resulted in the formation of more autonomous labour unions (Riethof, 2004, Almeida, 2001) whose shop-floor action demanded the abolition of the union tax, arguably the Brazilian corporatist cornerstone. These practices were also crystallised in CUT discourse. It was not the 'socialist project' formally framing CUT official documents but the idea of *CUT e pela base* which resulted in the establishment of factory commissions and the expansion of internal trade union deliberation (Rodrigues, 1997, Rodrigues, 1999).

On the other hand, without changing its discourse but adapting its practices, the CUT moved with the PT in government, as a scholar put it, 'from new unionism to unionism of social arrangements' (Alves, 2000). *'With the PT in government, we needed to widen our intervention creating more participatory spaces in order to control public policies...but we defend this government'* (BRA:TU:N1). The sentiment of bringing CUT grassroots participatory model into the PT-led administration of the government represented a strong driver for change in public policy (Abers and Keck, 2009, Burity Joanildo, 2006, Cornwall, 2008) though its results proved ambiguous. In 2005 at the possibility of changing the bases of corporatist legislation, the CUT elicited 'hidden' internal disputes revealing disagreement regarding union tax and trade union democratisation (Radermacher and Melleiro, 2007). The result was that unions enrolled in the Socialist Party and others left the central in a move that represented for the CUT a 20 percent membership decrease. Regardless of the nuances and details in relation to what led to the split, it proved a weak common understanding regarding the role of the grassroots in questioning corporatism in its legal form.

In sum, the case of the CUT should not be explained in dichotomous terms of *either / or* but instead in terms that integrate an irreverence narrative alongside both the grassroots and the corporate.

CTA

'Against the crises...there were many colleagues suggesting that the best option available was to become part of the system by organising trade union businesses. They were businesses that understood that trade unions were to be rescued but at the expense of workers' (De

Gennaro, 2001: 49). CTA's leader expressed above in a few words the sentiment driving the CTA attempt to recreate a new trade union culture in Argentina. They thought that the cause behind the complicity of the trade union movement with neoliberal reforms was precisely the existing gap between elites and the grassroots. As a consequence, its emphasis on participation from below as means to democratise trade union structures was paramount (Armellino, 2005). In the case of the CTA, its practices were effectively translated in the letter of its regulatory statute, expanding membership as well as introducing open electoral competition for the selection of delegates at different levels. All these represented indeed not only a symbolic activation of the grassroots through the rejection of corporatist arrangements but also the actual practical performing of the cause.

Notwithstanding the actual 'irreverence-grassroots' innovation mentioned above, the CTA also showed the repetition/reproduction of old corporatist practices, for instance, in September 2010. '*Testimonial action runs short in CTA ambitions*' (Página 12: 16.09.10) argued Yasky, the CTA executive seeking re-election. On the other hand, Pablo Micheli, the opposition candidate, expressed the part looking for 'greater autonomy' (Página 12: 23.09.10) in sustaining a hard liner position in relation to Kirchner administration. The election resulted in a bitter internal dispute, a scandal in the public eye, in a subsequent division into two fractions as well as in a legal dispute over the preservation of the CTA name. The process revealed not only disagreement regarding CTA relationship with Kirchner's government but a fundamental flaw in relation to the alleged grassroots governance ruling the Central's decision-making process.

Like the CUT in Brazil the CTA in Argentina reflected activation of grassroots questioning old trade union movement practices with irreverence force. However, at probably its most critical time, the legacy of 'old' practices within CTA unions and leaders outweighed the will showed in ideas of new projects. This complexity (rather than contradiction) explains why I choose to feature CTA framing narrative within boxes 1 and 4.

FTV

The case of the FTV (and the MST that follows) depicts a distinction from the two cases reviewed above mainly because it originally represent experiences not exclusively connected to issues of work. In addition, over time, they have continued to exist as social movement

organisations independent from trade union forms. The FTV founding marker is associated with the process of mobilisation, land occupation and the establishment of self-run cooperative housing projects which included the provision of public services at the early 1980s (Delamata and Armesto, 2005). Expressing a pressing demand for housing through the development of direct actions in a context of authoritarian government, the FTV¹⁶ weaved strong grassroots support and developed a communitarian ethos challenging patronage relationships dominating the politics for the poor in the suburban areas of Buenos Aires.

In what to some extent illustrates the changing regional socio-economic context, over the years, the FTV moved from a small organisation demanding housing to one of the quantitatively most important ‘unemployed’ organisations in Argentina. The latter is not understandable without taking into consideration the long process of ‘grassroots irreverence’ resulting in turn in community development in many of the neighbourhoods of Buenos Aires province where the FTV undertook its actions. Under Nestor Kirchner’s government (2003-2007), the FTV became the largest holder of government subsidies for the unemployed; managing for instance 18 thousand employment programs (*Programas de Empleo Comunitario* (La Nación: 17.06.07). Engaging in partnerships with the government through the actual implementation of social policy programs, the FTV encompassed an organisational shift from local-neighbourhood-orientated interventions towards actions echoing the national space. The latter did not imply the plain separation of its strong grassroots component and detachment of its original communitarian ethos but instead a nuanced transformation. In other words, the FTV did not become a trade union or an NGO but remained instead as a SMO performing irreverence actions against power structures. However, FTV’s interaction with the state expanded its interventions towards the distribution and administration of public resources partially displacing its original role in what, as a consequence, resulted in adding to its framing narrative elements of ‘corporate grassroots’.

MST

It was argued that MST *Mística* keeps the movement’s inspiration alive, develops a practical pedagogy, cements collective identity preserving its cultural roots, and also prevents in turn the movement’s institutionalisation (Issa, 2007). The complexity of political and ideological

¹⁶ The FTV was formally given its name years later within CTA organisational umbrella. In the 1980s the now called FTV was an informal neighbourhood network (*Red de Barrios*) in the suburbs of Buenos Aires. I keep FTV’s latest nomenclature to refer to previous action, however, for the sake of clarity.

traditions coexisting inside the MST includes Communists, Socialists, Catholics (largely aligned with the liberation theology tradition), Lutherans, Agnostics, open Marxists, etc. (Harnecker, 2002). The latter combined with MST innovative organisational characteristics turn the task of making MST fit into traditional ideological categories rather elusive. MST attention on the ritual re-inscription of the symbolic moment of emergence by performing the ritual mystical (*Mística*) illustrates the demarcation of a political frontier but (not accidentally) without giving the subject a name. At the cornerstone of the production of the *Mística* is the MST own anthem:

‘Come, let us fight fist raised, Our Strength leads us to build, Our country free and strong, Built by people power’ (*Chorus*, fragment of MST Anthem, available at <http://www.mstbrazil.org>, accessed: 05.07.10)

The discursive emphasis on power built by ‘the people’ and not ‘the peasants’, ‘the proletarians’ or ‘the workers class’ is aligned with the MST strategy to create a movement that integrates the whole family, namely, men, women and children and not the traditional model used by political parties and trade unions of the left whose effect, it is argued, empowers the adult male, primarily. Encampment and occupations, however violent, as a consequence, have been enacted by MST mobilising grassroots, namely, the family. Guiding principles were the result therefore of the intersection of ideas and practice. The movement aims to transform ‘the masses’ (landless without organisation) into ‘the bases’ (landless with organisation and therefore orientation) (Prólogo in Pizzeta, 2009: 11 and 12). As a consequence, the MST has not only aimed to reach the grassroots but has equally performed a mobilising practice from the grassroots.

The formation of the ‘irreverence grassroots’ is hence in the case of the MST a result of not only direct action questioning the ruling power structures in rural Brazil but also due to the formation of a strong grassroots built upon both *Mística* and actions.

The limits to the above are marked in the conflictual relationship between the reproduction of the *Mística* of radical transformation, on the one hand, and the actual pace of agrarian reform and transformation of rural Brazil in a context of dominating agribusinesses, on the other. To some extent, after more than 30 years, a degree of ‘routinisation of conflict’ led to a ‘two-speed’ process that a commentator called ‘my land your social transformation’ (Caldeira,

2008). It does not suggest an actual divorce between ‘ideological’ militant elites and ‘utilitarian’ settlers at the grassroots level but instead highlights the complexities of sustaining homogenisation and multiplicity in a context of rapid changing circumstances.

The framing narrative permeating the mobilisation process in which the case studies analysed above took part was therefore the result of irreverence towards unequal distribution of power vis-à-vis the frontier constructed upon the intersection of an activated grassroots and ongoing corporate practices. The effect of this formation was twofold. It favoured the establishment of inwards and outward organisational solidarity mechanisms because of the presence of a strong common element in the form of irreverence against existing power structures. But it equally limited the latter insofar as it excluded radical anti-corporatists competing framings.

3 (‘deferential corporate’): the present box represents the second ‘default’ category in my analytical model not because of lack of examples but because cases I am exploring in greater detail do not fall into it. The alignment referring to ‘deferential corporate’ resonates to plain corporatism, i.e., organisations not only complaisant with state policies but most of the time organised by the same state as means to regulate and govern socio-political conflict. There is no room for autonomy or self-determination. Unlike the category ‘irreverence grassroots’, organisations under this narrative framing hold organisational structure, discipline and collective behaviour. However, the main driver for collective action is exclusively aimed at resources control and administration. Trade union centrals such as *Força Sindical* (FS) and the *Confederación General del Trabajo* (CGT) in the 1990s in Brazil and Argentina respectively could be interpreted within ‘deferential corporate’ parameters.

The value resulting in this formation allows the creation of inward organisational solidarity bonds as it lacks potential to expand solidarity outside specific organisational structures. The activation of the grassroots is close to nil as rigid organisational discipline is constructed upon fixed hierarchies.

3.2.3 Social Protest: multiple meanings behind a complex repertoire

The array of social protest over the past 20 years was well documented both in Argentina and Brazil (Dinerstein, 2001a, Auyero, 2002, Eckstein, 2001b, Ondetti, 2006, Hipsher, 1998).

Very briefly, studies on social protest in the region have made two important contributions for the analysis of socio-political action. Firstly, after the end of the Cold War and the emergence of democratically elected governments in the region, socio-political studies, from various theoretical angles, contributed to delve into the new complexity surrounding collective action in general and social protest in particular. Social protest was no longer expressed in the form of illegal movements largely explained by the apparent existence of closed and repressive regimes; it now assumed a renewed multiform whose meaning needed to be carefully decodified. Secondly and in connection to the latter, because the wave of social protest was mainly interpreted in relation to the parallel implementation of the so-called Structural Adjustment Programmes, scholars tended to (rightly in my mind) explain it in terms of ‘defensive resistance’. This interpretation definitely elicited important features apparent in the process of social protest in the region throughout the 1980s and 1990s. My argument endorses the latter and builds on it. It also suggests, however, the existence of a tendency to emphasise ‘resistance’ as the ‘effect of’ leaving in turn underestimated the ulterior effects of the act of performing social protest in the public arena. In other word, I am saying that it was ‘the effects of the effects’ or, put it differently, the ‘effect taken as new cause’ which to some extent remained underexplored.

Thus, this subsection aims to highlight that the emergence of the array of social protest repertoire made discontent visible, on the one hand, and it equally created a ‘performing public act’, on the other. The combination of visible discontent vis-à-vis the act of performing such discontent in various forms in the public arena contributes in turn to the production a *deconstructing organisational force* for change. In other words, I argue that the act of demonstration and protesting is not just the ‘effect of’ but also, and more importantly, as the ‘cause behind’ the production of new solidarities and articulations previously nonexistent. Informing the argument further the data reveals a tendency towards a process of autonomisation ex-post demonstrations themselves as organisations lose control over further mobilisations and collective action. The emergence of a more autonomous *self* is as consequence anticipated in actions set up by plural *others*. The empirical correlation of this comes when demonstrations move, for instance, from ‘against labour reforms’ towards ‘against neoliberalism’, i.e., keeping the negative formulation but gaining a more general meaning. This tendency of collective action to produce ‘empty signifiers’ (Laclau, 2005b, Laclau and Mouffe, 1985) results in the amalgamation of heterogeneous struggles in turn producing unifying contentious nodes.

It is precisely the empirical illustration of the movement encompassing protesting, performing and later displacement that I turn to now.

The quantitative magnitude of the multiform ‘mobilisation wave’ represents a dimension of social protest which was thoroughly documented over the past years. Looking at the historical trend that spans from late 1980s until early 2000s, some observable commonalities become apparent. In Brazil there was a decreasing number of strikes (Invernizzi, 2006, Riethof, 2004), fluctuating number of strikers (Alves, 2000), increasing number of land occupations (Ondetti, 2006) alongside rising levels of violence (Heil, 2010), and growing media coverage of MST and other interventions of SMOs (Comparato, 2001). Similarly in Argentina, looking at the same historical period, we see decreasing levels of strikes, with force in the second half of the 1990s (Etchemendy and Collier, 2007: 387), encompassed by sustained levels of alternatively typified social protests (Schuster et al., 2006).

In sum, alternative forms of social protest tend to increase at the expense of trade-union led strikes. Although the correlation between collective action undertaken by unionised workers vis-à-vis alternative forms of protests displayed by non-unionised workers is apparent, the line of argumentation posited in this section aims to go beyond the dichotomy ‘industrial action’ (unionised) versus ‘social protest’ (non-unionised). Hence, quantitative data needs to be critically revisited in the light of qualitative exploration in order not merely to challenge dichotomous analysis but mainly to discover significant relationships between one and the other.

Looking in particular at the data produced in the analysis of case studies worked throughout this thesis, there are two important features to highlight, one empirical and the second one analytical. Firstly, the roots for contention proved to be creative and diverse to both unionised and non-unionised groups resulting in the displacement of a broad repertoire of collective action. It is important to emphasise the fact that both unionised and non-unionised organisations engaged in creative forms of protests and demonstration which to some extent arguably challenged pre-existing organisational boundaries. Secondly, data suggests a subtle but clear movement encompassing a transition from ‘protests’ to ‘campaigns’. This transition, elicited in the form of social protest, reveals a process of displacement from organisational

actions expressing specific grievances, angers and demands into the *constructions* of a less specific, more general and eventually more powerful cross-organisational force.

‘for the MST the act of occupying land- which they call ‘cutting the wire’ – is the cornerstone of their movement...it plays a key role in the *mística*, the moment of collective theatre and mythmaking that kicks off all MST events. MST leader João Pedro Stedile recognises that it is a huge step for a poor rural family to take part in an occupation. ‘The vehemence of this action means that no one can sit on the fence’, he says. ‘You have to have a position, either in favour or against [emphasis in the original]’ (Branford and Rocha, 2002: 65).

First and foremost MST encampments represent a kind of direct action aimed at gaining control over a disputed piece of land. As suggested it by Stedile, MST’s co-founder, this type of action creates both internal and external effects. Internally, it rigorously self-organises families and activists in the design and instrumentation of the best tactic to secure success. Because the action itself could result in violence and repression, deliberation and self-awareness over participation is paramount. But encampments also generate an ‘external’ direct effect in the form state intervention. They force direct government intervention where it was previously a matter of private businesses. Most of the time state interventions combine repression and negotiation largely depending on the government involved. But the immediate consequence of encampments lies in the fact that they happen to turn a ‘private’ issue into a ‘public’ contentious case. Agrarian reform, as a consequence, gains visibility and MST action as a whole is left open for the generation of a new chain of effects I analyse below.

The regional repertoire of social protest included *puebladas* (town revolts), *cacerolazos* (pot banging), *asambleas vecinales* (neighbourhood assemblies), among others. But probably the case whose effects mirror more clearly Brazilian encampments in Argentina was the *piquetes* (pickets or roadblocks).

‘That picket was historic because it ended up with the signing of an agreement between the government and social organisations. We got 25 million dollars for the construction of new schools, roads, precarious programs to get food, employment and preventive healthcare. In winter, thousands of families with children resisted on the picket line in the open, awakening in the idea that people could organize, fight and win. From then onwards pickets grew around the country. Groups, marches, strikes and roadblocks spread culminating in the 19 and 20 December 2001... Mostly, people took to the streets to demand an end to economic policy and reject the state of siege.’ (Luís D’Elía in *No somos lumpen o*

The FTV leader is commenting on his memories of the *matanzaso*, the collective action which brought to the city what up until then had remained confined to the very North and South of Argentina. Roadblocks were originally reactions against the privatisation of YPF (*Yacimientos Petroliferos Fiscales*) and the ‘dismantling of the quasi-welfare state developed by the former state-owned company’ (Dinerstein, 2001b: 2). They were originally conflicts circumscribed to the ‘ypefeano world’ (Svampa and Pereyra, 2003: 102 and 103), namely, a response to the destruction of a complex social fabric woven between resources of an active state and the development of strong identities. But pickets that emerged at the peripheries moved to the centre as the result of action like the one quoted above. Interrupting the circulation of people and goods proved effective to call everybody’s attention (Villalon, 2007: 142) and, as in the case of the MST, it generated both internal cohesion and external interventions.

Unlike encampments pickets ‘occupy’ the road rather than the land. Like encampments, however, roadblocks share the production of two effects. On the one hand, direct action generates in turn direct state reaction in the form of either repression or negotiation, and sometimes both. In addition, the ‘resolution’ of the specific action tends to result in the internal empowering of participants as they feel a sense of ‘victory’. As said in the quotation, although precarious, they obtained something that they did not have before the action took place. Either in the form of social plans, healthcare or a piece of land, the ‘recognition’ that comes ‘in return’ for the action is not only symbolic but also material and in many ways improves the condition of participants in these actions. On the other hand and because of the above, the occurrence of experiences like roadblocks and encampments are encompassed by a ‘performing public act’ whose resonance goes beyond the action itself. The latter generates visibility, namely, the transformation of a ‘private’ issue into a ‘public’ matter insofar as its consequences result in the generation of a new set of relationships previously inexistent; but it also produces a subtle process of displacement which I analytically suggest to interpret as the transition from ‘protests’ to ‘campaigns’.

Having used examples of ‘new’ social protest repertoire to illustrate the first part of the point above, I briefly draw on an ‘old’ form of social protest to illustrate the second part of it below,

namely, strike action. The ‘pick and choose’ criteria for the selection of illustrative examples is the direct consequence of the argument and not the result of the absence of methodological criteria. In other words, I treat unionised-led actions and non-unionised-led social protest actions not as actions of the same type but as generating the same type of ‘effect’ or, as I put it above, as generating the conditions for the production of the ‘effect of the effect’. Thus, examples are carefully selected in relation to the latter and not as the consequence of random sampling.

‘And in 1995 the CUT calls for a national strike. It had rail workers without agreement, the banking sector without agreement, oil workers without agreement, civil servants without agreement, and many other categories without a collective agreement. We wanted to call for a general strike but there was no agreement for that. Rather it was called for a strike of all the categories that were pending of negotiation. It lasted from May 3 to June 3, 1995. More than two hundred thousand people standing. And they called a strike in the oil sector. We were the more powerful of this confrontation.’ (BRA:TU:SM2)

“It was in 1995 when the movement made the march to Brasília. That March was very impressive in Brazil it was very innovative, unique to that period. We are talking about times of neoliberalism, in the middle of the 90s, several occupations occurring, several strikes, forms of resistance, the last occurring in 1995 massive strikes against neoliberalism. The oil strike, when Fernando Henrique sent the army to massacre.’ (BRA:SM:RE:N1)

The year 1995 marked a hinge in Brazil’s process of mobilisation from below. The first quotation belongs to a former oil worker and founding member of the *Federação Única dos Petroleiros* (FUP) whereas the second quote comes from a *Comissão Pastoral da Terra* (CPT) activist, in practice a close ally of the MST. The oil workers’ action referred to represented one of the most important strikes during Cardoso years in government. First of all it should be said that as with encampments and roadblocks, the oil workers’ strike triggered an immediate (and also brutal) response. The fact that *Petrobras* was (and still is) a state-owned company added to the lack of mediations between the protest action, on the one hand, and state response, on the other. So we can also see in this case the process of *visibilisation* undertaken in the privatisation attempts, FUP action and state ulterior reaction. However, the case of the oil workers’ strike also informs something else. The action began as a strike for wage adjustment (Riethof, 2004: 39) because as our interviewee explained above, oil workers, like many other categories, had not reached a national collective agreement. Thus, the action

itself represented to some extent a specific action claiming for a narrowly defined demand in the form of wage increase.

But the question it makes sense to raise at this point is the following: what turned a ‘simple’ strike into a broader mobilising ‘campaign’? My contention is that it is here where it can be seen as a process of displacement from specific to general, from ‘wages’ to ‘against neoliberalism’, and what as a consequence results in a process of assemblage of plural demands into a contingent unifying position. The cross-reference to the oil workers’ strike in union’s accounts and in CPT narrative is no surprise. The strike itself is barely remembered for its original objectives but for precisely the ‘effects’ which were caused as a consequence of happening. It is what I suggested in terms of ‘performing public act’. The combination of a complexity of factors which included the brutal state response, oil workers’ perseverance and the parallel mobilisation of MST and other organisations for similar causes, caused the eventual transformation of the strike for wages into a wave of ‘mobilisation against privatisations’.

Studying, for instance, the historical sequence of actions either promoted or supported by the CUT over the years (available at <http://www.cut.org.br/institucional/38/historico>, accessed: 10.10.11), the shift from strike action to ‘campaigning’ (in the form of marches, referendums, national days of struggle, popular meetings, etc.) is apparent.

- April/May 1997 – *Campanha Reage Brasil – Contra as Politicas Neoliberais de FHC*
- 6th December 1997 – *Encontro Popular Contra O Neoliberalismo, Por Terra, Trabalho e Cidadania*
- 13 November 1998 – *Maratona Nacional Contra o Pacote Pelo Emprego*
- 25 March 1999 – *Dia Nacional de Luta Em Defesa do Brasil*
- 21 March 2002 – *Dia Nacional de Luta Contra a Flexibilizacao da CLT*

Unlike the call for strikes, campaigns widen the number of organisations endorsing the action, broadening in turn cross-organisational solidarity chains. To some extent, the transition from strikes to campaigns also contrasts the internal lack of consensus with the external widening of solidarity networks. The CUT quoted above mentioned the lack of consensus within trade unions to call for a general strike in what finally ended up as coordinated strikes or ‘national strike’, as the interviewee put it. Internal disputes and lack of agreements seem to contrast

with the expansive coordination with organisations outside the trade union movement when setting up a campaign.

In sum, the movement from specific actions into campaigns illustrates a process of surfacing of relations from the background to the foreground with effects both in trade unions and SMOs. Within the contexts of campaigns they finally ‘visibly’ interact with each other in what in turn affects the specificity of their own constitution. In other words, as result of cross-organisational interactions they are both partially deconstructed, re-emerging as something new, although more general and less specific, more powerful and equally contentious.

3.2.4 Alternative Forms of Doing

As anticipated in the introduction of the current chapter, the final element constituting *self-organising* refers to the ubiquitous effects resulting from alternative forms of ‘doing’ or the formation between ‘the demise of development’ and the ‘problematisation of protest’ (Escobar, 1992, De Sousa Santos and Rodriguez-Garavito, 2006). Similarly, the importance of bringing attention to the meanings disputed in alternative form of doings was related to the expansion of ‘critical consciousness’ regarding inequalities and power asymmetries (Pearce et al., 2010). It was argued that community development is deeply political, because for communities to ‘develop’ they need to grasp these power logistics and realize that they can be changed’(Pearce et al., 2010: 270). Democracy should not be thought of as effect of development but instead as the precondition for development (Howell and Pearce, 2002) or, as this section suggests, alternative practices of doing enact transformations whose effects have to be interpreted under the light of democratisation. In other words, this final sections aims to explore the significance of the organisations’ engagement in, not protesting, but the undertaking of activities including working in neighbourhoods, villas, settlements, setting up social entrepreneurship, etc.; in the form of cultivating the land, administrating state-funded socio-productive programs or their own autonomous endeavours. Although peripheral, small in scale and largely shadowed by dominant narratives, I argue that the actual implementation of these endeavours contribute to the generation of a contentious driving force. The latter is apparent in the effect of ‘alternative doings’ in a) cementing and sustaining already activated

grassroots and in b) creating the space for ‘reflexive practice’¹⁷ which ultimately allows self-learning and innovation.

The array of empirical ‘alternative doings’ includes a diverse group of experiences such as factory takeovers, agrovillas, organic orchards, bakery entrepreneurship, recycling centres, housing development projects, neighbourhoods regeneration projects, community kitchens, skills education and training, etc. In order to illustrate the point of the argument and to try to abbreviate an otherwise long discussion, I focus this section of the analysis on the FTV in Argentina. Through this specific exploration I do not pretend to ‘universalise results’ but instead to raise two questions (expressed above in *a* and *b*) which are particularly relevant to my line of argumentation and I think have been partially undermined by the literature.

To some extent it is common sense that the relationship with the state involves confrontation as well as collaboration at different levels. More interestingly though, it was argued that the establishment of funding arrangements with the state at certain level does not preclude opposition and even confrontational positions at, for instance, the political level (Merklen, 2005). This equally bold and simple statement seems to have permeated FTV history since its early days. But the case of the FTV tells an even more important story. I argue that it was its practice in the form of ‘alternative doings’ which kept FTV grassroots active over time in turn creating the space for critical innovation insofar as it endured at the forefront of social conflict for more than two decades. In other words, the transformation from a ‘landless organisation’ (in the 1980s) into an ‘unemployed organisation’ (in the 1990s) was the result of two interlocked factors. Firstly, the effect of ongoing integration of members into various work-intensive endeavours was not only to offer a short-term solution to people in need but also to cement long-term grassroots activation in the form of solidarity networks and a territorial sense of belonging. A new space was created as result of the latter. It was a space featured by the presence of both horizontal (with other organisations) and vertical (with the state) relationships as well as marked by a movement of both resistance and cooperation.

But it is precisely because of the presence of this particular movement that the second point can be understood, namely, the self-reflexive practice leading towards innovation (in

¹⁷ The notion of ‘reflexive practice’ was proposed in ([Forthcoming] Ferrero, 2012) to understand the learning path undertaken by MST settlements in the formation of the ‘food sovereignty’ as the ‘new agrarian reform’. Although conserving its original analytical meaning it is applied in this case for the understanding of a broader changing scenario involving a more varied complexity of situations.

contestation)¹⁸. It was the grassroots-activation-centred practice that allowed the FTV to ‘displace’ its dominant demand from ‘land for housing’ towards ‘jobs and assistance for the unemployed’. To say it differently, this transition could not have occurred without the ongoing process of organisational engagement in projects whose effects produced an ongoing (re)activation of the grassroots. Indeed the FTV was not the ‘only’ organisation expressing the voice of the unemployed in Argentina but it was one of the few that (re)oriented its struggle towards different aims; giving evidence, as a consequence, of its passage through a process of ‘reflexive practice’ which in turn (re)signified its action into *new* contentious struggle.

Thus, in order to illustrate the point outlined above I analytically identify three critical junctures out of the historical trajectory of the FTV: 1) resistance vis-à-vis direct action, 2) ‘work and innovation’ and 3) ‘revolt and new beginning’.

1) In 1986 due to heavy floods in Laferrere district in Buenos Aires’ suburbs a group of families decided to occupy public lands in order to rebuild their lost houses. Their successful experience led to a series of copycat experiences in the nearby area (Cross, 2004: 297). But before the expansion of occupations a cross-neighbourhood network was put in place in order to provide logistical support to new settlers and equally protect the occupied land from state repression. This neighbourhood association functioned hands-on, without external support and aimed to provide very specific solutions not only to the general protection of the settlement but also to improve the living conditions of its people. It helped to transform settlements into neighbourhoods, i.e., to arrange the provision of basic utilities and services, most important of all, water and electricity. For that purpose, the first cooperatives were organised in order to mediate assistance from local government. Up to this point the now called FTV was expressed in the form of informal cooperation across newly settled neighbourhoods. The new element apparent in this process was that a bottom-up solidarity network was being self-organised independently of the specific influence of existing political parties and trade unions, the two grand socio-political organisers in Argentina.

¹⁸ Innovation refers in the case of the FTV to organisational capacity to express multiple forms of discontent over different periods of time. The emphasis, however, is put on the activation of the grassroots as driver of reflexive practice in turn leading towards processes of innovation. It departs, as a consequence, from explanations emphasising the institutional design as explanatory source leading towards innovation and organisational adaptability.

2) Between 1990 and 1997 this activated neighbourhood network gained a thicker dimension as result of the intersection between ongoing ‘internal’ work and ‘external’ unfolding crises. The massive increase in unemployment figures impacted in organisations like the FTV whose pre-existing communitarian work made them quick to react to the effects of the crises. As a result they multiplied their actions adding to their repertoire of interventions social assistance such as kitchens for the unemployed families. This type of ‘non-governmental public action’ (Dinerstein et al., 2008: 52) represented a form of endeavour which despite needing state resources was delivered in an relatively autonomous fashion. The demand was great and the FTV was delivering what the state was not. The effect was rapid organisational expansion across the whole country and a tendency to increase interaction with the state in what a scholar called *ongizacion* (Masseti, 2009: 209), i.e., a tendency to transform bottom-up ‘rebel’ action into legally existing NGOs for the sake of public funds. Although the FTV increased its level of institutionalisation what it is important to note in this second moment is its ability to react against a new situation. I argue that the latter was the result of pre-existing solidarity ties which, under new conditions, were not consolidated but displaced and hence turned into something new, gaining greater ‘organisational force’.


3) The FTV was formally created (or, better, named) under the umbrella of the CTA in 1998 (Gurrera, 2005: 48). Throughout these years the FTV was finally crystallised as something new, becoming the largest unemployed organisation in Argentina, surpassing others supported by political parties (Delamata, 2005, Delamata and Armesto, 2005). While unions arrived partially late to the bottom-up self-organising dynamic of the unemployed, political parties arrived very late. Everything had occurred when they set up their own organisations. Hence, it was no accident that the FTV ended up at the forefront of the biggest revolt in Buenos Aires province against privatisation policies (*matanzaso*) in the year 2000, a year before the 2001 national upheaval. From 2003 the organisation entered a rather ‘normalised’ period in its relationship with the state insofar as it now not only implements its own projects but also government social policies. The effect of ‘reflexive practice’ though is aimed to alter the ‘normal’ because it implies the ongoing re-signification of discontent as well as its actual conditions of performativity.

3.3 Self-organising: a preliminary typology

Preliminarily, self-organising captures part of the hidden dynamics governing contentious collective action in Brazil and Argentina insofar as it depicts the following particular features:

- Unlike traditional organisational structures (political parties and trade unions), the prefix *self* preceding the word organising aims to differentiate the nature of the dynamic it seeks to describe. Although permeated by organisations it escapes their established borders and control. In other words, the emergence of self-organising is not the result of rational arrangements resulting from elite decision-making but, instead, of a *force* operating beyond organisational control which in turn affects the nature and behaviour of organisation themselves.
- It rejects the static notion of corporatists' arrangements which assumes the normative function of the state. Instead, the use of the gerund form conveys not only ongoing movement but also dislocates the notion of pre-established actors and processes. Actors or, better, subjects of change, are the result of the interconnection of dynamics and not the other way round.

Figure No. 3: The Process of Self-organising



- It is a dynamic which is contentious in nature because it essentially challenges a basic corporatist foundation, namely, the conservation of hierarchies and traditions. Hierarchies are not dissolved but instead temporarily challenged due to the rhizomatic character of the force in question. In other words, by providing various entry and exit points, it sets the bases for a dynamic relationship different from typically either vertical or horizontal. The autonomic effect (never essentially autonomous) of self-organising is therefore the result of action against, within and/or beyond the state.
- Finally, self-organising follows ‘nomadic waves or flows of deterritorialization [that] go from the central layer to the periphery, then from the new center to the new periphery, falling back to the old center and launching forth to the new’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 74). It is because the action of territorial actors falls into deterritorialising dynamics that a contentious process through the creation of *new*

solidarities (the effect of campaigns or reflexive practice) can emerge. It explains the appearance of the multiplicity.

3.4 Final Remarks

I tried to explain the formation of a contentious dynamic out of the observation of apparently loose and disconnected fragments. Self-organising suggests a new way to look at divisions marking ‘the old’ and ‘the new’; ‘the traditional’ and ‘the non-traditional’. Instead, it proposes to reconceptualise fuzzy links into the complex interactions whose effects count in the institution of the order, as well as contestation to such order or the emergence of disagreement.

Embedded, permeating as well as transcending organisations themselves, self-organising emerges and departs from territorial spaces, gaining relative autonomy, transforming into a non-territorial dynamic and hence radically challenging corporatists’ arrangements. It expresses in this sense a vital component of radical contentious action in contemporary South American politics, which was adequately abbreviated in the opening remarks: ‘we are never sufficiently organised’.

In the following chapter I further elaborate on a second internal component in the constitution of democratic subjectivities: the institution of horizontal deliberation by default in the effects of networking.

Chapter 4: Networking. Horizontal Deliberation by Default

‘We need a theory of what I call the networking or the tying together of truth procedures.’ (Badiou interviewed in Bosteels, 2011)

Introduction

This chapter explores a second emerging dimension of democratic subjectivities in Argentina and Brazil: networking. I argue that networking practices forge a process of ‘horizontal deliberation by default’¹⁹ through a) the opening of a multiplicity of forums and b) the establishment of delimiting discursive boundary that determines connecting and disconnecting nodes, regulating norms of integration and exclusion. In addition, networking is performed as contentious action insofar as it reveals public deliberation mechanisms outside the politico-institutional framework. It contributes therefore to the complex process of formation of the ‘we of the radical democratic forces’ (Mouffe, 1992b: 3).

In point 2.3 of Chapter 3 it was suggested that when social protest has experienced a transition from ‘protests’ to ‘campaigns’, it reveals a displacement from ‘isolated’ actions to ‘collective’ constructions in the development of a more powerful self-organisational force. The present chapter builds on this point and proposes a close-up look at the object of ‘campaign’ in order to display unwritten but significant details. The methodological amplification of campaigns at the expense of the broader picture is justified by their contribution to the understanding of networking processes vis-à-vis the formation of the locus of contentious action.

¹⁹ I use the notion ‘by default’ in opposition to the idea of ‘by design’. Whereas the latter conveys rational behaviour in response to pre-existing institutional frameworks, the former implies practical (deliberative) action outside traditional deliberative bodies, such as the Parliament but also organisational internal deliberative mechanisms. It does not suggest replacement of one over the other. Instead, it posits the existence of ‘alternative deliberative mechanism’ eventually contributing to the generation of contentious collective action.

As commented in the previous chapter, between the mid-nineties and early 2000s the economy of Argentina and Brazil experienced unprecedented unemployment rates, high levels of informality and growing inequality in income distribution. In Brazil, organised labour movements lost the spectacular force they had shown in the 1980s. Similarly, in Argentina, the unified labour movement split into four different trade national confederations, which added organisational fragmentation within subaltern groups. The difficulty of mobilising members in a context of declining trade union membership enables the understanding of the observed transition from protest action to campaigns. However, effects of such creative response in context of labour movement retrenchment need to be further explored in relation to the democracy question. My contention emphasises the importance of forging alternative deliberative (rather than participatory) mechanisms for the subaltern. More precisely, deliberation ('by default') was the result of cross-organisational practical negotiations and sacrifices which built contingent and *horizontalizing* internal consensus. The latter was simultaneously encompassed by the construction of a discursive frontier²⁰ determining the 'inside' and the 'outside' of the established network, namely, both instituting the *other* and defining the terms of the collective disagreement.

In order to explore networking practices I offer a close-up on the 'Social Movements' Coordination' (CMS) in Brazil and to the 'National Front Against Poverty' (FRENAPO) in Argentina. The chapter is organised as follows: 1) I discuss some relevant theoretical concepts with participatory democracy literature in order to build a relevant differentiation. 2) Campaigns mentioned above are scrutinised in greater detail and analytical elements are extracted from data. 3) I outline the effects of networking in relation to the opening of multiple deliberative forums. 4) I explore elements present at the establishment of a discursive frontier in relation to the formation of a point of assemblage. 5) I briefly conceptualise findings positing a networking typology. Concluding remarks elaborate on the significance of networking as part of the overall argument of the thesis and also introduces the topic of the following chapter.

²⁰ Networks as seen in this chapter are basically constructed by practical negotiations, compromises and agreements across organisations (empirically referred in the form of campaigns), on the one hand, and discursive forms of structuration, on the other. The notion of 'discursive frontier' therefore frames this second constitutive element of networking dynamics as I see them functioning in case studies.

4.1 Forging Consensus and Delimiting Dissensus

The relationship between deliberation, social movements and democracy is being reassessed by the specialised literature under the overarching notion of either ‘participatory democracy’ or ‘participatory governance’ (Wolford, 2010, Baiocchi, 2001, Abers and Keck, 2009, Fung and Wright, 2001, Rodgers, 2010, Cornwall, 2004, Albert, 2010). Although the literature is not homogeneous I argue that the tendency has been to emphasise participation at the expense of deliberation. In other words, the tendency has been to illustrate the effects of participation of individuals or collectives who had been activated without clearly explaining the process through which such activation occurred in the first place. Having said that, the debate supposes a step forward in the interrogation of democracy through not only the understanding of new empirical evidence but also new methodological approaches. My argument shares the latter fully but equally raises a subtle analytical limitation and posits a more fundamental theoretical critique.

Although showing in-depth research into various contemporary innovative experiments of what they called participatory governance, Fung and Wright’s work (2001) ‘Empowered Deliberative Democracy’ (EDD) probably best exemplified the attempt to encapsulate real world experiences into ideal modelling. They sensibly suggested that the principles behind the institutional design of EDD should be based on tangible problems, bottom-up dynamics and deliberation (Fung and Wright, 2001: 17). But in my view the problem is twofold and lies precisely in the extraction of ideal conditions out of empirical formations. Firstly, their explanation does not help to understand how such participatory spaces are created and hence how participants became activated in the first place. Secondly, the institution of ideal working principles holds a normative resonance that weakens its analytical potential which empties the space of conflict (inherent to politics) in favour of consensus. Not surprisingly, following a similar line of thinking but applying it to research Participatory Policy Council and Participatory Budget in Brazil, Alberts (2010) concludes that direct democracy spaces lead to the localisation of discussion at the expense of radical contestation. Under the same lens a less pessimistic picture is offered by Rodgers (2010). He argues that despite the eventual demise of the Participatory Budgeting in Buenos Aires, the experience showed that participatory institutional spaces can emerge in the absence of programmatic politics which in turn results in the promotion of democracy innovation (Rodgers, 2010).

A groups of scholars offered a contribution to the debate as they went beyond the limits of created spaces delving into the production of participatory dynamics (Wolford, 2010, Cornwall, 2004). Wolford (2010) interestingly suggested that the MST underwent a type of participation by default (and not by design) insofar as it was transgression and not deliberation that marked the creation of spaces for direct interaction with the state. My argument borrows the idea of *default* constructed against the idea of *design* posited by Wolford. It challenges, however, her separation between transgression and deliberation which in my account are interconnected processes. My argument is that transgression is the effect of deliberation (by default) caused in turn by the establishment of binding networking practices. ‘I argue that this default participation begins not with deliberate innovation but with transgression’ (Wolford, 2010: 95). But, what triggered transgression in the first place? My stance is that deliberation needs to be reconnected to transgression or, in other words, to the process of articulation resulting in the construction of subject position which in turn explains contentious action.

My approach to the relationship between deliberation, participation and democracy is more aligned with the work of Cornwall (2004). The idea behind the notion of ‘invited spaces’ put forward by Cornwall (2004) translates well the line of argumentation that differentiates between activated participants (who participate in ‘invited spaces’) and the process of participant activation involving deliberation through networking practices. She argues that ‘in some cases, ‘invited spaces’ have been transplanted onto institutional landscapes in which entrenched relations of dependency, fear and disprivilege undermine the possibility for the kind of deliberative decision-making they are to foster’ (Cornwall, 2004: 2).

But, as anticipated in chapter 1, my argument departs from a more general although more fundamental critique to the paradigm in which participatory democracy is inscribed. Although sharing the goals of a more egalitarian society with Radical Democracy, it belongs to a different philosophical universe holding as a consequence significantly different theoretical assumptions²¹. The main point of disagreement relates to the basic understanding of conflict. Whereas participatory democracy argues in favour of ‘evolutionistic and stagist conception of moral development, and they require the availability of ‘undistorted

²¹ For a an extended discussion on the limits of participatory democracy see (Dinerstein and Ferrero, 2012)

communication’ and of a final reconciliation of value claims’ (Mouffe, 1992b: 13), my understanding of radical democracy postulates the very impossibility of the final realisation of democracy. In other words, democratic struggles should be conceived ‘as discursive surface of inscription, not an empirical referent’(Mouffe, 1992b: 14).

A theoretical clarification between a relational approach behind the core of the argument and the network analysis needs to be briefly mentioned at this point. Although my argument accepts that network analysis at large has moved ‘from metaphor to substance’ (Wellman 1988 in Diani, 2003: 1) it is distanced from holistic formulation like the one that poses the catchall idea of *network society* (Castells, 2010); which places network dynamics at the centre of contemporary social order and social practice. Networks constitute in my reasoning one contingent aspect or mechanism in the formation of democratic subjectivities and not a structural element governing domination and insubordination. Instead, networking, for the purpose of this chapter, represents a particular type of socio-political relationship, analytically different from self-organising (and demanding, chapter 5) and located at a meso-level of analysis. More specifically, I take the following operational definition:

“the process of connection involving exchange of information, shared ideas, conflict over and negotiation of meanings, and coordinated strategies to motivate action. As advocacy networks multiply, they become an increasingly routinized part of activists’ strategic repertoire. Although few networks could be called institutions, the practice of networking has quickly begun to be institutionalised....Core network participants are bound up in shared practices of contention and resistance that resonate across borders (Keck and Stikkimk, 1998: 235)

In other words, it is a particular form of (latent) mechanism underlying the practice permeating forms of identification. It would be incorrect (and contradictory to my theoretical point of departure) though to assume networking as a permanent element of socio-political practice. New democratic subjectivities, the research question of this thesis, are broadly understood within the context of processes of subjectification therefore precluding ‘any possibility of reaching their essence’ (Mouffe, 1992b: 10). Hence networking dynamics help to unpack an important (although not ‘essential’) tier in the complexity constructing democratic subjectivities.

Finally, it is important to specify ‘how networks matter’ (Diani, 2003). For the purpose of this chapter, a) networks matter in relations to cross-organisational interconnectivity (rather

than individual participation) creating horizontal spaces of deliberation outside institutional deliberative bodies; and b) it matters in relation to the formation of a discursive frontier, that because it determines connecting and disconnecting nodes it regulates the norm of integration and exclusion of such network.

4.2 Post Transition Uncertainty and the Emergence of Campaigns

The literature seems to agree on the gravitating role played by the ‘new unionism’ pushing for political liberalisation in Brazil in the 1980s. Workers’ organisations staged strikes that became popular manifestations (Montero, 2005: 83) which in turn accelerated the transition to democratic rule. The CUT, established in 1983, alongside its expression in the political system, the Workers’ Party (PT), dominated grassroots participation in the movement that both challenged dictatorship and state corporatism (Rodrigues, 1997, Keck, 1992). The CUT coexisted though together with moderate workers’ organisations (CGT and FS) which campaigned for better wages while accepting the discourse of competitiveness and therefore tacitly accepting government market reforms. If between 1980s and early 1990s labour strikes dominated the scene of discontent alternative means of mobilisation became apparent throughout mid-1990s, during the early days of the *Plano Real*²².

Political liberalisation favoured the emergence of a myriad of formal and informal organisations expressing new grievances under new forms. This was seen as the effect of the deconstruction of the only subject as privileged actor in the field of collective action (Gohn, 2010: 331). By the middle of the 1990s after the 32-day strike against the privatisation of the state owned oil company (1995), the CUT urban mobilisation was in decline. The dimension gained by the MST March to Brasilia in 1997 illustrated increasing visibility on non-unionised actions of dissent which in turn worried trade unionists. It was suggested in this thesis that CUT and MST relationship was marked mainly by cooperation and solidarity. However, a sense of competition regarding the leadership of the mobilisation process in the late 1990s became apparent. An indication of CUT attempt to intervene on rural affairs was the integration of the CONTAG, Brazil’s main rural workers union, in 1995. The institution

²² The Real Plan was a stabilisation plan implemented under the direction of Fernando Henrique Cardoso as Finance Minister of Itamar Franco, the Brazilian president replacing Collor de Mello who had been deposed after two years in office through parliamentary impeachment following corruption allegations. As Montero (2005: 84) put it ‘the Real Plan had the expected effect of cooling labour militancy, since the reform succeeded in ending hyperinflation’.

of networks occurred sometimes at the expense of and sometimes beyond strict organisational strategic interests. To some extent, these complexities express what I propose to look at closely by examining the experiences of the National Forum of Struggles (*Fórum Nacional de Lutas*) and Social Movements Coordination (*Coordenação dos Movimentos Sociais*) as campaigns both forging horizontalisation in the decision-making process as well as cementing cross-organisational solidarity mechanism despite dissimilar organisational strategic interests.

A similar shift from unionised to non-unionised and diversified forms of dissent occurred in Argentina within the post-transition years. Democratic transition also contributed to open up the space for popular mobilisation and expression of suppressed and postponed demands (Dinerstein, 2004: 264). A new governing coalition formed by the *Unión Cívica Radical* (UCR) and *Frente País Solidario* (FREPASO) took office in 1999 promising to change policies established after a decade of *Menemismo*. The reality would soon demonstrate something different when the government ‘assured the IMF in New York at the end of March 2000, that Argentina would comply with all the commitments assumed in the Letters of Intent of December 1997 and January 1999, by implementing an agenda of structural reforms agreed with the said organisations’ (Dinerstein, 2004: 269).

The crises of state-sponsored trade unionism became apparent (Fernández, 2005b) as a consequence the transformation of the development model of full-employment in which it had been erected (Basualdo, 2001). It showed, however, different reactions to the process of sweeping neoliberal reforms to some extent challenging the idea of labour movement complacent inaction. Trade unions representing industrial and services sectors which remain in the CGT (*Confederación General del Trabajo*) accepted labour flexibilisation reforms in return for safeguarding their control over the *Obras Sociales*²³ (Murillo, 1997, Etchemendy, 2005). A second trade union block informally split from the CGT forming the MTA (*Movimiento de Trabajadores Argentinos*). Although the MTA represented a smaller number of organisations, the presence of trade unions from the transport sector (truck drivers) gave their protest actions high visibility. Although the MTA showed a more combative position

²³ The *Obras Sociales* is a system of healthcare insurance dependant on wage labour whose provision is under federal government legislation and resources control and service delivery run under the administration of trade unions. Although the system is governed by the principle of solidarity (the more you earn the more you pay, getting in return the same health service), its provision is dependent on formal employment relationships, i.e., excluding those either unemployed or in informal work.

against reforms than the CGT, they did not seek the creation of a second national trade union confederation as they thought it meant going against unity of the labour movement which would ultimately undermine collective labour force. A third group of trade unions representing mainly civil servants and teachers took a more radical approach forming the CTA and questioned not only CGT response to neoliberal reforms but also the strategic alliance with the PJ as well as trade unions' governing values. For the purpose of the following section it is important to highlight that it was in this context in which the CTA alongside other organisations promoted the *FRENAPO* campaign which illustrates the process of deliberation outside formal deliberative mechanism. I study in greater detail on the following section.

4.2.2 The Case of The 'Nacional Front Against Poverty' (*Frente Nacional de Lucha contra la Pobreza*)²⁴

The FRENAPO was one of the many protest actions developed in the second half of the 1990s resulting out of the multiplication of commonalities in the struggle against neoliberalism. It took place in a key moment of Argentine recent history as it preceded the 2001 upheaval. Methodologically, it is particularly useful for the purpose of this chapter because it represents a prime example of an *event*²⁵ or *node* expressing the networking dynamic in contentious collective action in Argentina.

The FRENAPO campaign did not last long. It was a referendum type of campaign opened for a period of three days. In practical terms the lobbying campaign lasted for no longer than a few months in 2001. However, the campaign itself catalysed pieces of collective action which had been taking place during the previous years.

4.2.2.1 Antecedents

²⁴ This subsection is partially based on material collected for the elaboration of the report '*El Frente Nacional de Lucha contra la Pobreza* (FRENAPO)', written in collaboration with Silvana Gurrera. The document was produced for the CTA research and documentation office (IEF) in the year 2006/7 and it has not been published.

²⁵ Not mobilisations but "events" serve as point of reference for networks (Keck and Stikkimk, 1998: 236).

The FRENAPPO campaign represented ‘innovation’ in social protest which according to the gaze of historians became more complex, heterogeneous and diverse in the context of existing political democracies (Lobato and Suriano, 2003: 136). Behind the acceleration of innovation in the protest repertoire, however, lay two interlocked processes: a) the construction of trust through the establishment of enduring interactions and b) organisational self-awareness regarding their own limitations in performing collective action. In order to observe the presence of these elements there were four important antecedents building up the development of the FRENAPPO.

A - Campaña por el millón de firmas [The Millon Signature Campaign] in 1993,

B- Marcha Federal [Federal March] in 1994,

C- Marcha Grande por el Trabajo [the Grand March for Work] in 2000 and

D- Encuentros por el Nuevo pensamiento [Meetings for the New Thinking] in 2000

A - Campaña por el millón de firmas [The Millon Signature Campaign]

In 1993 in opposition to the neoliberal content underpinning the official project of pension reform, the CTA embarked in a campaign to collect ‘one million signatures’ in order to force the parliament to call for a referendum on the matter. The initiative finally assumed the form of the ‘campaign for the million signatures’ undertaken through mechanisms of direct democracy included in the Argentine Constitution although never actually implemented²⁶. The form of the call therefore found in Constitutional framework a legitimating tool for the display of a mobilisation campaign.

The call against the reform questioned both the content and political agreement negotiated with the CGT that had paved the way for parliament consideration. Likewise, the aim was to demonstrate in favour of debating a more comprehensive plan regarding social security reforms in the understanding that tactical governmental reforms by each sector would successfully divide resistance and hence allow reforms to take place. A popular mobilisation was organised in the form of a march that took place on the 10th of March culminating at the national Parliament building in the centre of Buenos Aires city. The public rally concluded

²⁶ The introduction of mechanisms of direct democracy took place one year later (1994). The inclusion of the referendum (*consulta popular*) and popular initiative (*iniciativa popular*) were introduced in the Reform of the Constitution which allowed presidential re-election for a second period, among other things.

after handing over around 80 boxes containing 980,000 signatures and publically asking the government to call for a binding referendum regarding the pension reform in question.

Although the CTA had the initial campaign call other organisations actively engaged in it expanding the influence beyond the limits of CTA trade unions. These included the unemployed and retirees' organisation MIJP, human rights group Mothers' of the Disappeared, Agrarian Federation (FA) and Small Businesses Association (Apyme). Equally the campaign received the independent public support of trade union leaders from the CGT such as Saúl Ubaldini, Lorenzo Miguel and Alicia Castro.

The initiative failed in practical terms insofar as the government not only did not call for the referendum but also privatised the pension system through the creation of private pension funds of individual capitalisation (AFJP system, for the acronyms in Spanish). However, it did constitute an antecedent to FRENAPPO as it was not only the CTA involved but, more importantly, a diverse grouping of organisations emerged as interactive force, participating in the campaign. The effects of such process became more evident in future actions.

B- Marcha Federal [Federal March]

The Federal March (*Marcha Federal*) unfolded between the 3rd and 6th of July 1994 in a context in which the government of Carlos Menem became increasingly associated with rampant neoliberalism. It called to march against the economic and social model in what organisers said was an attempt to stop the neoliberal advance against welfare provision in general. A CTA activist explained it as followed:

‘In reality there was a need to gather ideas, meet to agree on all orders and offer proposals. It is not only about opposing to criticize but also to offer alternative proposals to a broad sector of society. I was astonished when participate in those preparations meetings for the Federal March. I went to all I could. Logically, the activity would not let me go to all, but it surprised me to see the diversity of sectors and organisations in one place. Despite that, we were all with the same goal, holding very similar ideas...’ (ARG:SM:N7)

In addition, a third trade union, the CCC, also participated expressing the interest of social movement organisations and political parties of the left. But it also gained the support of mainstream political parties such as UCR, *Frente Grande*, Socialist Party, Workers' Party

(PO) as well as the Student's National Federation (FUA). In addition to the expansion of actors willing to actively involve themselves in joint acts of demonstrations a more subtle process was emerging and is raised in the interview. Regular cross-organisational meetings, discussion tables on developing alternative proposals as well as very practical demonstration logistics emerged as a routine exercise in the practice of the organisations involved. As this exercise evolved and was put in practice an emerging cross-organisational sentiment of trust and reciprocity was encompassing such interaction that was not only making current interactions possible but was also shaping the character of future 'co-ventures'.

'Co-ventures' were not strictly bottom-up actions but the result of organisational collaboration at the top evolving into grassroots interconnectivity at the bottom. Furthermore, unlike the first campaign commented above, it added to the language the preposition *against*. Although still elusive, it could be argued that the drawing of a discursive boundary referring 'the economic and social model' started to be enacted. Although at this point it did not name a common *us*, the process of formation of something beyond organisations' territories was observable which in turn constructed a broader non-territory. Increasingly moving networks rather than settlements and agreements seem to be the dominant feature resulting from this process of mutual recognition, collaboration and creation of trust.

C- Marcha Grande por el Trabajo [the Grand March for Work]

The March for Work represented the most immediate joint protest action before the development of the FRENAPO. The first element to take into account is the time difference between this action and the FRENAPO. Unlike the other campaigns, the time frame between the two was shortened revealing a simplification in the negotiations involved in order to set in action a joint action of protest. The *Marcha Grande por el Trabajo* was deployed between the 26th of July and the 9th of August of the year 2000. The mobilisation itself covered the distance between Argentina's two largest cities (Rosario-Buenos Aires), a distance of approximately 300 kilometres. The demand for the implementation of the unemployment allowance was accompanied by the campaign in favour of the implementation of the delayed regulation of popular referendum [*consulta popular*] and the immediate call for the first one to involve the voice of the people on how to tackle unemployment. A total number of 420.979 signatures in support of the initiative was recorded at the end of the campaign

(Armellino, 2005).

The introduction of a specific demand (for work) in the campaign call aimed to catalyse collective anger and frustration in a context of increasing unemployment rates. In the own words of Victor De Gennaro founding member and leader of the CTA at the time "The message should be clear, we will continue marching until the whole country marches' (*La Nacion*: 17.09.00). But adding specificity to the demand also expressed something else. It brought to light the elaboration of a collective counter-proposal in the form of insurance for the unemployed. It was a project for the implementation of unemployment and training allowance (*empleo y formación*) of 380 pesos (equal to \$380 dollars at the time) endowed automatically to every unemployed household breadwinners. Not only protesting against unemployment but also campaigning a counter-proposal on how to deal with the issue illustrates initial 'deliberative' results out of an ongoing networking practice.

D- Encuentros por el Nuevo Pensamiento [Meetings for the New Thought]

Using the national organisational structure of trade unions and social organisations affiliated to the CTA a number of symposiums, conferences and round tables formed part between 1998 and 2000 of discussions over alternatives projects regarding work, social policy, income redistribution, causes of inequalities as well as more general concerns such as the site of politics, democracy and the role of the state. Meetings were co-organised by CTA and partners including universities in this opportunity but also religious and human rights organisations. It meant a step further in the deliberative process resulting from networking practices. Multiplication in the number of exchanges in turn increased the density of the web of interaction evolving into the production of network relationships. Although some regional meetings were hosted by universities it was not an academic debate. Instead, it pushed forward the consolidation of cross-organisational solidarities by forging agreement over specific projects. They represented feasible projects rather than opposing but abstract rhetoric.

The campaign echoed positively in the press what gave the initiative important public visibility. De Gennaro, somehow summarised the spirit of the event: 'there is no struggle

without thinking that can project it'²⁷. Precisely one of the themes around which the meetings was organised was the elaboration of 'new' narratives that could contribute to the development of thinking beyond the predetermined neoliberal orthodoxy. Likewise, the cooperative movement participant of these events argued that 'against the only thinking it was necessary to build new common sense, to build new subjects, to study the social practices of these subjects, so that as a result of the analysis can emerge new forms of thinking about society in order to transform it' (IMFC et al., 2000: 199) Two plenary sessions were set up in 1998 and 1999 and recollections of those meetings were published, including individual interventions in the event as well as institutional participations (Lozano, 1999a, Lozano, 2000). Although there was no direct call for street mobilisation, it grew critical mass and further consolidated networking across organisations. They disagreed on many things but seemed to be deliberating towards agreeing on something fundamental: differentiating themselves from the *big Other*: neoliberalism.

4.2.2.2 FRENAPO as Intensive Node

The FRENAPO campaign took the form of a 'popular referendum' seeking to counteract the effects of neoliberal policies on unemployment and social protection. The call for the referendum had been originally made for the 13th, 14th and 15th of December but it was later postponed after the three trade union centrals (CGT, MTA and CTA) agreed to undertake the seventh national strike against the Alianza government on the 13th of December. The referendum finally took place between the 14th and 17th of December. More than 3 million people participated throughout the country casting their votes resulting in almost unanimous agreement with the proposal. By setting in motion mechanisms of direct democracy from below, the FRENAPO set up a campaign which, although imitating existing institutional mechanisms, took place outside established deliberative bodies. It performed in practice a mechanism of direct democracy included in the Constitution such as popular plebiscite (referendum) and popular initiative²⁸ which had never been instrumented.

²⁷ De Gennaro actually titled his written contribution '*No hay lucha sin un pensamiento que lo proyecte*'. It was included in the edited book which compiled memories of the first meeting for the new thinking and passionately argued in favour of breaking neoliberal thinking corsets by talking about what 'they do not want us to talk about' (De Gennaro, 1999: 392).

²⁸ See articles 39 and 40 of the Argentine Constitution which regulate mechanisms of direct democracy.

The referendum in practice developed outside institutional mechanisms but drafted a piece of legislation which had at least two effects. As the project clearly justified where the resources were coming from, it turned an abstract idea into a potentially feasible piece of legislation which could be translated into public policy. The second effect was that it challenged existing deliberative bodies (Parliament) by positing a popular deliberation from below. More interestingly, the campaign also submitted the proposed bill for Parliamentary consideration resulting in the creation of a crack in the orthodox fiscal deficit discourse dominating both government and parliamentarians. The document was titled ‘Insurance for Training, Employment and the Universalisation of childcare benefits and pensions’. In the section ‘reasons’ of the proposed piece of legislation it argued:

‘1- The deterioration of the socio-economic conditions resulting from the crises demand not only contingent responses but essentially structural reforms leading towards the alteration of existing relationships governing the economy as well as relationships at the centre of the development of the social fabric.

2- Considering the magnitude of the political and economic reforms a successful referendum would imply, the strong support of the population beyond political tendencies is essential.

3- The instrumentation of the Project will have a profound effect on the entire population because it is a policy based on universality. Counting with the support of the majority of citizens is therefore fundamental.’²⁹

The proposal not only suggested a new relation between state and society, basically advocating for greater state intervention in the implementation of a safety net, but also indirectly questioned electoral representation, as prime means of participation. The campaign therefore purposely wanted to contrast the participative character of the counter-proposal against the delegitimising effect of government’s policies. This contrast became apparent in a moment in which the lowering poll turnout in articulation with government’s fiscal discipline ethos was facing the so-called crises of representation. Indeed instead of crises of representation initiatives like FRENAPO were eliciting, a parallel process of networking, mobilisation and protest that was going to challenge the assumption of such reasoning. For campaign participants, however, the ‘crises’ were the sheer exemplification of the state’s incapacity to solve the social drama of unemployment. In sum, the referendum

²⁹ The document was published by the CTA circulated extensively during 2001. The national newspaper *Pagina12* published regularly about the initiative and also circulated the proposal in one of its issues. A more recent account including the original document in the appendix can be found at (CTA, 2011).

was built upon two interlocked images: a) 'the crises of the (neoliberal) state and b) the 'crises of representation'.


'...the referendum movement can become an ideal tool to mobilize the debate also within political parties in the upcoming general elections...From the Movement for the Consultation intention to vote is the result of a collective and organized action throughout the country...where direct democracy and income distribution define the reasons as well as the "why" of the vote to be developed. We believe it can be a proper path for all those social and political organisations that follow this interpretation so that they can deploy a common strategy' (Idem)

The call for activation and mobilisation connected to a process of collected reflexivity expressed above was instrumented in what constituted the core of the operational logistic of FRENAPO: the institution of *juntas promotoras* (promotional boards, hereafter JPs). JPs were created at municipal, provincial and regional level articulated by a national one. They constituted the actual space for the practice of deliberation and articulation of cross-organisational consensus. It hosted institutional and non-institutional actors such as political parties, trade unions, religious organisations, social movement organisations, businesses organisations, etc. JPs were created and some of them started functioning in April 2001, namely, eight months before the referendum due date. Because JPs adopted unanimity rule as decision-making formula, the construction of consensus became paramount for their success. The success was measured by simply upholding full cross-organisational engagement in the campaign. In addition JPs needed to elaborate internal consensus but translate internal agreement into external communication strategy including the elaboration of pamphlets, TV appearances, and radio participation. Persuading the general public beyond cross-organisational support became cornerstone for the success of the campaign in general.

The composition of the national JP, for instance, reflected the variety of sectors and actors involved in the campaign. It was formed by approximately 57 members 17 of which were members of parliament of the opposition, 10 high-ranked CTA activists, 4 representatives of Apyme, 4 from IMFC, one representative FAA, one representative of the political party ARI and Polo Social; 7 members from human right organisations; 3 from religious organisations and 3 were activists of women's associations and university student federations. JP at the provincial level tried to replicate the model at the national level although this was only achieved partially due to weaker representation of some smaller organisations at federal level. In total regional JPs counted in number of members the following type of activists: 31 from

human rights, 43 different sectors of the labour movement, 13 from religious organisations, 22 university and education institutions, 47 members of parliament (local and national), 28 members of different trade unions and finally 65 social organisations of various types.

Figure No. 4: FRENAPO Networking Process



Source: my elaboration based on document analysis, media output and interviews made by the author.

The figure above aims to illustrate in the form of an image what I explained throughout the FRENAPO narrative. It adds however, the visual aid to understand the qualitative level of intensity FRENAPO supposed regarding the degree of connectivity with other organisations. That said it is important to highlight two interconnected observations in relation to the emergence of networking as a non-territorial dynamic. Firstly, cross-organisational interconnectivity existed before FRENAPO. The campaign showed greater intensity as well as further network expansion. Networking practices were the result of constructed reciprocity resulting in the establishment of solidarity trusts over

time. Antecedents and the FRENAPO campaign itself illustrated the importance of building a common trajectory in order to eventually produce a new significant networking node. Secondly, such increase in interconnectivity tended to horizontalise decision-making processes in turn resulting in the production of innovative campaigns that articulated a greater number of participants. The expansion and multiplication of nodes partially replaced centre and periphery of decision-making mechanisms but integrated other significant parts. Finally, and in connection to the latter, the transformation/expansion/intensification/complexisation of the network not only affected the dynamic of the network itself but its instituting nodes. In other words, to a large extent the FRENAPO campaign which started originally as the consequence of action of a territorial actor developed into something non-territorial which reshaped network participants themselves. The FRENAPO campaign was transformed from ‘a project for social insurance’ into ‘a battle against poverty’ through the practice of networking. It forged as a consequence a communal *us* significantly different from the plural *together* that initiated the action.

4.2.3 The Case of ‘Coordination of Social Movements’ (CMS, *Coordenação dos Movimentos Sociais*)³⁰

The CMS was founded in 2003 although it is largely recognised as a continuation of what was the *Fórum Nacional de Luta, Terra, Trabalho y Ciudadania* (FNL) founded in 1997 during the Cardoso administration. The CMS was in practice an umbrella organisation for the coordination of protest action among social movement organisations of different type, trade unions and political parties. It did not represent, however, the only attempt to create spaces for coordination. ‘Grito dos Excluídos’, ‘Consulta Popular’, ‘Intersindical’, ‘Conlutas’, etc., represented over the post-transition years various other attempts to accomplish the same function. CMS’s endurance over the years as well as plural composition, though, turned it

³⁰ This section is primarily based on ethnographic accounts of the CMS *VII Plenária Nacional* at the university teachers’ union (affiliated to the CUT) in São Paulo, Brazil, on November 23, 2009. In addition, I interviewed Antonio Carlos Spis, communication secretary of the CUT (2009), former leader of the oil workers’ union who participated in the *Forum Nacional de Lutas* (FNL) in 1997 and was at the time of the interview CMS facilitator. Also, first-hand accounts provided by a community organiser of the *Consulta Popular* and *Pastorais Sociais* contributed significantly to better understand vicissitudes of the CMS. Finally, material produced by the CMS, CUT and MST in paper and online contributed as second-hand data to weight CMS in the broader context as well as to make sense of it in relation to our line of argumentation.

into a case of relative importance in contrast to other experiences. Along the lines of my argument, CMS illustrates the effects of networking dynamics and hence I see the formation of experiences such as the CMS as consequence of previous ongoing articulation rather than the other way round. Its importance in relation to this chapter is mainly twofold. It further highlights the intersection between networking vis-à-vis deliberation and, secondly, it exemplifies networking practices in the real world by discussing the issue of multiple and overlapping memberships.

4.2.3.1 CMS Antecedents

The ‘organisational leap’ undergone in the 1980s (Boito et al., 2009: 36) multiplied not only the people participating in the public space but equally the number of organisations competing to dominate the newly opened political system. As noted in the introduction of this chapter, it was no surprise to register also in the Brazilian case an encompassing shift from strikes to campaigns, a tendency that was accentuated in the second half of the 1990s. The development of campaigns calling for the formation of common fronts as a consequence was not something extraordinary but instead the general pattern of actions expressing discontent and social protests. In 1997 the CUT, MST, *Marcha Mundial de Mulheres* among other trade unions, social movement organisations and political parties, set up the *Foro Nacional de Luta, Terra, Trabajo y Ciudadania* (FNL).

‘The Forum was very important because it united the whole world against Fernando Enrique, against neo-liberalism; we built together the largest march to Brasilia with more than 6 thousand people in 1999. It was a forum that elaborated proposals by consensus. Land reform, for instance was agreed by the MST and CUT formed part of the struggle plan of the FNL. It proposed solutions for housing problems and all the rest, including economic policy, communication policy... respect for the position of women organisations and their demands, integrating the position of blacks, Indians, the MST, housing movement. We made great debates which forced us to come to agreements.’ (BRA:SM:N2)

After every meeting the FNL elaborated a document that was later signed by every participant organisation and would signal the coordination strategy for the future months. Documents agree both on naming big reforms such agrarian reform as well as determined

specific collective action for the future. The named 'March to Brazilia' was probably the most remembered collective action against Cardoso government which became over time recalled as the biggest mobilisation against neoliberalism. The participation of student organisations and the catholic church alongside trade unions giving the FNL a particular eclectic composition. Deliberation became therefore not an ideal goal but a necessary practice for the agreement on different issues.

FNL had its most gravitating effects between 1997 and 2000, namely between the start of Cardoso second term in office and the demise of the PSDB in government marking in turn the rise of the PT. In a different register, FNL's strong activation encompassed a backlash to neoliberalism and its subsequent transformation. Setting up the FNT had at least two observable effects. Firstly, it had a quantitative impact on the number of mobilisations and actions of dissent as stated in organisations' records of protests action. The second effect was that it fostered the space for the elaboration of original campaigns in turn further expending spaces for articulation of common positions. In May 1997, for instance, the FNL organised the campaign *Campanha Reage Brasil* ['Brazil Reacts'] that gathered more than 50 thousand people in a public rally in the capital Brasilia demanding for the establishment of a minimum salary for rural workers. Throughout the realisation of such action it forged a common narrative not only integrating demands but reshaping them and generating new ones as a result.

The positioning of the FNT against the institutional politics was not neutral. On the contrary, its final act was precisely the creation of a unified block in support of PT candidate Luis Inácio da Silva (Lula). It certainly contributed to Lula's successful electoral performance. Lula's victory led to an impasse in FNL after which it was decided that deliberation within social movement organisations needed to be reactivated. It happened but under a different name (CMS) and gathering a slightly different number of organisations. It endured though in the perseveration of good networking practices established upon the construction of joint trajectories based on reciprocity and trust.

The FNT did not connect actors whose action was disconnected before but instead gave empirical form to an instituting practice of networking that was taking place beyond and underneath organisations themselves. The change in name from FNL into *Coordenação dos Movimentos Sociais* (CMS) is aligned with impasse opened after Lula's presidential victory

because, as a scholar put it correctly, ‘it is difficult to see the rise of Lula to government without having the impression of being at the conclusion of a grand social movement’ (Santos, 2003: 132).

4.2.3.2 Coordenação dos Movimentos Sociais as Intensive Node

Regardless the change in name and context I propose to analyse FNL and CMS as markers of continuation and not of rupture. As the graph below illustrates, differences between FNL and CMS are more the effect of change in the ‘shape of the network’ rather than change in the intensity of the interaction. The latter jumped with the creation of FNL and is largely sustained in CMS. In other words, although there are observable variations in the connected and disconnected nodes instituting the network, the reproduction of practices displayed by networking remains unchanged. This is why first-hand ethnographic accounts of the seventh CMS annual meeting can bring new references to rethink the processes and effects of networking practices, namely, a) the intersection between deliberation vis-à-vis networking and b) the issue of multiplying and overlapping membership.


The document outlining the call for the seventh annual plenary session holds the signature of 25 organisations formally taking part of the CMS³¹. There are trade union centrals, religious organisations, civil society associations, women’s social movement organisations, and landless and housing organisations among others. To what extent did the CMS reproduced networking practices previously established under FNT? There is no easy answer to this question. CMS members recognised themselves as part of a common tradition opened up by historical junctures such as ‘novo sindicalismo’ in the 1980s and ‘struggles against neoliberalism’ in the 1990s, MST land occupations, and so on. However, unlike the

³¹ CUT, MST, CMP (Comunidade por Moradia Popular – Projecto Comunidade), CNBB (Confederacion Nacional dos Obispos do Brasil), UNE (Union Nacional de Estudantes), ABI (Asociacioin Brasileira de Impresa), Grito dos Excluidos, Marcha Mundial de Mulheres, UBM (Centro Universitario de Barra Mansa), CONEN (Conselho Estadual de Entorpecentes – No a las drogas), MTD (Movimentos de Trabalhadores Desempregados), MTST (Movimento de Trabalhadores Sem Teto), CONTEE (Confederação Nacional dos Trabalhadores em Establecimientos de Ensino), CNTE (Confederação Nacional de Trabalhadores de Educacion), CONAM (Confederação Nacional das Associações de Moradores), UNMP (Union Nacional por Moradia Popular), Ação da Cidadania, CEBRAPAZ (Centro Brasileiro de Solidaridad os Povos e Luta por la Paz), ABRAÇO (Associação Brasileira de Radiodifusao Comunitaria – RS), CGTB (Central General dos Trabalhadores do Brasil), CNQ (Confederação Nacional do Ramo Quimico), FUP (Federação Única dos Petroleiros), SINTAP (Sindicato Nacional dos Trabalhadores Aposentados), ANPG (Associação Nacional de Pos Graduados), CTB (Central dos Trabalhadores do Brasil).

FRENAPO, the CMS intended to open a regular space for interaction for organisations of the popular campaign. It aims to ‘institutionalise’ the space for interaction whereas the FRENAPO sought in practice campaigns in favour of something in particular. There is therefore an ‘open’ feature in the founding mark of the CMS in contrast to the ‘closed’ mark of FRENAPO. I argue that both of them, however, illustrate different features of the same phenomenon.

The fact that the experience of the CMS occurs along Lula’s presidency it is something that matters; is reflected in the graph below, and is related to the question of autonomy. In other words, the presence of Lula as Brazil’s first working class president affected the networking dynamic without interrupting its practice. Whereas during FNL the moment of intensity of the network looks shared between *n2*, *n1*, *n3* and *n6*, during CMS, *n2*, namely, the CUT tends to be more at the centre of a centripetal dynamic.

Figure number 5: CMS networking process



References: n1: MST; n2: CUT; n3: Consulta Popular; n4: Government; n5: political parties of the opposition; n6: Pastorais Sociais; n7: Contag; n8: FS; n9: Marcha Mundial das Mulheres; n10: UNE; n11: CNBB; n12: Intersindical; n13: Conlutas; n14: NCST.

Note 1: The graph does not provide exhaustive account of organisations involved but highlights instead dynamics among the most relevant ones.

Note 2: grey numbers refer to organisations either not present or irrelevant in the studied period. Bold black numbers in turn show their correspondence appearance.

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Source: based on data produced by document analysis, media output and interviews made by the author.

Understandably, the question on autonomy with Lula in government became object of reflection in the CMS. João Pedro Stedile, founding member of the MST and speaker at the seventh CMS National Plenary in São Paulo, stated the following:

‘The victory that we had in 2002 with the Lula government was a political victory because we defeated the continuity of the neoliberal project, but the electoral victory was not enough to alter the hegemony in Brazilian society.’ (BRA:ET:N1)

Interestingly, the MST as probably the biggest social movement organisation in the CMS decided to safeguard such space for participation not leaving the CMS and committing itself to deliberative practice among other organisations. However, it raised important differences regarding the diagnosis of the balance of power after PT electoral victory and the general role of the subaltern sector in such scenario. But the critical position assumed by the MST was not unanimous and it was precisely the issue of autonomy in relation to the government which resulted in different groups leaving the CMS:

‘...in 2000 there was an important shift with the Lula government, I found that there was a readjustment of the trade union movement. Some sectors left the CUT (and therefore the CMS) forming new organizations. Trade unionists linked to PSTU, left unionists linked to PCdoB, and the PSB (Brazilian Socialist Party), and also unions with a more conservative political orientation...The UGT is a fusion of part of Forza Sindical and Association of CAT (Central Autônoma of Trabalhadores) which was linked to the PSDB, the political party of the neoliberal project in the country, along with the Democrats, eh (PD). In short, there was a fairly significant reorganization from the Lula government.’ (BRA:TU:N1)

The connection and intensification of certain relationships encompassed disconnection and differentiation with other organisations. It highlights the ongoing movement of networks but more importantly the dynamic of integration and exclusion underpinning its force. But in what respect and how did networking practices forged deliberation, creating consensus and hence favouring integration within different sectors? Spaces such as the CMS illustrating networking dynamics suggests that the creation of consensus adopted the form of agreement at the bottom with eventual differences (though not disagreements) at the top. In relation to this point we read the following testimony:

‘...we are not against the government, we do not want to overthrow the government, the parties who lost the election want that...We [CMS] are critical of the government and we demand respect for social movements.

So, the MST stands by Lula's government but they equally disagrees with many of Lula's government initiatives. It happens the same in the movement struggling for housing. Lula's government implemented very important actions towards democratization of labour-capital relations, the humanization of social movements and lifted more than 14 million poor people from absolute poverty. Yet, we have problems. What are these problems? Land reform remains undone. No progress on the democratisation of communication has been achieved; Brazil is dominated by OGlobo network of communication, SBT and Bandeirantes. In 2007 they renewed their public licences for another 15 years. The CMS was demonstrating on the street to prevent that from happening, unsuccessfully.' (BRA:TU:N1)

The paragraph above is illuminating in at least two important respects. Firstly, it shows the technical separation drawn between electoral politics and (to play with words) political issues allowing networking space to exist. Recognising the right of organisations to withstand different electoral choices does not seem to fully challenge the value of the space itself. It mattered, as warned above in relation to the exit path followed by some organisations after Lula's victory. Secondly, it mattered to the extent of not deterring the development of solidarities and collaborations. Drawing the line opens room for the creation of spaces at the bottom to deliberate on issues that matter to them all (media monopoly, agrarian reform, housing). This reveals a subtle line of connectivity among organisations that cements spaces for collaboration although not assuming a totalising effect and therefore making articulation *in the difference* possible.

On 16 August 2005 the CMS called for a national day of struggle against neoliberal 'destabilisation attempts' mobilising on the streets of major cities and producing a document called 'Letter to the Brazilian People' ('*Carta ao Povo Brasileiro*'). The mobilisation occurred after proved allegations of corruption of high-ranking officials in Lula's government. Corruption cases resonated in a massive media campaign against Lula which the CMS tried to challenge. A second example of 'political issues' in which the CMS effectively intervened was the referendum against the privatisation of the river *Doce* in 2008 (CUT online, accessed: 13.12.11). Unlike the previous one, this action aimed to lobby Lula government to reverse the privatisation undertaken in 1997 under Cardoso. The examples illustrate areas in which solidarities were enacted regardless of organisations' relationship with politico-institutional representative bodies.

Looking at accounts regarding the celebrations of CMS at local level helps to understand the actual performativity of practices which were posted above in more abstract terms. The following quotes are extracts of local from regional reports read at CMS seventh national plenary and delegates' independent participation in open discussions.

'Hello, I am delegate from Brasilia, from secretary of social policy CUT Brasilia and also CONSERG official. In Federal District we ran two seminars. Housing is a dramatic problem in Brasilia; and we are also discussing public land use. The CMS together with the CMP are organising sectors struggling for housing.' (BRA:ET:N3)

'My name is Silvana, I am a union member as well as a member of the CMS, from Curitiba, Parana state. We gather every Wednesday in a community centre called 'Che', where most of social movements gather. It is a very different space for every social movement in Curitiba because although we have a federal coordination we participate as equals, there is no actual coordination, and everybody keeps asking about who the coordinator is. Unions, *Pastorais Sociais* and popular movements for housing alike seem disconcerted.' (BRA:ET:N5)

'Representative CUT of Goias: we face serious difficulties to undertaking coordination in our district. CUT and MST are always articulated and meetings take place at CUT facilities. But we face difficulties because even the MST is having internal conflicts. We are working in very specific activities also because we've got no resources, so we're not participating in everything.' (BRA:ET:N1)

'Delegate from Mina Gerais. In Minas CMS is formed by CUT, unions, popular movements, CTB and students. It took a great deal to set this up. We tried to relate with Intersindical and Conlutas for mobilisation on the May 1, but there is no room left for articulation with these colleagues. Our message is that we are currently under recomposition.' (BRA:ET:N7)

There are two important points to highlight in the analysis of the above. The first one refers to deliberation in practice. Accounts reveal that it is hard to achieve, its success is uneven according to regions, it happens in multiple forms, debating common as well as regional specific issues and, finally, it posits horizontalising effect among different sectors. Delegates informally suggest the development of a special craft behind the dynamic governing cross-organisational spaces. The 'art' of coordinating these spaces supposes practical agreement on rules of equal participation which in turn incentivise 'small' organisations to share the space with 'big' ones. In addition, it also involves the 'understanding' of colleagues' organisations regarding their internal deliberation processes. Recognising others' autonomy and right to deliberate and decide autonomously seems a prerequisite to extend solidarities beyond

organisational borders. The result of such deliberation results in the deployment of joint action like the two episodes suggested earlier.

The second point relates to organisational memberships. More specifically, it relates the apparent cross-organisational overlapping membership. Delegates identified themselves by their names and the region where they came from followed by their organisational membership. Most of them tend to include at least two if not three and only rarely only one institutional membership. A qualitative look into this level of desegregation of the data illustrates that division between organisations are less clear than usually assumed. Activists tend to either participate in more than one organisation or are likely to have participated in a different organisation than the current one in the past. Multiple and overlapping membership reveals that *trajectory* counts more than membership in relation to networking practices. It inscribes members (and organisations) into a broader narrative and hence signals potential articulation upon a common sense of belonging. It correspondingly also signals elements of differentiation resulting in the formation of a boundary upon which such articulation is no longer possible.

4.3 Fora

Cases such as Frenapo and CMS provided evidence regarding the formation of deliberative mechanisms outside existing institutional frameworks. These deliberative mechanisms adopted the form of multiple forums (or Fora) contingently instituted upon intensive nodes resulting from cross-organisational exchange and interconnectivity. As proved by case analysed throughout this chapter, these mechanisms were actually expressed in the formation of empirical events at local, regional and national level.

- Cross-organisational linkages increased significantly resulting in turn in the creation of trust and binding relationships among different (and occasionally competing) sectors. Spaces were rarely formalised and imposed deliberation as an integration mechanism. The development of common fronts (FRENAPPO), umbrella organisations and campaigns (CMS) illustrate this point.

- The rise in the interconnectivity process was result of trade unions self-awareness of decreasing mobilisation power vis-à-vis an extended feeling of disenchantment against institutional politics.
- Developing deliberative spaces expanded the influence of networking practices connecting activated nodes and eventually activating new ones. The process of support granted to FRENAPO by ordinary people as well as by unusual CTA allies goes along this line. Spaces were created by interaction and deliberation was the effect of accords, negotiations, and limitations. In other words, they created their own governing rules as an effect of networking practices and they were not empirical pre-constituted territories.

4.4 Discursive Frontier

Networking practices were created upon ‘discursive surface of inscription’ (Mouffe, 1992a) that campaigns demonstrated, that went beyond factual collaboration and also instituted a common discursive frontier. Although created through the activation of territorial actors and the deployment of actual intervention in the public realm, deliberative spaces were co-constructed upon the formation of a discursive frontier that both instituted the space and favoured repetition, preventing empirical encapsulations. The institution of the discursive frontier relates to the ‘contents’ of networking practices that cement relationships, connect nodes but equally disconnect and signal disagreement. It forms the contingent frontier determining ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’ of the established network.

- Case studies reveal that the first common discursive frontier was constructed upon the division between institutional politics and social movement action. Networking practices resulted from a process of frustration and lack of trust in the institutional environment leading towards actions ‘outside’, for instance, representational politics. Although this did not preclude processes of permeation and diffusion, it expressed contentious discontent against the ‘crises of representation’.
- The formation of the ‘surface of inscription’ resulted from processes of common trajectory-building rather pragmatic contingent alliances. FRENAPO as well as CMS

resulted as ‘intensive nodes’ because of an accumulation of historical interaction had opened the path for the expansion of solidarities. Over time, as a consequence, the latter favoured the development of solidarities across organisations holding different contingent goals but sharing a common history of struggles.

- A discursive frontier was also partially instituted as a result of specific issues upon which consensus were reached. There is interaction rather than causation in this point. Consensus was reached as a result of deliberation practices and vice-versa. In other words, networking practices generated deliberative spaces which in turn resulted in, for instance, deliberating new issues such as poverty, or the privatisation of water resources, etc. There were no networking practices ‘in the air’ but always referring, deliberating, intervening on a specific topical (and eventually) contentious issue.

4.5 Networking: a preliminary typology

Preliminary observations lead to emergence of the second critical dimension instituting the internal dynamics of democratic subjectivities in Argentina and Brazil: networking.

Like self-organising, networking is better described as a non-territorial dynamic with territorial consequences. Although performed through the practice of territorial actors, its movement and dynamic exceeds their particular influence in turn eventually transforming organisations into intensive networking nodes. The FRENAPPO campaign did not succeed in making the government implement the unemployment insurance. It did however expand an existing network of collaboration and added density to alternatives against dominant neoliberalism.

Because it gives form to deliberation mechanisms outside the institutional realm it is contentious in character. It illustrates the formation of counter-deliberation spaces in turn positing alternative issues to those felt ‘legitimate’ or ‘acceptable’. In other words, deliberation through networking practices expresses transgression insofar as it opens the deliberation sphere upon previously excluded sectors, actors and demands.

Networking practices result in a process of horizontalisation by default. Shared practices not only developed linkages, trust and mutual understanding but also the ‘burden’ to care about the opinion of others when deciding courses of action. Although the extension of these interactions is unbounded, as Keck and Stikkink (1998: 235) rightly put it, ‘core network participants are bound up in shared practices of contention and resistance that resonate across borders’. In other words, organisational borders become contested as a result of their increasing interconnection with other organisations suggesting a limit to autonomous organisational deliberation.

The process of construction of horizontal solidarity bonds is encompassed by the institution of clearly defined boundaries determining not only the extension of the network but also the exclusion created as a result. In the case of FRENAPPO, for example, groups advocating for a means-tested approach in social policy were disconnected from the networking practice. The CMS expressed the excluding principle at the time of ‘anti-corruption campaign’ aiming to challenge Lula government. It mobilised ‘against neoliberal regression’ and signalled what was inside and what was outside of the network.

Networking suggests the practice of movement that is both inscribed in the territory and also challenge its territorial crystallisation. In other words, spaces are created and recreated, resisting (designed, empirical) participatory spaces which are bound to more easily fall under the control of dominating mechanisms either from the ‘outside’ (the state) or from the ‘inside’ (corporate or bigger organisations). To some extent, networking practices are guided by the lack of guidance or by the contingent formation of an anarchic contentious principle.

4.6 Final Remarks

Thus, is networking a resource, a metaphor or simply social relation of a different kind? It is a contentious non-territorial dynamic that reconnects deliberation with those excluded from existing deliberative mechanisms. It does not replace grassroots activation (self-organising) but instead overlaps such process adding in turn a new critical dimension, a point of assemblage, to the formation democratic subjectivities in the Argentina and Brazil.

In the following chapter I study the formation of the third ‘internal’ dynamic exploring relationships inside the construction of demands. I argue that *demanding* illustrates the increasingly gravitating role of ‘material things’ in the development of ‘political projects’.

Chapter 5: Demanding. The Territorial in the Immaterial

'the progressive character of a struggle' depends 'on its link to other struggles. The longer the chain of equivalences set up between the defence of the rights of one group and those of other groups, (...)the more difficult it will be to neutralize certain struggles' (Mouffe, 1988: 100)

'I value a lot clinching small victories, gaining concrete things, improvements that can be achieved for the workers and the popular movement. In the popular camp workers need small victories to keep alive the flame of struggle that needs to target transformation of society' (Alberto Piccinini quoted in Rauber, 1998: 107)

Introduction

The objective of this chapter is to introduce the third constitutive internal non-territorial dynamic shaping the formation of democratic subjectivities in post-transition context: demanding. My contention is twofold: 1) organisations show the presence of foundational markers whose construction lies in territorial struggles. It is in the territory where organisational demands are constructed. The FTV demand for housing, the MST demand for land reform, CUT and CTA demand for union democracy; all of which is constructed upon defined territories of action and interaction. Such struggles adopt the form of needs, grievances and problems. 2) Demands are in tension with *demanding* as a broader dynamic or, in other words, the de-territorialising effect that produces general struggles out of specific claims.

Demanding is not an isolated dimension but is strongly intertwined with self-organising and networking, discussed in the previous two chapters. It overlaps with them as a consequence in many respects. However, there are two interlocked effects resulting from demanding which are different and justify their separate analysis. It is through the observation of the formation and enactment of demanding that the liquidation of the distance between object and subject

can actually be understood. In other words, demanding further suggests the radical interdependency between the former and the latter in the contingent formation of chain of equivalences and intensive nodes (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985). To put it bluntly, I suggest that the territory is the ‘new material’ which becomes ‘non-material’ as result of the production of a non-territorial dynamic that is both embedded and goes beyond the territory itself. Secondly, demanding challenges the ‘delegation’ hypothesis extended in the political science of the region. For Critchley, *demanding* expresses an active (ethical) experience ‘whereby new objects emerge for a subject involved in the process of their creation’ (Critchley, 2007: 14). Demanding therefore elicits an ongoing activation of an array of territorial issues which control organisations protect, enact and negotiate but do not delegate.

The chapter is organised in four sections. Firstly, I discuss my understanding of demands in relation to ‘delegation’ and ‘chain of equivalence’. Secondly, I introduce the legacy of dictatorships in what I see as the configuration of a macro form of regulation of demands in post-transition contexts. More precisely, I briefly draw on episodes in history to illustrate post-transition governance, i.e., the discursive construction of the distinction between ‘responsible’ and ‘irresponsible’ demands. Thirdly, I study the effects of the intersection between organisational types and differential demands. I suggest that the emergence of the division between ‘the lack of’ and ‘the sense of injustice’ helps to explain the formation of equivalential critical junctures. In addition I suggest by drawing on one example the temporal dominance of new unionism as represented is the result of its accession as an *empty signifier*. Fourthly, I offer a preliminary conceptualisation of demanding as a non-territorial dynamic a) shaping the names and struggles of collective contentious action and b) instituting a third overlapping but different internal dynamic of democratic subjectivities in Argentina and Brazil. I conclude with brief final remarks.

5.1 Delegation, Demands and Demanding

For the purpose of this chapter it is important to place the notion of demanding in its correct theoretical position which in my argument is found between ‘social demand’ a la Laclau (2005b) *in relation to* a critique of the notion of ‘delegation’ in O’Donnell’s term (1994). Demanding is inspired in the former, although it does not express its literal translation and aims to challenge basic assumptions underlying the latter.

The focus of Transition School, i.e., its focus on institutions has been appropriately pointed out elsewhere in this thesis. O'Donnell's (1994) notion of 'Delegative Democracy' (DD) intends to explain the weak institutionalised but lasting political democracies. He defines it as:

'a type of democracy which rests on the premise that whoever wins the election for the presidency is entitled to govern as he or she sees fit, constrained only by the hard facts of existing power relations and by a constitutionally limited term of office' (O'Donnell, 1994: 59)

Countries such as Argentina, Brazil and Peru in the region embody according to O'Donnell's in the DD model. In contrast, the cases of Uruguay and Chile follow a path closely related to representative democracies. DD is constructed precisely upon its differences with representative democracy (RD). Regimes where presidents govern as they *see fit*, according to the author do not seem to be in the path of becoming representative democracies inasmuch as they are failing to develop central institution building to achieve regime consolidation (O'Donnell, 1994: 57). O'Donnell's argument raises concerns regarding the enduring practices of patronage, corruption and clientelism in democratically elected governments that ultimately undermines the de-personalisation of politics.

Drawing on the comparison between transition and post-authoritarian regime evolution in Brazil and Argentina, Panizza (2000) praises O'Donnell but points to a limitation in his argument. He states that the 'new economics' (neoliberalism) has been moulded by 'old politics' (patronage relationships) and he asks why some presidents (e.g. Menem) have been more successful than others (e.g. Cardoso) in promoting economic reforms. His answer to this conundrum lies in the importance of the politico-institutional settings in which these reforms took place (Panizza, 2000: 738). Such politico-institutional settings were expressed in Argentina by the installation of a governmental coalition which, according to the author, expresses some sort of institutional cement and not the complete lack of it as suggested by the DD model.

Unlike Panizza who seems to agree with the general terms of the DD model but not with its general conclusions, Peruzzoti (2001) offers a more critical stance on the matter. Bringing to the fore processes and experiences from below, he claims that DD has turned a blind eye to innovative processes which have made Argentina's wave of democratisation distinctive. He

shows concern regarding the disenchantment of transitologists' literature on democratisation with recent political processes (Peruzzotti, 2001: 135). What the Transition School assess as Democracy's poor performance, Peruzzotti sees as a lack of attention on processes from below in turn feeding the cultural institutional consolidation. The monochord criticism on populist culture seems to the author misleading and problematic as it fails to analyse an array of rich experiences emerging from civil society. Argentine society in particular, he argues, has undertaken a process of cultural learning whose effects in turn impacted institution consolidation: 'the politics of human rights acted as a catalyst for cultural change, triggering a profound renovation of the country's democratic traditions' (Peruzzotti, 2001: 141). He interestingly concludes that the role of civil society and social movements needs to be reassessed in relation to institutional and regime consolidation.

Although Peruzzotti successfully signals one of DD weakest points his contribution aims to complement or add to the model rather than to produce a radical departure. I think that his attempt ultimately fails because it does not tackle the most problematic assumption underlying the model which is the notion of 'delegation'. The attempt to match the effects of *active* social movements to a model, which is structured upon the assumption of *passive* individual delegation, is bound to result in irresolvable ambiguity.

Looking at democratisation as embedded in the processes of *demand* formation contributes to overcome the pitfalls above mentioned. Demands constitute a central piece of Laclau and Mouffe (1985) problematisation of hegemony in the production and expansion of political identities. Although framing demands remains contentious, recent social science contributions (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985, Laclau, 2005b, Critchley, 2007) help to overcome common theoretical traps, such as seeing demands either as the product of alienated immanent actors or the transparent input to a non-conflictual political system. The 'rediscovery' of demands seems important both methodologically and analytically.

'The first path is to split the unity of the group into smaller unities that we have called demands: the unity of the group is, in my view, the result of an articulation of demands. This articulation, however, does not correspond to a stable and positive configuration which could be grasped as a unified whole: on the contrary, since it is in the nature of all demands to present claims to a certain established order, it is in a peculiar relation with that order, being both inside and outside it. As this order cannot fully absorb the demand, it cannot constitute itself as a coherent totality; the demand, however, requires some kind of totalization if it is going to crystallize in

something which is inscribable as a claim within the 'system'. All these ambiguous and contradictory movements come down to the various forms of articulation between logic of difference and logic of equivalence' (Laclau, 2005b: ix and x)

Looking at demands as the smallest unit of analysis, instead of empirical or immanent actors or subjects, is paramount to unravel subject positions and moments of structuration as Rancière puts it:

‘...the relationship of the ‘we’, the subject of utterance that opens the sequence, to the subject announced, whose identity is served up in a variety of forms (citizens, workers, women, proletarian), is defined solely by the set of relationships and operations in the demonstrative sequence. Neither the *we* nor the identity assigned to it, nor the opposition of the two defines a subject. There are political subjects or rather modes of subjectification only in the set of relationships that the *we* and its *name* maintain with the set of ‘persons’, the complete play of identities and alterities implicated in the demonstrations and the worlds –common or separate–where these are defined’ (Rancière, 1999: 59)

Rancière brings an additional important element connected to social demands which is the dynamics of *naming*. Articulations and contingent saturation of heterogeneous subject position require names enacted in order to be performed. Such names are radically embedded in the territories and context in which they are produced and therefore allow us to think thorough the process of formation of subjects along with the politisation of things, i.e., the radical dissolution of the frontier subject – object. Or, as suggested by Laclau (1992: 17) ‘the unity of the object is the retroactive effect of naming itself’. The latter gives the nomination process an essentially performative character which is the precondition for hegemony and politics.

This chapter posits that the notion of demanding therefore builds on the critique of delegation as suggested by the DD model and equally aims to interpret naming processes whilst observing case studies. It departs, however, from the full methodological meaning given by Laclau (2005b) inasmuch as in this thesis it shares the position of ‘smaller unity’ with two other dynamics (self-organising and networking). This point justifies using my own nomenclature and not the category of ‘social demand’ as fully conceptualised by the author.

But, more importantly, demanding shares with ‘social demands’ the underlying idea of impossibility of fixing the unity of a social formation. If self-organising resonates with the question of *who* and networking on *how*, demanding emphasises the *what*, the quest about things that make names.

5.2 From Dictatorships and Transitions to Democracy

Taking a closer look at the dynamics behind the construction of demands, the first observation needs to highlight a general, although significant, shift produced by the end of military rule. The transition from military rule in Argentina and Brazil had the effect of altering the form by which demands were formulated. The context of subjugation to any form of political dissent (persecution, torture and disappearance of activists and militants, intervention of trade union organisations, banning of political activity, etc.) marked an era of closure and rampant demand repression. The document produced in the first MST national Congress in 1985 refers to the dictatorship as follows:

‘In rural areas the military dictatorship crackdown on farmers’ organizations, their leaders were murdered, imprisoned or exiled; any attempt to discuss and elaborate on the agrarian question in Brazil was suffocated. The military government imposed a modernisation policy of agriculture, to meet the demand of the urban-industrial and foreign market, without reforming the agrarian structure. Such modernization deepened social exclusion, increased rural exodus, technological and social inequalities in rural Brazil’. (MST, 1985)

The document uses the expression to *suffocate* to refer to the successful military attempt to undermine debate and deliberation upon the question of ‘modernisation’ and agrarian reform.

Similarly, the CUT in its second national congress in Rio de Janeiro in 1986, nearly a year after the end of military rule, condemned in similar terms the military strategy against the ‘suffocation’ of, in their case, the labour expression of discontent. The document ponders that the military passed law 4330 making strikes unfeasible in practical terms. The right to strike was therefore curtailed for Brazilian workers according to this document. In addition, the CUT national congress criticised the attempt by the recently elected government to replace law 4330 with a new one although they failed to question the essence of the military

regulation based on a 'fascist, corporatist trade union structure which is either created or controlled by the state' (CUT, 1986). By doing this the CUT understood that the government was, in practice, not lifting the military-imposed ban on the right to strike but instead reinforcing it.

Organisational references to dictatorship legacy are found similarly in Argentina adding not only the legal impediment to strike, to perform demonstrations, to petition or, simply, to demand but also in terms of 'mind colonisation'. In other words, the legacy was felt in the effects of the oppressive regime in peoples' attitudes towards petitioning and claiming for civil, social and political rights. One of the interviewees referred for instance to the 2001 uprising in Argentina in the following terms:

'From there pickets grew around the country. It emerged various new organisations, marches, strikes and roadblocks that led episodically to the 19 and 20 of December 2001. It was the moment that we believe put an end to the legacy of military dictatorship in the head and the heart of our people. Mostly, people took to the streets to demand an end to economic policy and to reject the state of siege...' (ARG:MO:N3)

The extract above interestingly links the 'call for order' made by president Fernando de la Rúa in Argentina and the final drivers that led to the 'December riots'. The call for order involved the declaration of a state of emergency which legally suspended civil rights. The suspension of civil rights resonated, according to our interviewee, with the military long-lasting state of civil rights 'suffocation'. It was precisely the collective memory of 'what we do not want anymore' that finally triggered the 'enough is enough' leading to the riots of the 19th and 20th of December 2001.

Dictatorship years though are also recalled as a time of active underground mobilisation. While human rights organisations like the Mothers of Plaza de Mayo searching for their missing children managed to gather international recognition and hence visibility in Argentina; in Brazil the 1980s appear in activists' memories largely marked by the pluralisation of demands as well as organisations expressing an array of different concerns.

'...in fact in the 1980s occurred a very strong rupture with the military government. A myriad of social movements emerged struggling for a diverse range of issues: for health, housing, road asphalt, specific issues as well as more general issues such as health, schools. This fight takes place in the city and the countryside, almost simultaneously. I remember a great struggle of farm workers

in 1979 held by sugar cane workers. Part of the landless movement starts there. The entire society is involved in a series of demonstrations in 1980s' (CUT:BRA:TU:1)

Although struggles 'in the city' and 'in the countryside', as the interviewee puts it, gathered pace in the 1980s, the opportunities for these struggles to become demands were largely doomed, mainly because repression was tight on various fronts. However, although political liberalisation happened later in Brazil than Argentina it is reasonable to argue that the process of loosening repression started earlier in the former. It signals a different country pace in the alleviation of repression through a similar pattern in the construction of narratives regarding the relationship demands vis-à-vis democracy.

Transition took place and the scenario relating to the thread this chapter is trying to unveil also changed. In other words, if the context in which the process of demanding was of 'repression' and 'closure', the presence of elected governments contributed to the formation of a new state of affairs, which I argue is still with us today. It is likely that the clearest signs of the new scenario were deployed in the first few years of elected governments.

Developments in Argentina also help prove this in the most dramatic fashion. Looking at, for instance, the human rights movements the literature tends to agree that the 'apolitical civil rights' petitions were actually producing political results through the establishment and signification of spaces and territories of memories (Jelin and Langland, 2003), i.e., undermining military local and international legitimacy. Thus, the case of the human rights movements in Argentina was characterised by 'quiet' resistance and the development of a common identity (Pereyra, 2005) in the context of brutal repression. President Alfonsín (1983-1989) favoured and supported the creation of the National Commission for the Disappeared (CONADEP) which paved the way for the historic trial that sentenced the entire military junta to jail (Torre and De Riz, 2001). It represented the spring of democracy and the collective perception that 'everything was possible'.

However, what followed the democratic spring was the realisation of a rather more complex state of affairs in which the military, but also corporate interests in general, remained in a privileged position. The lieutenants' revolt that followed in the early days of the transition proved the latter and forced the government to put an end to judicial trials. By Easter of 1987

the government had negotiated with the military to implement two key laws, generally known as impunity laws. Due Obedience and Full Stop (*Obediencia Debida y Punto Final*), that would allow no further trials or investigation into military involvement in human rights abuses. This process was reversed under the Kirchner administration and human right crimes are finally being prosecuted as crimes against humanity.

Hence, how is it possible to explain the coexistence of ‘everything is possible’ alongside the establishment of impunity laws? For the purpose of the argument in this chapter this paradox illustrates a crucial distinction. Democratically elected governments contributed to the establishment of a new system for the regulation of demands governed by the logic of what was seen as, on the one hand, ‘responsible’ and what was considered, on the other hand, ‘irresponsible’ (demands, actions, mobilisations, protests, etc.)³². The establishment of democratically elected governments mattered greatly in the institution of this socio-political norm because it allegedly established a system to translate demands into the politico-institutional sphere. I argue therefore that the legacy of the dictatorships needs to be scrutinised in the light of their effect on the formation of new systems of the regulation of demands. As already suggested, the essential elements constructing this new regulatory system (‘responsible and ‘irresponsible’ demands) emerged as a consequence of the transition or what ‘they are not’. Both feelings of immense possibility and dramatic limitations permeated actions and perceptions underlying the reconstitution of a new form for regulating demands in the post-transition.

The formation of a system of distribution and regulation of demands, needless to say, resulted from human rights struggles between the military corporation, human rights organisations, activists and government. It was not a pre-established frontier but rather it was determined by the interplay of actors struggling for what was at stake at a particular historical moment. I argue that the legacy of the institution of dictatorship vis-à-vis the new regulatory system, however, remains unchallenged and is currently permeating the inclusion of some issues at the expense of others. And issues are interwoven with the constitution of subjects in turn struggling for those issues. However, although the differentiation between ‘responsible’ and

³² It is important to make two comments to prevent confusion. Firstly, demanding is something different from ‘the state’ because it would imply bypassing relevant differences between dictatorship and democratically elected governments. Secondly, demanding allows us to capture the specificity of the new regulatory system of demands in the context of the post-transition. Most evidently, it expresses the difference on demanding in a context of curtailed civil rights and demanding in a context of extended civil liberties.

‘irresponsible’ demands endures, the content of what falls into each space is a matter of contentious and open struggle. That is to say, ‘contents’ cannot be determined ex-ante but instead result from contestation and correlation of forces.

The scenario is therefore now set to continue the complex discursive deconstruction of demands trying to understand linkages, relationships and the underlying mechanisms of exclusion, inclusion and (in)subordination. The construction of demanding as a non-territorial dynamic builds on this macro system of regulation established in the post-transition resonating the legacy of the pre-transition. In order to study the latter and introduce the following section, it is useful to have the following questions in mind: Is there an underlying structure behind the development of *demands* in the context of democratically elected governments? How do these demands (or the logic behind them) contribute to collective action? To what extent are demands revealing something beyond empirical petitions for concrete solutions? In order to approach these questions further exploration of empirical material in the form of discourse analysis is needed, which is something I undertake in the following subsection.

5.3 Demands vis-à-vis Organisation Type

The task of aligning a specific demand or set of demands to particular organisational forms is difficult and to some extent problematic. It is difficult because the formulation of demands is fluid and therefore subject to variations over time in nomenclature and also in content. Likewise, allocating demands to organisations is something empirically valuable, although analytically incorrect insofar as organisations *and* demands produce collective action, which in turn reconstructs organisational forms and demands. This complex interdependency is analysed below. I do this in two steps. I firstly reconstruct cross-country demands according to the type of organisation (trade union and social movement organisation). Next, building on commonalities discovered in step one, namely, the common division between the ‘lack of’ and the ‘sense of injustice’, I illustrate with an example the ‘cross-organisational deconstructing effect’ of demanding as a non-territorial dynamic. In other words, I briefly show the qualitative process underlying the transition from ‘(localised) organisational demands’ to ‘(broader) cross-organisational projects’.

5.3.1 Demands vis-à-vis Social Movements Organisations (MST and FTV)

So, to what extent does the claim for land, housing and agrarian reform actually encapsulate the process of demanding in which the MST and the FTV have been actively involved for more than 30 years?

The MST first national Congress in 1985 was clear in its aims and principal demands. It took the following guiding motto: ‘There is no democracy without agrarian reform’ [*Sem Reforma Agrária, não há Democracia*]. Brazil was under the military rule that had seized power in a coup d’état in 1964. They had approved a Land Statute (*Estatuto da Terra*) in order to diffuse the increasing pressure caused by the landless emerging as a result of the displacement caused by the expansion of huge cattle ranches into the most productive part of the country known as the Amazon basin. Furthermore, President Emilio Garastazzu Medici also introduced a land settlement programme ‘to take landless families...to the northeast...matching ‘men without land’ to ‘land without men’’ (Branford and Rocha, 2002: 5). This project was aimed at producing the labour force ranches and mining projects needed for the ‘modernisation’ project the military and governing elite had in mind for Brazil. A minority ended up working in farms they had previously owned and the vast majority fled to the suburbs of the largest Brazilian industrial cities, but settlements did not flourish (Branford and Rocha, 2002).

The MST whose origins can be traced back to the late 1970s, celebrated its first national congress at the end of military rule seeking to force agrarian reform into the politico-institutional agenda³³. Identifying their own action, territory and demands was important in making their ‘autonomous space’ different from allied organisations like the CUT and the catholic church (Carvalho, 2006). Thus, as result of its first Congress they produced a document calling for agrarian reform (above all) as a principal demand as well as further strengthening MST’s newly-created organisational structures.

- 1- To put land reform on the country’s agenda;

³³ The agrarian reform is not something new in a country with one of the worst land distribution of the world, i.e., 1% of landowners own 50% of Brazilian land. The Rural Leagues [Ligas Camponesas] is the most recent historical antecedent which despite its short life span (1954-1964) managed to introduce the debate about agrarian reform by promoting peasants’ political organisation for the very first time (Morais, 2006).

- 2- To consolidate the MST organisation nationwide;
- 3- To unify peasant struggles in the country;
- 4- To define and implement struggles against the large landownership (*latifundio*) (MST, 1985)

Twenty-three years later, in 2007, the MST drafted another document summing up ‘the most relevant problems of society’ in order to debate alternatives and possible strategies to overcome them. As in the first Congress the agrarian reform occupied a significant part of the document, but unlike the document written in 1985, the demand for agrarian reform appears to now be intertwined with three new components: a) the need to work on the constitution of coalition and articulation with other sectors. The document mentions firstly ‘the need to discuss project which can challenge imperialism’ (MST, 2007) with all sectors and their organisations. b) The protection of the environment. It represents a theme MST highlights. The call to campaign against burning native forest for sole purpose of expanding *latifundio*. c) the battle against neoliberalism. Fighting against neoliberalism means struggling against ‘the expansion of multinational corporations aiming to control the production and distribution of the Brazilian agricultural trade’ (point 6 in MST, 2007).

In Argentina, the FTV was institutionally formed in 1998 when it adopted its current name and was formally integrated to the CTA structures and deliberative bodies. As mentioned elsewhere in this thesis, it represented the key ‘nationalisation’ moment for an organisation whose area of influence had largely been reduced to Buenos Aires. Its original markers were constructed during the process of demanding land for housing through the implementation of land occupations in the province of Buenos Aires (*La Matanza*), in the late 1980s (Merklen 1991 and 2001 in Svampa and Pereyra, 2003: 43). Land occupation in this case resulted from multiple causes such as the search for individual plots for housing, occupation of empty public buildings, etc. Land takeover represented for the FTV one of the mechanisms used by deprived popular sectors in order to find a place to live (Calvo, 2006: 63). The first analytical observation identifies occupations with unsatisfied basic needs for example housing, but also running water and electricity. In more general terms the FTV original marker should be related to demands associated with community well-being through the improvement of living conditions.

The development of the Neighbourhood Network (*Red de Barrios*) resulting from FTV’s successful strategy to bring real solutions to the basic need of communities, originally

grouping just four neighbourhoods, had expanded to more than a hundred by 2003. Developing an organisational structure was the result of the 'neighbourhood network' increasing its quantitative complexity. Such complexity in turn also evolved into an increasingly demanding complexity, integrating new issues and struggling in solidarity with other organisations. FTV quantitative as well as qualitative passage from 'victims' to 'squatters' over the years, was correctly captured by Merklen (1991: 28 cited in Cross, 2004: 297), and presupposed a significant transformation in their social formation. By the time the FTV was formed in 1998, under the umbrella of the CTA the extension, heterogeneity and complexity of the network was significant in many respects. As a result, they successfully positioned themselves as interlocutor with the state, negotiating resources in the form of food, land expropriations and subsidies.

So, late in the 1990s the 'Community Centre Mary of Nazareth' was the centre hosting the social activity of El Tala neighbourhood. It had, for example, a 'land office' in which, among other things, provided help with the paperwork for the get property titles of occupied land. It also included a 'community area' offering training and workshops addressing the growing unemployment' (Calvo, 2006: 59 and 60)

'Victor De Gennaro tends to say that the neighbourhood is the new factory and a colleague told me: 'hey, and what about the rural sector?' Then we redefined the concept used today by saying: 'The community is the new factory' (Luis D'Elia, FTV, La Matanza, quoted in Svampa and Pereyra, 2003: 42).

Quotations above contribute to identify two elements regarding the FTV which I want to highlight at this point of the analysis. The first relates to the character of the FTV demands at the time of emergence, whereas the second refers to subtle changes within the theme underlying the construction of FTV demands to which it is critical to pay attention to.

The first quotation, to a large extent, encapsulates the principal features surrounding FTV (or the neighbourhood network that gave it birth) demands at its foundation. Demands clearly arose from the territory and were defined in relation to 'needs' and 'problems' closely identified with the territory or, more specifically, the neighbourhood. At this point the extent of the demands remained largely local relating to a particular group of people (those seeking land for housing). Property rights over occupied lands as well as demand for the improvement of neighbourhood conditions (including services, asphalt, water supply, etc.) dominated its foundation. These demands, although common to a significant number of

people, were also very specific and did not gain a more general character. In theoretical terms, they did not initiate a *chain of equivalence* that could depart from their original meaning in the process of articulation with equivalential demands.

The second quotation raises another significant point which, as in the case of MST showed earlier, leads one to think beyond 'organisational demands'. As it has already been pointed out in this thesis, the 1990s was the decade during which unemployment levels swung between high and historically high levels (25% in 2001 was the record high). It was precisely in this context that the debate over the site of the 'new factory' needs to be discussed. Clearly, the emergence of the FTV was primarily dominated by urban type actions and in consequence the neighbourhood as 'the new factory' typifies its foundation. Over time, however, it shows constraints that 'remain specific' in favour of widening the scope of the organisation and therefore its demands. 'Community is the new factory', the FTV leader states, anticipating that 'new issues', like unemployment, were becoming not only a new FTV demand but also its driver for struggle. The consequences of this raise the thought I put forward below.

The relationship between 'organisational demands' in the case of the FTV and MST need to be accounted for, both in relation to their particularity but also and, more importantly, in relation to their (potential) complementarity with alternative demands or set of demands. In other words, both organisations can illustrate the process of constructing their demand in relation to the territory. In this sense demands are the result of bottom-up dynamics in which it is the people and their experiences who are the determining factors. However, these 'territorial markers' appear to be essentially open elements inasmuch as they are the result of contested negotiations and therefore may be subject to change over time. To a large extent the case of MST illustrates (and FTV to a lesser extent) 'original markers' are not neutral in the sense that they tend to endure in the form of organisational features and identity markers. While FTV engaged with 'struggles against unemployment' MST integrated 'food sovereignty'. Transitions built upon the redefinition of original markers rather than erasure of past actions. New demands and struggles have to be defined *in relation* to these original markers. In this complexity lies the openness in relation to articulation with different demands, as well as the limitations in relation to the demands that cannot be articulate. It shapes the nature of the struggles with which organisations engage after their crucial moment of public emergence.

Finally, as already mentioned, MST and FTV prove that original demands matter. In this respect only MST and FTV represent ‘different’ demanding experiences than, for instance, trade unions. But they also prove that there is an element of ‘excess’ that goes beyond the original moment which suggests therefore the presence of an ‘instituting practice’ governing the open-ended demanding logic that is both embedded and relatively autonomous from the organisational mould.

5.3.2 Demands vis-à-vis Trade Union Centrals (CUT and the CTA)

To what extent claims to change the corporatist trade union model fully encapsulates the process of demanding with which the CUT and CTA have visibly engaged over recent years? Elements of continuity have characterised the Brazilian democratic transition over broader socio-political change:

‘...the remarkable ability of traditional elites to conserve their positions of dominance in the system, and the permeability and gradual blurring of the boundary between supporters and opponents of the military regime. A vivid illustration was President José Sarney (1985-1990). After splitting with his pro-military party over his choice of presidential candidate, Sarney was elected vice president in indirect elections on a ticket headed by conservative opposition leader Tancredo Neves. When Neves died before taking office, Sarney became Brazil’s first civilian president since 1964 as a new member of the PMDB, the largest party to emerge from the antiauthoritarian opposition. Sarney was not alone in his odyssey; a considerable number of PMDB federal deputies elected in 1986 were former members of the pro-military party (Keck 1995: 233)

While continuity was the dominant feature of the politico-institutional sphere in Brazilian politics, something different was posited by the mobilised grassroots as illustrated by the previously discussed case of the MST. In what, to some extent, was a heavily complicated process, the new trade union movement expressed the mood for change within organised labour by organising a series of successful strikes in the industrial suburbs of São Paulo which catapulted Luiz Inácio ‘Lula’ da Silva to national prominence.

The CONCLAT, which would later give birth to the CUT national structure, clearly stated its priorities, demands and principles in the resolution produced in August 1983:

In this crisis, the workers' proposal requires:

1. the end of the government's economic policy;
2. breaking agreements with the International Monetary Fund;
3. autonomy and freedom of association;
4. freedom of political association;
5. agrarian reform under the control of workers;
6. no to external debt payment;
7. end to the National Security Law (LSN);
8. end to military rule and government controlled by the workers;
9. direct election for president.' (CUT, 1981)

The first impression of the above is a clear division between two different types of demands. Five of the points highlighted above refer to demands for 'greater freedom' and normalisation of civil and political liberties (numbers 3, 4, 7, 8 and 9), while the other four refer to 'economic' type of demands (numbers 1, 2, 5 and 6). In the same line, the crises were therefore evaluated as a result of the negative combination between pernicious economic policies advocated by the IMF on the one hand, and the oppression of basic civil liberties on the other, for example direct presidential elections and the autonomy of trade unions, were being seriously curtailed.

In one of CUT pioneering academic studies, Rodrigues (1997) refers to the voice of a worker from the Ford automotive factory from São Bernardo do Campo in the industrial hinterland of São Paulo:

'the minimum achievement conquered by workers was dignity [*dignidade*], respect for the human beings and their rights which did not exist before...Before that it was a living hell where there was no respect and where the boss had the only authorised voice, full stop.' (Rodrigues, 1997: 23)

The interview was recorded in 1984 and therefore expresses living memories of the wave of strikes that gave notoriety to 'new unionism'. But also, the interview happened while trade union organisation at the shop floor level in the most industrial part of Brazil started to gain a new dimension. Rodriguez (1997) interestingly relates the meaning attached to the notion of 'dignity' uttered by the interviewer to the influence of the progressive line of the Catholic Church which had advocated peoples' organisation at grassroots level since the late 1960s

when the liberation theology gathered force in the Catholic Church and gained special influence in Brazil.

In addition to the dimension of dignity, unions also struggled for autonomy, which was to a large extent a new unionism landmark. Autonomy in the case of the CUT was not a theoretical stance but rather a concrete rejection of the state-centred corporatist model built upon the establishment of the compulsory union tax (*imposto sindical*). Autonomy from the state was henceforth defined in relation to the abolition of such compulsory tax struggling to regain the sense of militant activism and grassroots engagement in the development of trade union membership. It represented, in many respects, the struggle to re-establish dignity within trade union activism in what had become a commodified practice. This was in other words the attempt to shift power from the top to the bottom. In addition to autonomy, the second most important new unionism demand was not only electoral democratisation, but also for internal democracy. It was not performed by oral declamation but empirical practice establishing factory commissions. They played an essential role especially during the growth of the movement and pushed not only to make unions more accountable to their membership but also for a wider democratisation of labour relations (Riethof, 2004: 32).

It is revealing to look closer at the microcosm of factory commissioning. In many respects life inside them provides elements to better understand the nature of the amalgamation of new and old demands and petitions. In the words of a CUT member and current PT government official:

‘My experience is formed in the popular movement that started in the late 1970s here in the ABC we regained unions, when Lula was president, in 1975. It was a period in which we started mobilisation to be later called new unionism. And the popular movement was very important in this process, because it was a period of great repression, military dictatorship yet. The popular movement played an important role because they expressed claims of many people about housing, living conditions, health, education, transportation, its territory. Then it becomes an important move because it begins to be a movement that not only passed by the door of the factory. Base communities were also another very important movement in the resumption of a democratic process in Brazil, social pastoral as well. A group of social actors was formed, which was basically my experience, church and popular movement. In the process developed my political experience, within 1978, 1979, 1980 ...’ (BRA:TU:N2)

The complexity found in the production of factory commissions seems apparent and I am going to highlight in particular two dimensions of such complexity. The first one relates to the diversity of personal trajectories, political affiliations and territorial belongings found in the composition of people setting up grassroots factory commissions. In the same line and connected to the first one, the second interesting dimension present at the level of factory commission organisation was the diversity of aims and objectives. The interrelation between CEBs and factory commissions needs to be emphasised because factory commissions to a large extent emulated CEBs experience, revealing the essential interdependence between the two. The new unionism brought experience from the outside, as the interviewee quoted above put it, 'the door of the factory'. Thus, clearly connected to the latter, objectives were diverse essentially because they combined 'old' labour movement demands together with 'new' social issues associated with social movement organisations which were different from trade unions. Although the CUT never formally integrated the informal sector into its trade union structure, linkages and bonds with social movement organisations were significant and largely shaped its historical development. However, the point that clearly emerges here is the following: the CUT is the consequence of a broader array of mobilisation transcending the labour movement. In other words, the development of factory commissions led to the mobilisation, which in turn paved the way for the creation of the CUT and not the other way round.

The CUT appears to be part of a bigger jigsaw including the reorganisation of the trade union movement in Brazil. Briefly, the CUT was a part of a wider political programme for democratisation and socioeconomic change which also explains the simultaneous creation of the PT (Keck, 1992) . Building a new trade union organisation on this basis re-defined frontiers and created areas of action, integrating changes in practice. Such a transformation was the result of developing a common process across different organisations which was expressed within the labour movement by the CUT and by the MST elsewhere. Understandably, new unionism performed demands which were heavily embedded in a larger configuration of demands being performed by the 'popular movement'. To be sure, it was about the abolition of the union tax, but it was also about 'public transport, territory, education...' as stated by the interviewee.

The CTA was then created a decade after the CUT as a result of circumstances which were specific to the transition to democracy in Argentina, but had a lot in common with the

Brazilian case. The elected President Alfonsín was not the Partido Justicialista (PJ) candidate but the Unión Cívica Radical's (UCR). The PJ was beaten in open and free elections for the first time, creating an uncertain new scenario for its historical ally: the trade union movement. President Alfonsín tried to re-shape the *verticalista*³⁴ (vertical) trade union institutions from the top. He claimed that democratisation needed to reach corporate organisations as well as civil society. This attempt to reform 'from above' the way trade unions operated had the opposite effect; it created a defensive and unified front in what up until then had remained divided into different competing factions.

The above description helps us to understand why Argentina took longer than Brazil for the labour movement to produce a new experience like the CTA which actually emerged in response, not 'against the military' but 'against *menemismo*' (Gurrera, 2005). The question I want to explore further by bringing the case of the CTA to the fore, relates precisely to the meanings arising from the intersection between CTA 'pure' demands and the presence of elements of 'excess' case studies scrutinised above seem to suggest. Anticipating the result and introducing an emergent analytical differentiation, demonstrates that it is probably the CTA case that reveals more clearly the gap between 'the lack of' and the 'sense of injustice' present in their demands or, what could be translated in demands for a 'new trade union model' encompassed by the struggle 'against *menemismo*'.

The 'Burzaco Declaration'³⁵ was for the CTA what the CONCLAT represented for the CUT, in the sense that the meetings produced the founding documents that significantly influenced CTA political strategies and organisational developments.

'...old trade union model based on dependence and complicity with economic power is not good to voice demands of their constituents neither to defend their gains and interest...this meeting of trade union organisations aims to put forward an agenda which widens the debate and suggests proposal...towards the formation of a political movement that includes the following:

³⁴ I use this nomination for the purpose of language economy and because it is widely used and accepted in the specialised literature. However, I am aware of the limitations related to oversimplification it might convey regarding the relationship between trade unions and the state. Briefly, the notion *verticalismo* aims to characterise a type of trade unionism 'pragmatic' rather than ideological and which organisational model tends to prioritise a strong relationship with the state at the expense of working class autonomic positions. In addition, the type of trade unionism that falls under this category (usually Brazil and Argentina) is less likely to manage internal different opinions through pluralist methods; but to follow instead the unwritten code of practice dictated by values such as discipline and loyalty. To read a good review on the matter see (Di Tella, 2003).

³⁵ Burzaco is a city in Almirante Brown district, Buenos Aires Province, where the meeting took place and gave the declaration its name.

1. Trade union autonomy from the state, employers and political parties
2. Trade union democracy rejecting sterile divisions and sectarianism
3. Openness to other social organisations expressing multiple demands of popular sectors reflecting the reality of 5 million Argentineans encountering job problems.
4. Reassessment of union ethics tackling corruption and pseudo-pragmatism with which union leaders justify public funding adjustment policies.’
(Declaración de Burzaco in Rauber, 1998: 321-323)

The *Declaration...* passage quoted above illustrates a rupture with the imaginary upon which the relationship between trade unions and the state was forged under Peronismo, i.e., heteronomy and *verticalismo*. Demands for autonomy, and democracy in particular, resonated with particular force in a context in which the CGT (the largest trade union central) was undergoing a process of reunification (Fernández, 2002), at the same time was negotiating with the Menem government to preserve ‘organisational resources’ like the administration of the *Obras Sociales* (Etchemendy, 1998), in return for silent support for the process of public funding cuts, state reform, privatisation and liberation of trade barriers. Thus, it seems apparent that the CTA, as a new trade union organisation, developed its own objectives and formulated to a certain extent, demands which were defined in relation to the trade union movement. Attempts by the CTA to change and transform the institutional framework governing trade union movement in Argentina was self-evident and expressed, what I consider to be their ‘empirical’ demands. In other words, these were a set of demands that were denouncing the ‘lack of’, i.e., what they saw as obstacles to the development of contentious collective action with the participation of the trade union movement. The labour movement was colonised by the bureaucracy and corporatists practices. It explains why one of the main ideas behind the proposal to transform trade unions was precisely the re-conceptualisation of the idea of the working class.

In the context of high unemployment and increasing informality, the CTA suggested that the notion of working class embedded in trade union practices in Argentina referred to those in formal employment only. In other words, workers’ representation was defined by their relative position in the labour market, consequently leaving the vast majority (unemployed and informal sector) without representation. One of the founding members and influential intellectuals of the CTA argued the need to rethink the concept in a context that combined ‘skilled workers [along with] dispensable or disposable workers’ (Lozano, 1999b: 18). His thoughts were greatly influenced by an ‘end of work’ debate that in a nutshell argued that

capitalist reorganisation of the economy after the technological revolution of the 1970s was incompatible with the former Keynesian model of production based on full employment. The discussion presented elements of contemporary and relevant academic debate. However, CTA goals were more practical and aimed to compete for the representation of workers both within and outside of formal employment. The consequence of that was to create partnerships with existing organisations representing the marginalized, in the form of full integration to the structures and government of the trade union central.

Besides the self-evident demand related to a new form of trade union organisation, demands in the case of the CTA included a second and different element which, although related to the organisation of work, seems distinctive. In relation to this, one of the CTA founding members and eminent leader made the following evaluation regarding the 'outside' impact caused by the ongoing stirrings 'within' the trade union movements:

'The politisation of trade union activity is the inevitable consequence of the implementation of neoliberal policies coming from the state. Today, any sort of grievance, however small, implies standing in direct confrontation against the existing political project. It does not fit the model.' (De Gennaro quoted in Rauber, 1998: 111).

Although its foundation took place in November 1992 the state recognised the CTA as a trade union institution in 1997. However, the institutional recognition was only partial, allowing the CTA to hold inscription at the Labour Ministry as workers' central but not full membership as a functioning trade union with the power to sign collective bargaining agreement. The Argentinian legal framework does not allow the state to recognise more than one national trade union central which is why the CTA carries on demanding for full legal recognition; a struggle which is backed by ILO (International Labour Organisation) Convention No. 87. The CTA institutional path was developed in the context of violent confrontation against the implementation of structural adjustment programmes and liberalisation of the economy by the government of Carlos Menem. To the CTA Menem represented for the CTA the spectacular realisation of the reactionary policies first introduced in the country by the military junta in 1976. Menem continues their work. It is why De Gennaro quoted above, associates the emergence of the CTA not only with the need to 'democratise' the trade union movement in order to break the corporatist model and combat

‘corruption and bureaucratisation’, but he also blamed Menem for the materialisation of a ‘political project’ which did not contemplate the possibility of workers gathering to struggle against it. The ‘sense of injustice’ was articulated in the case of the CTA in relation to the consolidation of a ‘neoliberal system’ in the hands of the Menem government.

Firstly, the answer this section suggests is that evidence alludes to the formation of a strong link between demands and organisations. Organisations have produced ‘specific’ demands in relation to their territory (agrarian reform, housing, etc.), or represented groups (new trade union arrangements) revealing an empirical ‘lack of’ which in turn defined the borders of a particular constituency. However, data analysis summarised above also showed the presence of a second gravitating element characterising such demands: ‘the sense of injustice’³⁶. Although appearing strongly related to the nature of the empirical issues, it also trespasses its territorial limits gaining a certain degree of autonomy. The ongoing presence between the two suggests the emergence of a non-territorial dynamic. While the first mentioned element is related to the territory and a specific ‘lack of’, the second tends to be defined in relation to ‘the sense of injustice’, which refers to a broader system of signification. In order to illustrate this point in greater detail the next section aims to explore the *demanding* ‘formations’ by continuing to scrutinise the development of our case studies over time and from a slightly different angle.

5.4 From ‘Things’ to ‘Projects’: on the articulation of ‘sense of injustice’

Drawing on one example I aim to analyse the complex and contradictory process of negotiation, alliance, pacts and struggles shaping the demanding dynamic in practice. In other words, the following section illustrates the enactment of the demanding regulatory formation in post-transition contexts. The demanding dynamic in action produced the contingent effect

³⁶ The perception of injustice has also been thought by Kelly(1998). He aims to construct a different intellectual agenda for the field of industrial relations. ‘Instead of starting from employers’ need for cooperation and performance or from the general problem of ‘getting the job done’, it begins with the category of injustice’(Kelly, 1998: 126). His analysis is largely based on industrial societies seeking to explain mobilisation in conditions of full employment. The context of my research is, in contrast, of high unemployment and informality. I share with Kelly the notion of mediation between the workers conditions and the perceptions of experienced by workers of such conditions. Thinking the creation of this distance is fundamental. My understanding of the ‘sense of injustice’, however, as explained elsewhere in this thesis, departs from his view of employment relationships and its implications which basically grant trade unions a more privilege position over social movement organisations in actions of mobilisation.

of turning ‘organisational demands’ into ‘cross-organisational projects’ and therefore paving the way for the appearance of contentious collective action. Thus, demanding speaks of *form* as it emphasises an alliance within organisations, but it primarily raises the issue of *content*, namely, the ‘things’ and ‘names’ upon which such process of articulation is constructed in historically circumscribed practice. Demanding therefore dissolves the false separation between form and content suggesting a process of structuration that integrates both inseparable elements into a unified dynamic. Also, the example below illustrates the radical contingency of contentious collective action largely due to its dependence on contextual circumstances. A theme this chapter only introduces and the next one analyses in detail, as the final piece in the jigsaw constructing democratic subjectivities in post-transition contexts.

5.4.1 The Complex Practical Interactions within Work, Identity, Collective Action and the State

The context of job informality and high levels of unemployment marked the 1980s and 1990s in Brazil (Mollo and Saad-Filho, 2006, Invernizzi, 2006), as a consequence of which an array of work-related issues became broadly defined as ‘social problems’. However, while a context of social exclusion and high unemployment could arguably be interpreted as a necessary condition to explain the generation of collective action, it does not constitute a sufficient condition for collective action activation. In addition, needless to say, the potential formulation of demands around the issue of work is wide, to say the least. The *novo sindicalismo* in general and the CUT in particular uttered a number of definitions regarding work, which are of particular importance here, because they successfully amalgamated a variety of different and at some point contradictory views within the trade union movement. It expressed the institution of a governing norm whose effects determined a conflictual type of integration of ‘dissidents’.

New Unionism, expressed in the constitution of the CUT, generated a set of principles and demands including a) factory commissions, the right of workers to get together in order to express grievances and petition for wages and better working conditions; b) internal democracy in order to make trade union structures more accountable to their members; c) autonomy from the state and rejection of state corporatism by challenging the compulsory union tax which they thought was at the base of the system and d) voluntary trade union

membership in order to regain militant activism, ideological persuasion and *mística* for the labour movement equally fighting top-down bureaucracy. In addition, the CUT established strong connections with social movement organisations (like the MST, for instance) and with the new left in more general terms; it aimed to organise the workers outside the formal sector by promoting solidarity economy (*economía solidaria*); and finally it also encouraged participation in electoral politics by founding the PT.

Principles mentioned above were not unanimously accepted but instead strongly contested by groups which despite holding dissent granted their support to the emergence of the complex new workers' trade union central. Socialists, Trotskyist and Catholic groups 'converged' under the CUT organisational umbrella. Different ideological trajectories would have been irrelevant had it not been for the fact that they heavily influenced groups' political stands regarding the role of trade unions in broader emancipatory struggles. Contrary to what CUT internal regulations dictate, two important internal streams -the CSC (*Corriente Sindical Clasista*) aligned with the PCdoB, on the one hand, and US (*Unidad Sindical*) aligned with the PCB, on the other. They actively participated in the life, discussions and action of the CUT whilst continuing to support both union tax and the 'one-union' organisational model (Radermacher and Melleiro, 2007: 128). In other words, the CUT, allegedly the ultimate expression of new unionism, hosted internal fractions openly opposing some of the critical ideas behind the new unionism's own foundation.

Similarly, the CUT became affiliated to the agricultural workers' trade union confederation (CONTAG) in an attempt to increase their penetration in the rural areas. The incorporation of the CONTAG also raised an interesting question for two main reasons. Firstly, it had represented the corporatist trade union model in the rural sector, that collaborated more than resisted dictatorship and, secondly, it represented the organisational model the MST, a close CUT ally, was clearly opposed. MST thought the old peasant conception associated with the working classes resulted in focusing on organising the adult male at the expense of the 'rural family', which included women and children, in the development of a new relationship, not only with the production system, but also to the sense of belonging to the land.

The corollary of this was that by the mid-1990s the CUT had become the majority national trade union in Brazil occupying centre stage of the Brazilian progressive left (Arditi, 2008).

So, how was the above possible, what ‘effect’ was produced and what limits to contentious action actually posited? The answer to this question will be found in the ongoing demanding dynamic apparent underneath and beyond specific organisational structures that eventually found in the CUT a contingent ‘nodal point’. CUT demand for organisational democratisation, in the form of a struggle against corporatists’ traditions, triggered a process of hegemonic overdetermination over and above other unsatisfied grievances and demands. It was the ‘sense of injustice’ apparent in CUT demands which eventually found stronger articulating power. It became the dominant meaning in turn re-signifying alternative demands. In other words, it was the ‘sense of injustice’ resonating from CUT demands that, on the one hand, successfully integrated some expressions of discontent whilst, on the other hand, subordinated the implication of competing demand; it dominated the meaning-creation dynamic emerging from a fundamental hegemonic process.

CUT became the voice against the old and corporatist system successfully conveying a present ‘sense of injustice’ which other organisations failed to portray. In other words, it was not the essential ‘worthiness’ of CUT principles that produced such a result, but instead the construction of such worthiness in connection with a broader expression of injustices (unemployment, informality, landless, etc.), which finally granted the CUT, in its anti-corporatist struggle, the power to govern the construction of ‘sense of injustice’.

The analysis of ‘effects’ in social science is problematic because studies tend to search for the understanding of complex processes, rather than to simply describe causation processes. However, the word ‘effect’ for the purpose of my argument aims to help in the search for connected relevant events which ultimately affected the development of the ‘sense of injustice’. Having made this clarification, the analysis of the example in question can progress one step further. One important episode, relating to the CUT, vis-à-vis the development of the ‘sense of injustice’ needs to be brought to light: The Work National Forum (FNT).

It was a tripartite space (unions, government and employers) created to negotiate reforms in work and within the unions’ legal framework.³⁷ The FNT was an institutional space opened in a different environmental context (Lula in government) which aimed to provide a ‘direct

³⁷ The reform came under the name of ‘*Reforma sindical e trabalhista*’. For details and documents, see Brazil’s National Employment Ministry official website <http://www.mte.gov.br/fnt/reforma.asp> [Accessed: 01.06.2011]

response' to historic demands from the trade union movement in general and the CUT in particular. FNT outcomes were not what the unions expected because progress was limited. While legal recognition of trade unions confederation was agreed, union tax remained untouched as well as further democratising initiatives. The state response in creating the FNT was a direct consequence of the unity forged behind the CUT as point of articulation of heterogeneous interlocutors and their demands. It was the unity in the diversity that gave the CUT sufficient disruptive power to force state intervention via FNT in its public policy. The translation between the 'sense of injustice' and the signals of institutional response to such processes can be observed in the implementation of the FNT.

However, the FNT also illustrates the limits apparent in the formation of a precarious constitution of unity. Certainly, the FNT³⁸ proved, for the purpose of this illustration, not only that it was a reaction from above to something that had happened from below; but it also provides a glimpse of the presence of limits in collective action. In short, limits can be summarised in two points. On the one hand, the double edged government reaction which was both a response and an intervention and, on the other hand, the influence the latter had on the 'unified block's' differences surfacing, hence undermining the cohesion built upon within. By calling to reform the work and trade union legal frameworks, employers and government draw a limit suggesting that democratising trade union structures would have to be at the expense of conceding greater work flexibilisation. A consequence of the terms of the negotiation, sectors, which up until then had been full members of the CUT left the confederation. In relation to the latter, a CUT delegate in the FNT talks about the negotiation process and also expresses his frustration in the following passage taken from the interview:

'Now in 2000 there is an interesting shift in the Lula's government, I found that there was a readjustment of union movement. Some sectors left the CUT to form new organizations; trade unionists linked to PSTU, left unionists linked to PCdoB, and the PSB (Brazilian Socialist Party), and trade unions with a more conservative political orientation. There were sectors that left Forza Sindical to created UGT. The UGT is a fusion of part of Foza Sindical and CAT (Central Autonoma dos Trabalhadores) which was a central linked to the PSDB, the political party most representative of the neoliberal project in the country together with the PSDB. In short, there was a fairly significant reorganization of workers movement under Lula government.' (BRA:TU:N1).

³⁸ To read a detailed chronology of the negotiation undertaken in the FNT see (Radermacher and Melleiro, 2007).


The interpretation offered above, distances itself from others that emphasised the ‘strategic’ decision that caused the labour movement’s shift from ‘radical socialism as a political objective to a more pragmatic political and economic strategy’ (Riethof, 2004: 31). Although undoubtedly every organisation has its objectives, priorities and strategies and they may change over time, it is presumptuous to endow them with such decisive power as to determine the nature (radical or moderate) of their actions. Instead, I argue that such action whether radical or moderate in character may result, depended on a more complex set of issues, involving *demanding* dynamics (as well as self-organising and networking), that go beyond specific organisation.

5.5 Demanding: a preliminary typology

- Firstly, demanding expresses territorialised demands and is associated with petitions and claims leading to the general improvement of living conditions. This localised spatiality raises ordinary issues in the public arena. On the other hand, it identifies struggles that can be won. It brings to the surface previously excluded issues and separate demands from ‘truly abstract interests’. It provides names as a consequence of non arbitrary creations but is dependent on its territorial production. Issues become problems that are eventually transformed into demands. In other words, demanding suggests that the ‘materiality’ of activation is the product of engaging in small achievable transformations rather than grand ideological projects. Demanding partially dislocates the territorial base of demands through the creation of a new constituent, as further elaborated below.
- Demanding dislocates territorial demands as it presupposes their enactment in post-transitional contexts which are largely influenced by a specific post-dictatorship legacy. Such legacies instituted a form of inclusion and exclusion of demands into, not only the political system, but the public space in general. The infiltration of demands into its governing post-dictatorship system deconstructed original demands resulting in a deterritorialisation movement. The division of ‘responsible’ and ‘irresponsible’ demands appears a powerful system of governance of integration and segregation. ‘Irresponsible’ demands resulted as a direct consequence of excluded and

segregated creation. They equally resulted, however, in the fertile space for the emergence of contestation upon the excluded heterogeneity.

Figure No. 6: Demanding Dynamic



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Source: My elaboration based on data collected for this thesis some of which has been presented in the current chapter. Also, the figure follows the rationale underpinning the structure organising the chapter and expressing in full flesh my own thinking.

- Within excluded demands, it was possible to observe specificity and therefore difference in the formation of the ‘lack of’. However, the development of a shared feature, expressed in a common ‘sense of injustice’, enhancing a process of mutual recognition and similar identification was also apparent. The articulation between different demands through the recognition of a common sense of injustice developed a new contentious constituency out of an already de-territorialised exclusion. The latter paved the way to cement an equivalential moment of heterogeneous demands into an activated demanding dynamic.
- The formation of an equivalential moment resulting from demanding expresses a process of active articulation, which in essence challenges the idea of passive

‘delegation’. Instead of passive recipients of public policies or non-citizens dependant on patronage relationships, demanding reveals a process of active articulation of excluded dissent into the development of a new contentious constituency. The newly formed constituency claims the redistribution of places performing therefore an egalitarian struggle. The latter, in practice, resolves the theoretical discussion between individual disenchantment and collective participation inasmuch as creating equality is developed upon the acceptance that the other holds equal value.

- Finally, demanding suggests agreement with the need to move towards a ‘second transition’ (O'Donnell, 1994) but elicits disagreement with the terms that the second transition should enact. It suggests that regime consolidation will further cement current discriminatory systems of governance primarily based on exclusion and invisibility. The characteristics of the second transition need instead to be thought through the path towards deepening democracy, i.e., the consolidation of demanding dynamics reproducing contentious activation which ultimately favours egalitarian interventions.

5.6 Final Remarks

This chapter has illustrated the dynamic of conflicting demands in circumscribed spaces of exclusion into non-territorial contentious dynamics. Unlike self-organising and networking, demanding shows more emphatically the substantiation underpinning the process of activation of disagreement. How small things became bigger names, or how heterogeneous struggles acquired a single nomination, in turn forging a unifying moment. Instead of ‘delegative democracy’ based on passive recipients demanding expresses democratisation based on active forces forging deepening democracy.

Up to this point I have explained the lateralisation process of activation expressed in the formation of three non-territorial dynamics (self-organising, networking and demanding) in turn opening three contentious fronts (grassroots, deliberation, substantiation). In the following chapter I delve into another tier of relationships equally concerning three dynamics in the temporal structuration of democratic subjectivities.

Chapter 6: From Heterogeneous Complexity to Antagonistic Simplicity. The Institution of the Limit

“The intellectual history of Dissent is made up of collisions, schisms, mutations; and one feels often that the dormant seeds of political Radicalism lie within it, ready to germinate whenever planted in a beneficent and hopeful social context”. (E. P. Thompson, 1991: 39)

Introduction

Up to this point I have commented on the process of the activation of the contentious character which is expressed in the institution of three non-territorial dynamics (self-organising, networking and demanding). I have argued that, analytically, the latter concerns the development of the ‘internal’ elements of democratic subjectivities. This chapter aims to study the missing element in the formation of democratic subjectivities, namely, the ‘antagonistic contextual exterior’ or, in other words, the formation of the ‘external’ limit in relationship with which ‘internal’ dynamics operate and against which perform the post-transition democratic subjectivities in Argentina and Brazil.

The study of the constitution of democratic subjectivities through the observation of different protagonists of socio-political history of Brazil and Argentina for the past 30 years suggests the formation of different contextual *moments*. Each of these moments appears defined by the hegemony of *one* governing discourse overdeterminating others. In particular this chapter explores the discourses against, within, and beyond, by which contentious collective action is defined. It relates to a broader discursive surface upon which actors tend to pledge their specific actions. Because the emergence of such surface of inscriptions transcends the actions of particular actors, it could practically be characterised as the result of the intersection of ‘struggles from below’ and ‘policies from above’. It is precisely the relationship between ongoing contentious (internal) dynamics and the contingent closure of a dominant (exterior) discourse which constitute precarious though disruptive democratic subjectivities.

There were three operating discourses dominating the political realm, corresponding to three alternative historical moments. In the 1980s the discourse ‘for democracy’ clearly dominated the different struggles, amongst others, free elections, human rights, legalisation of political activism, higher wages, land, wealth redistribution, housing, etc. Democratisation specifically defined in relation to the restoration of free and competitive elections, amalgamated and to some extent unified a mosaic of different struggles overwriting some, but also excluding others. As far as the development of contentious action is concerned, the institution of the discourse ‘For democracy’ divided the political realm into two antagonistic spaces, supporters or non-supporters of the transition to democracy. Such antagonism governed heterogeneous struggles because it represented the ground upon which all of them had to redefine themselves either in favour or in opposition. E.g.: a petition for better wages in the 1980s had to subsequently become a struggle for democracy in order for the petition to be recognised as such.

In the 1990s the dominant discourse governing the political realm was ‘anti-neoliberalism’. Unlike the previous decade it was a discourse literally named *in opposition to* instead of *in favour of* something. Neoliberalism conveyed many different things but it suggested the development of leading neoliberal orthodox opposition resulting in the complex configuration of unifying common fronts and alliances. The configuration of ‘anti-neoliberalism’ resulted in the division of the political realm into two opposing camps, namely, friends of antineoliberal struggles or enemies supporting neoliberal reforms. It crystallised a moment of antagonism, rather than an objective state of separation, which shaped and co-constructed both struggles from below and policies from above.

Finally, in the 2000s, it is possible to characterise the emergence of a third defining moment. Heterogeneous struggles appear permeated by the idea of ‘beyond governments’. Its formation was the result of two competing narratives, *rebaixamento de horizontes* (Brazil) and *gobierno en disputa* (Argentina). The most visible differentiating feature emerging in the 2000s, in contrast to the 1990s, is on the position of governments within the new structuration of the political realm. In the 1990s governments resonated as synonyms of neoliberalism turning struggles against-neoliberalism into struggles against elected governments. The formation of ‘beyond government’, on the contrary, suggests something different. Governments could be on one side or the other, they could be friends or enemies, depending

on specific issues rather than generalised assumptions. In this latter period governments acquired to some extent ‘the benefit of the doubt’. The way such doubt is constructed and resolved depends on the government stance on questions and policies on specific issues.

The focus of this thesis has been primarily on two analytical moments corresponding to the past two decades (1990s and 2000s) and it has only briefly touched the 1980s. I am placing the focus of this chapter at the transition from the ‘anti-neoliberalism’ discourse to ‘beyond governments’, attempting to understand the changes and continuities underpinning such transition from one moment to the next. Furthermore, I initially seek to interrogate the relationship between the transition in hegemonic discourse, on the one hand, and the depth, form and dimension of democratic subjectivity, on the other. The result of such a relationship will provide elements to finally fully assess the limits of democratic subjectivities, as well as the transformation of power in contemporary Argentina and Brazil.

I propose to unfold the argument introduced above in the following five sections. First, I explain the importance of the antagonistic logic in relation to the constitution of democratic subjectivities. In addition, pointing out some of its implications, I emphasise why I think it is vital to get the historical characterisation of this environmental logic right. The second and third sections are devoted to exploring, using the voices of actors, the meanings underpinning the discursive construction of ‘anti-neoliberalism’ and ‘beyond governments’ in the 1990s and 2000s, correspondently. In the fourth section I suggest a preliminary conceptualisation of the idea of antagonistic contextual exterior in relation to the central argument of this thesis. The chapter concludes with final remarks.

6.1 Contextual Exterior: instituting the limit

The first clarification that needs to be made is my understanding of the context or environment in relation to the discursive formation of an antagonistic contextual exterior. I suggest a theoretically informed, open characterisation in order to give the account of what is a central feature of my research problem. In other words, I approached the data analysis without a formed assumed theoretical definition in order to let the data ‘speak for itself’.

I introduce here a preliminary definition, leaving its broader conceptualisation to the final section of this chapter, after providing the necessary data analysis for such conceptualisation to make sense. Hence, to put it bluntly, the ‘antagonistic contextual exterior’ (hereinafter, ACE) is the result of the intersection of two general (although distinct) phenomena, namely, on the one hand, what could be graphically characterised as ‘struggles from below’ and on the other, ‘policies from above’. This intersection produces, as a result, multiple conflicting socio-political views, which in turn hold two determining characteristics. Firstly, these different views ‘compete’ with each other, and, secondly, they have an incremental tendency to lose specificity, gaining in turn a more general and overarching meaning.

So, why is the formation of the ACE relevant to the study of democratic subjectivities and to what extent does getting its characteristics right make an analytical difference? The first part of the question needs a preliminary and brief theoretical reflection, whereas the second emphasises the importance of anchor theoretical reflections in empirical evidence.

Authors like Rancière, Laclau and Mouffe, on whose provoking and inspiring ideas the argument of this thesis relies, have highlighted the ‘objectivism’ of certain theories studying the social not as an open, unfinished business but, instead, as the result of a completed and fully constituted order. For Laclau y Mouffe (1987), for instance, the social is not something ‘positive’ but instead is a construction that emerges through its relationship to an ‘outside’ which because it is constitutive of such an ‘impossible’ order, they called it ‘constitutive outside’ (Laclau and Mouffe, 1987 : 82). The ‘constitutive outside’ is to a large extent the condition of possibility for the existence of an object as such. Additionally, I agree with Rancière (2006) that studying the effects of the ‘constitutive outside’ can enhance our understanding of the process that makes competent to the ‘incompetent’; counting the uncounted inasmuch as *‘a political movement is always a movement that displaces the given boundaries, that extract the specifically democratic, i.e., universalist, component of a particular conflict of interests in such and such point of society, it is also to say that it is always in danger of being confined to that conflict...’* (2006: 84). Thus, the study of ACE is vital to the study of democratic subjectivities insofar as it speaks of the incompleteness involving their *politicisation moment* without which democratic subjectivities cannot be contingently fixed. The characterisation of ACE explains the path from collective action to the development of contentious democratic subjectivities.

The second part of the question posited above could not be answered without having in mind the above-mentioned theoretical reflections. It strongly suggests the necessity to examine democracy and democratisation through the rigorous scrutiny of historically situated phenomena. Detecting and putting forward the internal elements and external limits complex interrelationships of democratic subjectivities, thus, identifying the correct characterisation of ACE makes an analytical difference, because its results will depart from both theoretical speculation and common sense bias. While the former is the product of loosely empirically supported claims, the latter reproduces ‘real’ images without fully interrogating hidden processes, relationships, and/or the polyphony of meanings underpinning certain events. Henceforth, getting ACE characterisation right, largely depends not only on remaining loyal to what the data ‘says’, but also establishing the adequate theoretical connections and relationships. The route I follow in order to achieve the latter is to transparently define my rationale by giving an empirical account of my interpretations and clearly stating my theoretical reasoning.

6.2 ‘Anti-neoliberalism’: the discursive limit of the 1990s

Contemporary academic literature has made a significant effort to characterise the process of the implementation of a new set of policies that swept Latin American countries with varying degrees of intensity during the 1990s (for instance, Vilas, 1997, Saad-Filho, 2007, Walton, 2004, Evelyne and Fred, 2004). We have learnt a great deal about the effects of the introduction of market-oriented economic and social policies in relation to, for instance, institutional ‘stabilisation’, economic growth, as well as wealth inequality, flexibilisation of working conditions, poverty and exclusion. In addition, the literature tends to agree with the idea that the notion of *neoliberalism* is a term used in order to pigeonhole the relationship between neoclassical theory and actually existing ‘neoliberal’ regimes (Vilas, 1997: 931). In other words, ‘typical’ neoliberal cases did not exist but instead socio-political arrangements have followed, more or less closely, the neoliberal (typical) agenda.

Although the above represents a necessary context in order to understand macro-economic changes among other things, it is also true that we know little about the effects of the Washington-Consensus inspired ‘neoliberal wave’ of public policies (social, economic and cultural), on the one hand, and its relationship with struggles coming from below, on the

other. More specifically, although analysis of the uprising, mobilisation and state repression in the 1990s has been well documented (see for instance, Dinerstein, 2002, Almeida, 2007, Svampa and Pereyra, 2003, Petras and Veltmeyer, 2005, Ondetti, 2006), I propose to look at a slightly different angle. I am not interested in characterising either the ‘neoliberal policies’ or the array of social movement organisations participating in the uprising. Instead, I want to comment on the emergence of ‘anti-neoliberalism’ as the ACE, both shaping and simplifying the political realm in the 1990s. My argument is that the formation of the ACE instituted a system ultimately governing the type of constitution of democratic subjectivities in the 1990s, significantly different from the formation of the ACE in the 1980s or the 2000s. To some extent therefore the disclosure of ‘anti-neoliberalism’ refers to a measure of analytical *time* inasmuch as it marked a ‘specific’ moment different from what preceded it (‘for democracy’) as well as what followed next (‘beyond governments’).

In order to illustrate this contention and further explore the contents behind the ‘anti-neoliberal’ notion I propose to undertake a qualitative analysis of the editorial article of the *Informa CUT* number 268 (January 1998)³⁹ which I think, to a large extent, epitomises a common line of thinking within a significant number of other organisations.

1 ‘The rise in interest rates to stratospheric levels in the short term, it
 2 may reduce trade imbalances, without, however, ensure deficit
 3 reductions in the current ... This absurd level of interest rates should
 4 promote, in the short run, a substantial reduction in the level of
 5 activities thereby reducing the onwads level of imports and thereby
 7 pushing the whole productive system to export. The bill for the
 8 financial services is unknown...the public and private sectors in
 9 Brazil must pay higher interest rates, not only in the domestic market,
 10 which apply on its debt in Real, but also in external funding, in
 11 order to restore the entry flow of these resources ...This film is not
 12 new. Who does not remember the external debt crisis of the
 13 eighties? ...
 14 There is no minimum guarantee that by raising interest rates will be
 15 discarding the possibility that the country is again subjected to
 16 further speculative attacks, which could put off for a long period our
 17 hopes of stable growth with sustained generation employment and
 18 income distribution.
 19 Responsibilities for this difficult situation in which the country was
 20 placed and its dramatic effect - which is already being felt on
 21 employment and living conditions of all workers – lies entirely on

³⁹ It is the CUT Journal which is published on monthly bases. Alongside other organisational written material, I got access to *Informa CUT* published throughout the 1990s until 2005.

22 the President and his allies....
23 ...the CUT will fight with all its instruments in the defence of the
24 necessities and demands of the workers it represents. For sure we
25 will seek for the support from the broadest segments of society,
26 including members of Congress, upon who rest the responsibility to
27 make the final decisions about this authoritarian and anti-social
28 package.' (CUT, 1998: 3)

The general tone depicted throughout the extract is representative of the organisations rhetoric and strategic positioning in an environment that was perceived as extremely hostile and to some extent monotonous, unchanging. The MST used a similar narrative in its Third National Congress three years before in 1995:

29 'The first half of the 1990s was characterized by the adoption of
30 neoliberal policies in our country. State privatization,
31 denationalization of the economy and incentives to consumption of
32 imported products were imposed in the minds of the population as
33 synonymous of modernization of the country... The crisis and the
34 disintegration of the socialist countries of Eastern Europe signalled
35 the changes taking place in the international arena that certainly
36 impacted the popular struggles in our country.
37 It has been proved the decline of popular movements and trade
38 unions in our country in the early 1990s. The most notable
39 exception was the mobilization of the Brazilian people to rule out
40 Fernando Collor from office of president, accused of corruption.
41 In the countryside, even with the exhaustion of industrial
42 development model, it deepened the process of capitalist
43 development and modernization in agriculture, based on increased
44 exploitation of workers... Many of the peasants who remained on
45 the land have shifted their income towards wage labour, outside the
46 property rights...
47 As challenges, we continue the policy of prioritizing internal
48 strengthening of our organization. To promote efforts in the
49 development of the agrarian program, to improve organizational
50 methods and forms of struggle in coordination with other social
51 sectors in the country, peasant organizations in Latin America and
52 other continents. The slogan was: "Agrarian Reform, a struggle of
53 all." (MST, 1995)

Although the CUT and the MST relationship deteriorated (though never terminal) in the second half of the 1990s, selected extracts from documents within both organisations illustrate the construction of a strong common discursive thread linking not only MST and CUT but also a vast array of alternative organisations, including religious and students' organisations. This explains why I have chosen consecutive numbering counting the lines of different pieces as if forming a common text.

The first observation refers to the introductory lines in both extracts, i.e., lines 1-13 and lines 29-33. Although written three years apart, both opening statements refer to the 'new' context which is seen as holistically reshaping the role of the state. While the CUT (above) makes a more detailed appraisal of Brazil's Central Bank monetary policy; the MST (below) points out the macro transformations underpinning the establishment of a new regressive development model based on the state withdrawal from the economy. Interestingly, although marking the difference, the CUT makes the effort to link (lines 12 and 13) the development of a new context, highly dependent on foreign debt intake, and the 1980s debt crises. By doing so, it is building an 'organisational narrative' which is basically relating the legacy of the struggles of the 1990s with the 1980s 'for democracy' campaign. It is saying that struggles against neo-liberalism are also 'struggles for democracy'. By the same token, lines 37 and 38 refer to the declining level of mobilisation, which for the MST somehow explains the rapid penetration of neo-liberal policies in Brazil. Furthermore, the discursive construction of the context seems to be the result of not only global trends but more importantly the result of state action. State action is seen through the implementation of particular policies and is graphically embodied in the person of the president, and his 'allies' (line 22). In other words, steering through public policy is given a gravitating role in the implementation of the 'neoliberal agenda' in which governments, as a consequence, are an embedded constitutional part. As a result, the institution of government, Collor de Melo, Cardozo, Washington Consensus, etc., became synonyms insofar as they seem to share the embodiment of the neoliberalism. Thus, the first preliminary conclusion needs to emphasise that the formation of the 'constitutive outside' was the result of not only 'struggles from below' but, more importantly, 'policies from above'.

The second observation is actually an extension of the first one and is related to the element of 'simplification' underpinning the development of ACE. Neoliberalism seems not only to capture a vast array of issues but also to attach a clearly determined connotation that is basically constructed in opposition to another one. Looking again at the illustrations above, the following can be seen, for instance: the incremental role of financial capital is associated with speculative practices (line 16); in terms of the development model, neo-liberalism appears as favouring regressive income distribution (line 18) alongside worsening workers (line 21) and peasants (line 44) conditions. The notion of 'state reform' (30) seems figurative in an expansion of market 'self-regulation' at the expense of withdrawing state functions.

Finally, the introduction of agribusinesses in the form of rural modernisation (line 43) is related not only to the worsening of peasant conditions, but also causing incremental rural-urban displacement. Therefore, although the notion of neo-liberalism could attach to many different ‘objects’ depending on the illocutionary setting, it functioned as a simplifier analytical device codifying different complex aspects of socio-political life into a basic two-part antinomy, namely, neo-liberalism and anti-neoliberalism.

In addition, therefore, the ‘simplification’ happens alongside a third important component, which is the development of antagonistic conditions. But, where is the evidence to support such a claim? Line 25 elicits CUT’s explicit will to ‘seek the support of the broadest segment of society’ whereas line 50 highlights the effort to endeavour to provide coordinated actions with other activists and organisations. The interpretation I am suggesting is that the *antagonisation* is produced when groups or collectives are formed, because their practice has become meaningful as result of touching (or making a stance in relation to) the existing simplified environment. In other words, in the 1990s, there was no room for political participation outside of the neoliberal and anti-neoliberal antagonism. Outside such antagonism, participation was either testimonial, or insignificant, it would have been unable to communicate with others or, to ‘connect’ with others, i.e., reverting fragmentation. Metaphorically, they would have been speaking a different language. Thus, to some extent, cases such as MST and CUT in the 1990s were speaking, although not the same, a similar language because both of them constructed their action as part of the struggles against neoliberalism.

Finally and following on from the last note, the above extracts suggest one final important element of analysis regarding the ‘coordination’ of cross-organisational actions, namely, the element of externality. It was the struggles against neo-liberalism and not the CUT socialist project, or the MST agrarian reform proposal that cemented their coordinated action. As the first observation highlights, the formation of ACE is the product of struggles and policies that unveil its contingent construction. However, the above shows the presence of an element of externality also shaping this relationship. It is ‘external’ insofar as it is not entirely determined by organisational autonomous action but instead constructed (and hence redefined) in its relationship in the broader context. Thus, initially, the construction of ACE does not imply the elimination of autonomous organisational action, but instead suggests the presence of an external limit that creates the effect of transforming collective action into *contentious*

collective action; it transforms aggregation into subjectivity. It redefines segmented practices projecting them into transformative politics.

6.3 ‘Beyond Governments’: the discursive limit of the 2000s

The previous section was illustrated with Brazilian cases only, to avoid repetition based on the fact that no significant variations were found in Argentina. The striking similarity relieves me from the need to over-emphasise a point which the study in the context of Brazil made clear enough. Hence, the argument above applies in the context of both Argentina and Brazil (1990s). Although both cases also share the general pattern in the development of ACE in this third moment (the 2000s), they equally show interesting nuances in the institution of the second moment, which needs to be taken into account. I will therefore first study the meanings underpinning the construction of the notion of ‘*Gobierno en disputa*’ (government under dispute⁴⁰) which applies to the context of Argentina in the 2000s and after that I propose a similar exploration of the notion of ‘*Rebaixamento de horizontes*’ (lowering of expectations⁴¹) to explain the change in Brazil. Only after presenting the above separately will I extract common elements whose combination results in the broader idea of ‘beyond governments’; which unlike the two concepts does not emerge ‘from the voice of the actors’ but is instead suggested by the author to describe the most important recent transformation in ACE.

6.3.1 ‘Gobierno en disputa’

⁴⁰ I have not been able to find a more suitable translation -the one provided only partially conveys the intended meaning. It is though a better translation than the idea of ‘disputed government’ which meaning is associated to legal validity or political legitimacy. Rather, although there is not a dominant meaning, ‘Gobierno en Disputa’ generally refers to the idea that governments constitute a space of intense political dispute (Katz, 2004) and not an homogeneous politico-ideological formation. However, it is precisely its ambiguous meaning what makes it interesting for the purpose of this chapter. I use the following subsection to scrutinise meaning and effects of the phrase in greater detail.

⁴¹ This suggested translation captures the general sense of the phrase slightly better than the previous one. However, as pointed out above, I am sure the analysis will provide the necessary elements to further the understanding regarding the competing meanings that make the phrase relevant for the purpose of the argument developed in this chapter.

Hugo Yaski, the leader of the CTA campaigning for re-election as Secretary General stated the arrival of changing times in an interview given to a national Argentinian newspaper:

1‘We are not anymore a testimonial expression. The CTA against
2Menemism was necessary; we are now in an era of greater political
3maturity: testimonial action is now not enough’ (Página12, 2009b)

Likewise, speaking at the closing event of the ‘National Meeting for a New Social Constituent’⁴², Member of Parliament and CTA leader Claudio Lozano pointed out that:

4‘Nobody willing to seriously reshape the strategy towards the
5reconstruction of this country should be outside the *New*
6*Constituent*...I am not only speaking about the creation of institutions
7that can promote further democratisation of society and stronger
8participation of society in the decision-making process but also about
9the fact that the National State does not hold formal faculties in order
10to set up a strategy in relation to hydrocarbon resources, forests
11management and mining’ (Página12, 2009a)

Finally, it is interesting to listen to the words of Luis D’Elia long-standing president of the FTV who probably described the new situation most explicitly. The following are highlights of an open letter called ‘The Social Organisations and the Current Political Situation’ published in 2010 which is worth quoting at length:

12‘The 19 and 20 December showed the deepest crisis of representation
13of political parties which embraced the cause of conservative
14neoliberal thinking, based on the Washington Consensus...
15After various ups and downs Nestor Kirchner is installed in the
16national political scene...[Nestor Kirchner] was capable of taking
17charge of the deepest wounds expressed by our people in this
18historic opportunity.... The end of impunity, an exemplary human
19rights policy, the creation of a Supreme Court likely and
20independent, the new international alignment; resettling, with the
21help of Hugo Chavez, the relationship with the International
22Monetary Fund having achieved the largest private debt reduction in
23world history (US\$ 67 billion); to prevent the advance of the FTAA,
24the last imperial attempt, the 4 November 2005 in Mar del Plata,
25with the presidents of MERCOSUR represents the most evident
26proof that Argentina began to be inserted permanently in Latin

⁴² *Constituyente Social* was the name of the campaign launched by the CTA aiming to create a participatory space seeking unity among popular organisation in Argentina (<http://www.constituyentesocial.org.ar>, Accessed: 21.06.11). In many respects it represented the CTA strategy to create a political movement towards the 2011 presidential elections.

27America.
 28Likewise, the generation of policies looking employment recovery
 29and retirement pay, carrying out actions to eradicate poverty and
 30indigence, using cooperatives as a strategic tool; and the fact that it
 31has been resolved the implementation of a policies following the
 32principle of social solidarity like the taxes to the export sector, the
 33most benefited by favourable global conditions, are some of the
 34gains that transform Kirchner in the best president in the last fifty
 35years.
 36Inside the *Frente para la Victoria* there are political identities of
 37different origins, worldview, practices and stories...
 38Old party structures converge there with others accomplices ...with
 39the conservative neoliberal model. The yellow and traitor unionism
 40when faced against the decision of saving the unions or saving the
 41workers they chose the unions; militant unionism like MTA of Hugo
 42Moyano who made with us 7 general strikes and the Federal March
 43against menemismo; the Frepaso, born in the heat of the fight
 44against privatization and ended up asking for the return of Cavallo
 45as chief of staff of De la Rúa. And the social organizations that were,
 46along with other actors such as the CTA, the FRENAPPO and CCC,
 47the epicentre of the struggle against the dark nineties' (FTV, Not specialised)

The first observation that needs to be made is that extracts show both change and continuity in relation to what characterised the 1990s. It shows continuity insofar as it depicts the presence of a similar discursive structure compared to the one observed in the previous section. In other words, the extract mentioned above reveals the presence of the same structural elements determining the configuration of ACE, namely, (i) externality, (ii) antagonism, (iii) intersection of struggles and policies and, finally, a (iv) tendency to simplify the political realm in two parts. However, the illustrations introduced above also reveal signs of change regarding the content, meaning and/or definition underpinning each of the structural elements in turn (re)defining the formation and effects of ACE. It is precisely the effects of the latter that introduce the emergence of a new moment to a large extent different from the 'anti-neoliberal' previously discussed.

Paying special attention to lines 1-3 and 12-14 there are at least two important elements to take into consideration in relation to the construction of the (i) external element of ACE. Firstly, the identification of December 2001 as, not only a moment of economic and political crises that was expressed in the swift succession of five presidents in a period of two weeks, but also the final crises of the dominant way of thinking, epitomised through the so-called Washington Consensus. The ideas of 'the deepest crises' (line 12) precisely suggest the

appearance of something ‘after the crises’. Rather than being interested in finding out what came next, it is important to highlight here the emergence of a dividing line between ‘the past’ and ‘the present’ which suggests a clear dimension of time. Secondly, the path from ‘testimonial’ to ‘maturity’ mentioned in lines 1-3 is expressing the shift from ‘outside’ to ‘within’ and is key to understanding the extent of change that occurred in the formation of ACE between the 1990s and 2000s. The transformation of the antagonistic element needs to be unravelled first, in order to better explore the meanings of the latter. However, it can be summarised initially by saying that, firstly, there is an element of externality against which organisations position themselves politically and, secondly, that the composition of such elements seems different as it is not constructed upon discursive rejection from ‘outside’ but from contestation from ‘within’.

Although the anti-neoliberal discourse still permeates significant parts of the actions of dissent, its dominance appears relegated alongside the parallel emergence of new dividing issues. It shows a reconfiguration of the content dominating the (ii) antagonistic elements of ACE in the 1990s. Lines 4-11, for instance, speak not only about the need to expand people’s participation in relation to the administration of strategic natural resources, but also about state’s dramatic withdrawal from key functions. Questioning state absence in the preservation and regulation of natural resources means, in other words, denouncing state support to free market in the administration of such business. Although the government is only indirectly mentioned by making reference to the state, the above suggests rejection of government action in this field. However, it is important to observe at this point that the struggle against financial capital, capitalist speculation, privatisations, etc, all of which defined the anti-neoliberal composition in the 1990s, tended to shift from ‘rejection’ (tout court) to ‘recovery’ (of faculties and functions). The result of this is not only the reconfiguration of the content defining the antagonistic element of ACE, but also suggests the emergence of potential new antagonisms, at the expense of one pre-determining the rest. It seems apparent though that the change from ‘outside’ to ‘within’ suggested in the previous paragraph is not a change from contention to complacency.

The suggested argument that ACE is not only the result of (iii) struggles from below, but is primarily the effect of their intersection with policies from above is apparent throughout lines 18-33. There are explicit references to a number of public policies implemented by the government in areas including human rights, Latin American integration and employment.

Unlike the anti-neoliberal moment in which policies were usually rejected ‘in block’, public policies depict here a positive connotation. They are recognised as belonging to a common tradition to which the organisation (the FTV in this case) largely subscribes because it feels part of it. Such recognition between the past struggles of the organisation and new elements of public policies in turn affects the defining boundary between ‘us’ and ‘them’. The path from one moment to the other, it could be summarised, occurred alongside the reconfiguration of competing discursive parts in which, unlike the 1990s (when governments appeared clearly aligned with ‘them’), governments can appear aligned in either of the two discursively constructed parts depending on particular circumstances.

Although this new moment presents a new complexity it does also shows signs of increasing simplification (iv). That is to say, as in the 1990s, there is a tendency to ‘reduce’ the socio-political complexity into two antagonistic parts. However, unlike the 1990s, the content defining such simplification portrays particular elements, revealing its radical dependence on the new context. Lines 35-46 speak about the multiple fractions and alliances participating in the governing politico-electoral front. Rather than rejecting politico-institutional participation it is saying that the ‘new dividing line’ does not run outside governments, social movement organisations or trade unions, but instead runs across the heterogeneous formation of such organisations and institutions. Replicating the words expressed in the extract, it is about a division between ‘conservative’ versus ‘popular’. Again, unlike the 1990s, the constructed discursive space where one and the other are likely to be placed no longer seems certain, which is why it is reasonable to argue that this is not the ‘anti-neoliberal’ moment but the moment of ‘*gobierno en disputa*’.

6.3.2 ‘Rebaixamento de Horizontes’

A former oil workers’ trade union leader and social movement activist opened his speech at the CMS national meeting in November 2009 by saying:

1 ‘Good afternoon *compañeros* and comrades, I wanted to ponder the
 2 wrestlers and fighters of the popular movements such as CMS,
 3 Asamblea Popular, La Via Campesina, the Centrales Sindicales,
 4 mobilized in all states of the federation. But I am concerned that we are
 5 living the strong president syndrome. People feel too safe about how
 6 Lula is but people should also feel safe about making their own

7decision, eh? This plenary has to question the government because it
8has built a collective forum of social movements, unions, students,
9which are separated after the March mobilization...
10...when it comes to assess progress people say that we are what we are
11because of President Lula but when talking about the limitations
12people say it is because of the balance of forces, eh?' (BRA:ET:N1)

In the same plenary meeting MST founder and key organiser, João Pedro Stedile, gave an informative speech which is worthwhile looking at in detail:

13'...regarding the historical context, from our point of view (MST-Via
14Carpesina), we are living a period of crisis of historic interests of the
15working class: First, because we had a historic defeat in 1979 and in the
161990s with the hegemony of neoliberalism, globalization of
17international capital that led to the defeat of the working class
18worldwide. The victory that we had in 2002 with Lula government
19was a political victory because we defeated the continuity of the
20neoliberal project, but the electoral victory was not enough to disrupt
21the neoliberal hegemony in Brazilian society....The bourgeoisie still
22has absolute control of the economic power of Brazil. Second element,
23the Brazilian state...is formed by the judiciary, legislature and
24executive. Then we managed to make a dispute over executive
25power...to alter the balance of power in the executive branch, but in
26the legislative and judicial the Brazilian bourgeoisie holds almost total
27hegemony. Third element...the ideological reproduction of society...
28the bourgeoisie does not bet anymore to the school as key device for
29ideology reproduction...They are betting on the media: TV, radio,
30newspapers, magazines...The manipulation was evident in the
31criminalization of the MST on the production of oranges
32affaire....From our point of view, the working class is dead...we will
33discuss the struggles that come now (40 hours, the oil is ours, the
34land productivity index), we know that it is being difficult to mobilize
35the masses [different moment from]...the circumstances when we were rising
36in the dispute for a popular democratic project. When there were 2 million
37cutistas on Avenida Paulista, now there are people drinking
38beer over there.' (BRA:ET:N1)

In a different part of his speech, Stedile refers in length to economic policies introduced by the government in the light of the 2009 global crises:

39'The Brazilian government was quick to take Keynesian measures that
40protected the capital and prevented higher unemployment. [it involved]
41funds transfer of 80 billion for the automotive industry and the so-called
42white line. Second positive government policy, the primary surplus, 6 billion
43Reais, those 6 billion were transferred in the form of loans to industries in
44turn protecting the productive capital. It was good because it was not for
45banks...Third, element to explain why the crisis did not have much impact in
46Brazil...the policy of increasing minimum wage acted as a cushion allowing

47the Brazilian masses not to suffer so much. Fourth element, happily, the
46Brazilian economy came out of the economic influence zone of United States
47and Europe, which were who went into crisis; we are now in the area of
48influence of China' (BRA:ET:N1)

The final piece of original data that is to be introduced corresponds, to an organisation that works alongside the MST like the Movimento Consulta Popular:

49'-the left is divided into three ... camps, very clear. The first has the
50following interpretation; the balance of forces is extremely unfavourable
51for the working class. Our elite, the bourgeoisie, has hegemony over
52society. The minimal changes that occurred, they can't stand them. In this
53scenario the task of social movements is to support the government at any
54cost, to shield the government. ... In this field you find the PT, the PCdoB,
55CUT, UNE, CMS.

56Another camp says ... that the Lula government is a government that
57represents the interests of the petite bourgeoisie ... it is a government that is
58implementing the neoliberal measures that Fernando Enrique failed to
59implement because Lula holds the support of social movements; such as
60intervention in Haiti, labour reform, pension reform...agro-business, and not
61carrying out agrarian reform ...

62There is also a third field that makes the following interpretation: the
63balance of forces is extremely unfavourable to the working class, there is...a
64fragmentation of the left, it is very difficult to build demonstrations....The
65Lula government is a government of class composition holding 80% of
66popularity, which is impressive, that it puts us against a situation of
67*rebaixamento de horizontes*. With the Lula government the population has
68had access to what it had not had before, electricity, Bolsa Familia, access to
69university education, etc..

-What do you mean by *rebaixamento de horizontes*?

70-The horizon is our project...democratization of communication,
71democratization of land, agrarian reform, democratization of access to
72health, education. For the people receiving the Bolsa Familia it is already an
73achievement. So in this scenario the task of popular movements is to alter the
74balance of forces. That would be the task: changing the correlation of forces.'
(BRA:SM:RE:N1)

Extracts taken from the Brazilian case both confirm the presence of structural elements constituting ACE but also bring interesting nuances in comparison with the analysis on Argentina. That said, such nuances highlight Brazilian singularity rather than question the development of a new 'regional' post in the anti-neoliberal moment, as the notes that follow indicate.

The Brazilian case study confirms a partial displacement of the interpretative framework from which social conflict is defined, actors are constituted and therefore contentious action is likely to happen. 'We managed to make a dispute over executive power', says MST leader in lines 24 and 25 which connects well with the other speakers concerns (lines 1-12) regarding the dividing line between the social movements 'role' and government functions. The debate over the broadly defined Brazilian social movement responsibility in Lula's presidential appointment, on the one hand, and the redefinition of the social movement action, on the other, it is insoluble inasmuch as the effect of its interaction defines the emergence of something (i) 'external' to the movements themselves. In the 1990s such interaction seems to have been defined by 'separatism and opposition', i.e., the existence of a significant practical and symbolic gap between governments and social movement organisations. The gap existed largely due to the opposition of movements to governments' policies and initiatives. The new scenario suggests transformation in the sense that such gaps seem to have marginally narrowed. The relationship between (iii) struggles and policies is still there but 'separatism' seems to give way to interdependence. In turn, initial 'rejection' to government initiative changes in favour of contingent opposition as well as temporal alliances.

Displacement does not mean dissolution. On the contrary, interrogating the meaning of the much used notion of the 'balance of forces' provides significant information regarding the (re)drawing of (ii) antagonistic boundaries and therefore the (iv) (re)simplification of the political realm in two parts in the 2000s. Instead of reproducing past antagonisms the notion of the 'balance of forces' appear to be constructed between the junction of old (i.e., land reforms, wages) and new issues (democratisation of the media, preservation of natural resources) which as a consequence leads to an important rethinking of the key players, places and functions. Lines 18 and 19, for instance, speak about the hegemonic bourgeoisie presence in the state alongside the partial victory that winning the presidency pre-supposed. The state is no longer seen as the full embodiment of the neo-liberal project but instead a space that needs to be incrementally conquered by the democratic project. And this line of thinking is applied beyond the sphere of government including other state powers and, essentially, the media whose monopolies and dependence on 'corporate power' are largely taken as the source of 'cultural criminalisation' of social movement organisations.

The balance of forces emerges as a dominating signifier alongside the instrumentation of public policies which included the historic expansion of social policy (*Bolsa Familia*, for

instance, lines 68), as well as wage recuperation policies (*Salario Minimo*, lines 46), to name a few. Lines 45-48 precisely enumerate some of these policies, which organisations not only recognise as positive and tend to value highly, but also defend as their own. In other words, the interpretation is that new public policies were put in place because of the effect of their action affecting the dominant balance of power in the 1990s. Certainly, new policies would have been unthinkable without the generation of the condition of possibilities in which social movement organisations recognise they are playing an important part. As in the Argentinian case, the regional dimension represents an essential ingredient when analysing balance of forces. The inclination to negotiate (through agreements such as MERCOSUR, UNASUR, etc.) a regional common voice counter-balancing earlier unilateral relationships with, primarily, the United States is highly weighted. Stopping the development of the FTAA is seen as a landmark in challenging the neoliberal paradigm at the level of international relations.

Transformations mentioned above implied realignments in alliances, which in turn created new divisions, a sample of which is mentioned in lines 49-68. The consolidation of this new moment is marked by the (re)definition of each of the elements determining the formation of ACE. It is equally apparent that some positioning tends to prevail over others, in turn emphasizing fragmentation and regenerating the sense of unity. In the Brazilian case the *rebaixamento de horizontes* stance prevailed over complacent integration or up front opposition. It means strong and determined defence of progress achieved (in terms of organisational consolidations, and also in terms of some public policies) but also, and more importantly, the determination that ‘it is not enough’⁴³ and, as a consequence, further action (through street mobilisation, but also institutional participation) is required in order to alter the balance of power. The movement from the current margins to the desirable centre of power relations does not resonate as ‘outsiders breaking into’ but instead as ‘(in)subordinated insiders’ aiming to change the existing status quo from within. If disagreement was expressed in the 1990s through the performance of negative power to say ‘enough!’ (Dinerstein, 2003: 192 and 193); the 2000s suggest the positive although incomplete notion of power through ‘this is not enough!’ implying displacement in the framework from which social conflict is defined.

⁴³ The contribution of movements to the opening of spaces of participation redefines the relationships between movements and the state in the 2000s. The feeling that ‘it is not enough’ and ‘the benefit of the doubt’ also proves the dynamisms and unending character of democratic conflict.

Throughout this study my research has shown, the definition of this hegemonic line of thinking is more the result of the changing type of interaction between struggles and policies rather than the result of strategic or voluntary action. My interpretation moves away from perspectives that measure social movement organisations achievements in the light of either dissolving state structures or by gaining full colonisation. Equally it departs from interpretations that understand the interaction of state-movements in the light of state co-optation versus the consolidation of autonomic extra-states bodies. Instead, my interpretation assumes autonomy as an (im)possibility (Steffen et al., 2010) which means the necessity to rightly differentiate between the constitutive ‘relation of exteriority’ (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985, Laclau, 2001b), i.e., understanding those elements that are both embedded, but also beyond social movements organisations themselves. In other words, it is the interaction that really matters and what ACE aims to give account of.

6.4 ACE: a preliminary typology

There are two reflections that need to be outlined at this point for the purpose of this chapter. The first needs to further elaborate what has been suggested in the introduction in relation to the development of ACE as the final necessary piece of the Democratic Subjectivity puzzle. Secondly, the practical definition of ACE has to be differentiated from alternative ‘institutional’ approaches which, although having some family resemblance to ACE, depart from it in at least two substantial aspects that need to be specified.

In relation to the first point, as anticipated in the introduction, ACE emphasises the notion of ‘exterior’ in order to mark the difference between ongoing internal dynamics or non-territorial spaces. It is only after noticing and characterising ACE that it is possible to bring to the analysis the dimension of *time* meaning not only chronological space but also, and more importantly, to mark different socio-political *moments*. Thus, it is the analytical differentiation of ACE that elicits democratic subjectivity’s temporal dimension. The interrelationship between the ACE and non-territorial dynamics is key to finally explain what changed and also what remained unchanged in the transition from one moment (1990s) to the next (2000s). In other words, ACE vis-à-vis non-territorial spaces explains the path from

‘disagreement’ to ‘participation’ which is the aim of the following and final chapter of this thesis.

But the discovery of ACE upon the qualitative exploration of data used throughout this thesis in general and this chapter in particular also contributes to further interrogate alternative ‘environmental discourses’ by briefly marking two relevant counter-points. Although I have already anticipated the theoretical point of departure (‘constitutive exterior’) underpinning the thinking behind the development of ACE, it is important to mark its similarities and differences with, on the one hand, ‘institutional environment’ (Van Cott, 2005) and ‘political opportunities’ (McAdam et al., 1996), on the other.

The formulation of ACE does not fully comply with either of the two alternative viewpoints mentioned above. It shares, however, some common elements with the concept of ‘political opportunities’.

The ‘institutional environment’ is a central portion of the studies coming from a political economy perspective (Haggard and Kaufman, 2008) and also from a political science approach (Van Cott, 2005). In a nutshell, it argues that past policies –or the absence of them-- create constituencies and generate demands on incoming democratic governments (Haggard and Kaufman, 2008: 2). It implies that in the context of fiscal crises, prior welfare commitments place heavy pressure on a government for reforms and even retrenchment. It is a claim with which it is difficult not to agree, except for the fact that its level of generality tends to prevent detailed understanding behind the constitution of the subject ‘pushing for change’. Instead, reform seems to be the result of the natural effects caused by past institutional arrangements. Closely following the political science tradition, Van Cott’s (2005) celebrated book relies on a more specific notion of the ‘institutional environment’ in order to explain the transition from (ethnic) social movements to (institutional) political parties in Latin America. Following this interpretation there are permissive, or strict institutional environments (measured by the levels of decentralisation, improved ballot access, open party system), which either prevent, or facilitate, social movement institutionalisation through the emergence of a new political party or the integration in an already existing one. For the author, ‘new ethnic parties are significant because in many cases they pose a fresh model of democratic representation, one that is more inclusive, deliberative, and participatory’ (Van Cott, 2005: 6).

Although the above rightly gives an account of the effects of political party decomposition, the decline of class identities and cleavages, it tends to over-emphasise in a normative fashion the necessary elements to achieve better ‘democratic quality’. While focusing on achieving representation and stability, it equally loses insight of ubiquity and the ongoing nature of social conflict. In other words, attention on the quality of political parties vis-à-vis voters’ accountability indirectly suggests a normative path towards social conflict institutionalisation and, therefore, normalisation.

Although the concept of ‘political opportunity’ shows more analytical complexity, it tends to reproduce the fundamental problems noticed above. The openness or closure of an institutionalised political system is measured by the state capacity for repression, stability of a broad set of elite alignments and the presence of elite allies (McAdam et al., 1996: 10). For the protest cycle approach (Tarrow, 1997) the notion of political opportunities introduce interesting elements on interaction in which ACE also relies. However, such interaction (between the state and social movements) yields in favour of dependence upon the creation of the ‘window of opportunity’ for movements to emerge and hence the impact on a political system. In other words, opportunities do not seem to be truly the result of the effects of the interaction but instead, the effects of unilateral state transformation from which movements ‘take advantage’.

One of the key advantages of analysing social practice as discourse is its deconstructive power insofar as it assumes the radical contingency and construction of socio-political order. This epistemological claim imposes rethinking of relationships behind ‘given’ (pre)constituted ‘objects’ in turn avoiding positivists theoretical traps. In this sense the environment analysed as ‘constitutive outside’ and not as ‘something out there’, contributes to a better rethinking of ‘objects’ such as institutions and movements. ACE as an analytical framework does not reproduce the ‘gulf’ between movements and institutions (a tendency in both the Political Science and Social Movement approach) inasmuch as the dilemma ‘inside – outside’ is solved by the positions produced by the hegemonic project (Mouffe, 2007) and not by existing institutions. In other words, and as *moment 2* analysed in this chapter suggests, social conflict is antagonistic, i.e., ongoing and transcending institutional demarcation. Its expression could resonate from the ‘outside’ (as in the 1990s) but also from ‘within’ (2000s) which does not mean that it has been ‘solved’ but, instead, partially displaced. By the same

token, the formation of ACE contributes to bring about the ‘excess’, the ‘leftovers’ from the margins to the centre of political sociology theorisation.

6.5 Final Remarks

This chapter has explored the dimension of time as intrinsic although exterior to the formation of democratic subjectivities. It was suggested that the dimension of time was produced as an effect of the process of displacement occurring between the 1990s and the 2000s, i.e., from ‘anti-neoliberalism’ to ‘beyond governments’. The chapter outlined the nature of the displacement exploring four different elements: externality, antagonism, intersection of policies and struggles, and simplification. Their enduring discursive presence determined the formation of ACE as historically situated constitutive outside. The type of effects and meaning they generated over time, however, marked displacement and transformation in turn drawing the boundary between past and present, redefining the terms for the constitution of *them* and *us*, inside and outside.

The final chapter is devoted to find out the effect of ACE movement from moment 1 (anti-neoliberalism) to moment 2 (beyond government) vis-à-vis enduring non-territorial dynamics. Characterising the relationship mentioned above helps to understand the organisational path of the case studies under scrutiny, -and also to demonstrate the open character of democracy in decoding the complexity of democratic subjectivities.

PART III: Emergence and Reconfiguration of Democratic Subjectivities in Argentina and Brazil

The final part of this thesis is formed by Chapter 7 and a conclusion. Chapter 7 aims to pull different threads together, that is to say, to identify relationships between ongoing non-territorial dynamics and changing antagonistic contextual exteriors. Chapter 7 names and differentiates the constitution and displacement of democratic subjectivities in post-transition Brazil and Argentina. It interprets the latter as a complex movement from *disagreement* to *participation* showing, on the one hand, the emergence and transformation of multiform and radical dissent and, on the other hand, the contentious path towards deepening democracy in the post-transition context of Brazil and Argentina.

The conclusion sums up the most significant element of the argument, warns on limitations and outlines needed future research.

Chapter 7: From Disagreement to Participation? The Complex Path of Democratic Conflict over the Past 20 Years

Introduction

In this chapter I elaborate on the relationships between non-territorial dynamics and contextual antagonistic exterior over the past twenty years. By doing so I seek to firstly, learn from the development of case studies over time, i.e., understand cross-organisational solidarities and subsequent divisions, distances and eventual ruptures; relationships with the state and political parties. Through the critical analysis of case studies it is possible to notice the production of political conflict and its displacement resulting in the configuration of two different analytical moments (disagreement and participation). Secondly, I explain the underlying threads defining the constitution of the two moments reflecting on changes and continuities in the passage from the moment *a* (1990s) to moment *b* (2000s). Moments are not determined but instead over determined by the instituted relation of externality. It is as result of such relationship that moments become precariously structured as such.

My argument is that the relationship between new contentious spaces (in the form of three non-territorial dynamics) in relation to antagonistic contextual exterior (ACE) enacted democratic subjectivities in post-transition Brazil and Argentina. Moreover, the formation of democratic subjectivities was expressed in the formation of two differentiable moments, i.e., a moment of *disagreement* in the 1990s, and a second moment of *participation* in the 2000s.

Rather than a linear trajectory the study suggests that displacement⁴⁴ was the result of interactions involving complex power struggle, which have often followed a contradictory path. However, if contradictions seem apparent in the observation of case studies they equally become intelligible scrutinised through the lenses of *democratic subjectivities*, as this thesis proposes.

⁴⁴ The notion of displacement refers to the meaning posited in the previous chapter, namely, the formation of 'anti-neoliberalism' in the 1990s its displacement towards 'beyond governments' in the 2000s.

Thus, my final point draws precisely on the validity and explanatory potential of *democratic subjectivities* as analytical construct to explore the politics of post-transition. It has proved useful not only to detect the fundamental socio-political conflict permeating case studies and underpinning the construction of social order in Argentina and Brazil; but also to understand its effects in relation to the expansion and retrenchment of egalitarian practices. In other words, this final point seeks to unveil the constitution of ‘subjects of disagreement’ as performing democratic practices permeating the politics of contemporary post-transition regimes in South America.

In a nutshell, this chapter is about reconstructing what up to this point has been scrutinised in the form of separate elements, namely, finding meaningful partial institution of totalities in contexts of structural dissolution of totalities. It is about making explicit the unity which has remained implicit throughout the analysis of the various constitutive components.

This argument is presented in three sections. First, I (re)construct the moment of disagreement by explaining the particular type of relationship built upon the intersection of non-territorial dynamics and ACE in the 1990s. The first subsection focuses on the configuration of disagreement resulting from a) contextual antagonism and b) internal articulation. The specificity of this configuration resulted in the appearance of *those not entitled to govern* (Rancière, 1999, Rancière, 2006) or, in other words, the process of subjectification of what had remained subordinated and silenced. By the same token, the following questions need to be posited at this point: to what extent has the emergence of disagreement altered, transformed or changed the distribution of places and functions determining relative positions within the partial construction of order and (in)subordination? In other words, to what extent is disagreement associated with the production of equality and subsequently with democracy? I engage with these questions in the second section replicating the structure followed in the first one but applied to the context of 2000s. Influences, contradictions and legacies of the eruption of disagreement are scrutinised in the light of the questions suggested above. The third section reflects on the passage from disagreement to participation. My argument is that the passage reveals three key elements a) the emergence of the new practices; b) the production of the sense of unity that, although temporarily, overcomes fragmentation. It is the process of *visibilisation* of such new practices mentioned in *a*. c) The production of legacies which influence the reconfiguration of a new and posterior moment. In simple terms, I suggest that *a*, *b* and *c* informs *politics* in contemporary Argentina

and Brazil. It speaks about the process of interruption and consequently (re)distribution of places and functions, i.e., the (simple to name but complex to produce) alternative to the *arkhé*; a Greek word which meaning conveys *the established order*, on the one hand, and *new beginning*, on the other; suggesting, as a consequence, radical indeterminacy.

Table No. 4: Practices Instituting the Politics of Democratisation in Post-transition Contexts

	‘Anti-neoliberalism’	‘Beyond Governments’
Self-organising	Homogenisation	Difference
Networking	Assemblage	Dispersion
Demanding	Equivalential	Sectorial
Moments	Internal articulation + contextual antagonism	Internal differentiation + contextual consent
Effects	Disagreement	Participation

7.1 1990s: The Configuration of Disagreement

How did territorial actors contribute to the incomplete constitution of a broader ‘non-territorial’ subject which radically questioned the existing distribution of places and functions in the 1990s in Argentina and Brazil? The answer anticipated in the introduction consists in analysing the outcome of the particular type of interaction produced in the 1990s between what I called non-territorial dynamics, on the one hand, and the configuration of Antagonistic Contextual Exterior (ACE), on the other. Anticipating the argument further this intersection echoed radical subversion of order (disagreement) because to a large extent it successfully performed the fundamental socio-political conflict questioning established forms of

domination (excluding corporatist arrangements, closed representative deliberation and grassroots deactivation). In what follows I ground this assertion into specific critical junctures translating empirical findings into my proposed analytical narrative.

7.1.1 Self-Organising vis-à-vis ACE

Working on Deleuze and Guattari's (1987) insightful metaphor I suggested (chapter 3) that territorial actors such as the FTV and CTA in Argentina and CUT and MST in Brazil participated in a *rhizomatic* and *nomadic* processes⁴⁵ of (de)territorialisation which in turn resulted in the institutionalisation of a non-territorial dynamic I called self-organising. In addition, I argue here that the intersection between the 'internal' self-organising dynamic and the formation of the 'constitutive outside' in the 1990s (anti-neoliberalism) produced a moment (not a state) of assemblage or homogenisation between social movement organisations and trade unions. This moment of homogenisation is vital in understanding the voice of disagreement over the corporatist tradition as dominant form of socio-political organisation. As a form of organisation the corporatist model integrates formal wage-earners in a vertical form of relationship with the state whilst equally excludes heterodox organisational forms built outside and beyond wage relationships (e.g., the unemployed and the landless). In other words, self-organising fundamentally questioned existing forms of organisations raising questions on studies of democracy regimes whose analytical framework heavily rely on the classical model of industrial relations (Collier and Collier, 2002).

As suggested in chapter 3, self-organising emerges out of the deconstructing clash between 'organisational forces' versus 'objective deterrents'. I listed, on the one hand, episodes of protests in the form of strikes, demonstrations, petitions, referendums, marches, roadblocks, and so on, and suggested their thematic and organisational interdependence. Their linkages were related more to the emergence of a common pattern of horizontal production of dissent rather than to a strategic alignment of aims and objectives. In this sense, self-organising revealed the construction of a 'mobilising public togetherness' in which the grassroots component was weighted more than the organisational element. On the other hand, I also

⁴⁵ If a rhizome challenges the structuration of hierarchies, the nomad character turns dynamics into ceaseless movement defying institutional crystallisations. It is about institutionalisation (of a dynamic) which effect is to prevent institutionalisation (of organisations, actors or political arrangements).

associated self-organising as alternative forms of doing, providing FTV experience as illustrative examples. These experiences revealed not only aspects related to need and discontent but added the radical feature of '*doing* the alternative' through reflexive practice. It was the experience of, for instance, occupying public land that taught FTV about the importance of grassroots horizontal decision-making in order to cement and develop solidarities over time. Furthermore, settlements proved that the latter constituted a precondition for learning limitations and advancing towards the production of new knowledge through innovation, paving the way for the FTV to successfully innovate into an organisation for the unemployed.

Hence protesting and doing in Argentina and Brazil sparked a system of ramification that eventually challenged collective action deterrents in the form of competing subaltern narratives or fragmented labour force predominately either unemployed or in informal work. The ceaseless interconnectivity found between the two instituted a deconstructing force. But it was the juncture between this force and the broader outside that temporarily provided the missing grammar for the institution of contentious action. It was the intersection of self-organising with the 'outside' anti-neoliberalism that finally resulted in the production of a moment of meaningful assemblage between trade unions and social movement organisations. This assemblage was not a collectivisation of neutral floating signifiers but a moment of togetherness holding the grassroots experience at the centre of its contentious character.

As explained in chapter 6, the formation of the 'constitutive outside' produces not only simplification of discourses but also a process of antagonisation. Self-organising resulted therefore in raising grassroots as critical disruption in opposition to the established corporatist principle dominating industrial relations over Argentina and Brazil's history, i.e., hierarchical relations within trade unions and vertical negotiations with the state. As scholars (Schmitter, 1974, Fernández, 2005a, Etchemendy, 2005, Murillo, 1997) have extensively argued the corporatist or neocorporatist model guaranteed stability while equally subordinated grassroots participation in favour of the consolidation of elite establishments. Although the latter occasionally resulted in establishing a floor of guaranteed income distribution (De la Garza, 2001) it also facilitated the introduction of labour flexibilisation policies in the 1990s (Levitsky, 2004, Etchemendy, 2005, Murillo, 1997) largely thanks to agreements at the top level between trade union leaders, business corporations and state agents. What the establishment of the corporatist model meant for certain was the slow though definite

disappearance of grassroots organisations at the shop floor level, undermining the development of horizontal decision-making practices, and in turn radically preventing the emergence of any type of innovation from below.

Such innovation though, I argue, did not arrive from within but instead was the result of the formation of a non-territorial space that articulated elements from within, with elements from the outside. It was, to be sure, a moment of homogenisation between alternative trade unions and social movement organisations which, in the language of the grassroots, projected a fundamental critic to the bases of the corporatist model upon which organised labour, businesses and the state have historically based their relationship and, consequently, the preservation of the status quo.

Finally, the emergence of ‘the grassroots’ as result of the described critical juncture between self-organising and ‘anti-neoliberalism’ echoed disagreement because it not only rejected the principles of the (neo)corporatist model but also because it questioned assumed individualistic values such as political apathy and disenchantment.

Electoral democracy as a regime and politics as pathways towards accessing governments, have largely been the focus of transitologists studying democracy consolidation in the region. Their focus on the rule of law and institutional consolidation contributed to an understanding of elite pacts enabling transitions. However, their analysis on democracy consolidation primarily emphasised their institutionalist concerns rather than opening up their view towards socio-political processes taking place ‘within’ or ‘outside’ such institutions. As a consequence, transitologists explained the increasing gap between ‘institutions’ and ‘citizenship’ as an ‘accountability’ problem (O'Donnell, 1994). Following this argument individualistic behaviour, lower voter turnout, decreasing trade union memberships, ‘anti-politics’ behaviour, apathy and disenchantment, were all effects of the produced gap between ‘consolidated’ though ‘not accountable’ institutions.

My data analysis produces different results upon which I posit a different line of thought. Disenchantment, apathy and so forth constituted real socio-political phenomena as long as the analytical focus remained placed on institutions ‘desirable for democracy’. If attention is put in discovering emerging dynamics out of, for instance, ongoing practices of *protesting* and *doing*, instead of finding a disjunction between ‘politics’ and ‘citizens’, results suggest an

extensive process of dissent incubating and performing precisely the opposite values (solidarity and horizontalisation). They were in the 1990s primarily expressed at the level of the grassroots and not at the level of the representational system which also constituted a particular element for the emergence of disagreement in the 1990s. It was the effect of the intersection between self-organising and ‘anti-neoliberalism’ that determined that the sphere of government entirely corresponded with the neoliberal side. As a consequence, the relationship between ‘citizens’ and governments could be seen as not only based on ‘apathy’ and ‘disenchantment’ but primarily on antagonistic rejection because, again, government was perceived as an mechanical component of the neoliberal formation.

7.1.2 Networking vis-à-vis ACE

If self-organising raised the grassroots expression of disagreement through the rejection of corporate arrangements, networking in turn raised deliberation through networking by default as second feature of democratic subjectivities. It expressed contentious action in the defiance of institutional mechanisms as primary locus of democratic debate.

Networks have had the deserved attention of social movement scholars (Castells, 2010, Somers, 1994, Diani and McAdam, 2003). Interestingly, network analysis contributed significantly to detect the effects of networks throughout the complex developments of social movement. What is more important though is that they have opened up the necessary analytical space for the interrogation of processes of meaning-creation emerging from linkages, interrelation and interconnectivity involving not only people but also organisations and events (occurrences both embedded and beyond actions attributed to either individuals or organisations). Finally, indicating that network analysis is relational is a circular argument and to some extent incorrect because every concept in social science echoes social relationships. However, at the level of empirical scrutiny and data analysis, it enhanced the study of democratic subjectivities insofar as it bridged practical observation with the theoretical socio-political narrative this thesis follows.

As figures number 4 and 5 in Chapter Four indicate, my analysis focuses primarily on organisational interrelationships. However, linkages were drawn as result of explicit

organisational alliances and articulations with other organisations but also, and more importantly, as the result of shared participation in events as well as the development of common solidarity links weaved underneath and beyond organisational tactical decision. Campaigns like FRENAPO in Argentina and organisational umbrellas like CMS in Brazil, discussed in chapter 4, give account of a process of *relationality* based on the continuous presence of dynamics of blending, and mixing which I named networking. Networking like self-organising is embedded in territorial actors but its effects go beyond organisational or territorial borders. The constitution of networking as non-territorial dynamic as a consequence speaks about not only the ‘reconstitution of civil society’ but mainly on processes regarding building of trust based on mutual recognition of differences.

The analysis of the data over time also shows the *routinisation* of networking practices which I argued forge ‘deliberation by default’. Linkages and cross-organisational interdependence could differ in terms of the connected and disconnected nodes but data does not seem to suggest interruption in the dynamic of constant reproduction of the networking practices. The experience of FRENAPO and CMS illustrates the opening of a common space among student organisations, trade unions, Christian organisations, political parties, small businessmen and social movement organisation in which they are bound up in shared practices of contention and resistance across organisational borders. Organisational elites coordinated demonstrations and campaigns which proved the importance of organisational structures. However, grassroots activists hold multiple organisational memberships somehow challenging orthodox organisational fidelity. Instead members recognise themselves as inscribed in a broader meaning reference system related to a national or regional transformation project and contingently participating within certain organisational frameworks. What this apparent contradiction actually means is that networking dynamics are neither bottom-up nor a top-down only phenomena but instead the result of interrelationships between the two. The process of mutual recognition mentioned earlier builds trust relationships at the grassroots level while equally makes leaders’ decision-making accountable (a feature which also denotes the interweaving character of non-territorial spaces).

While the routinisation of networking dynamics is apparent it is also evident that such routinisation present in our cases a fluid type of consolidation rather than static crystallisation of linkages. In other words, cross-organisational system of linkages and connection change

over time opening new connecting lines with previously disconnected nodes and also potentially transforming core networking participants into peripheral ones and vice versa. The CTA in Argentina and the CUT in Brazil played a centripetal role during the 1990s which made them central nodes of a network whose linkages went far beyond their organisational moulds.

Up to this point, networking challenges the notion of segmented heterogeneity because it suggests an ongoing solidarity creation practice through trust building and recognition of differences which connects some nodes at the expense of disconnecting others. Menem and Cardoso governments in Argentina and Brazil correspondently were the most clearly disconnected nodes in the system of interconnectivity in which case studies were related to. Governments in the 1990s equalled 'neoliberalism' and it was what the constitution of disagreement was opposed to. Although the opposition to something paved the way for the proliferation of situations of unity; it also revealed the crises of hierarchically constituted mass organisations as key locus for collective action.

The latter explains the necessary condition for the development of collective actions but it does not reveal the causes of its emergence. Simple opposition to government policies is not explanatory enough. In other words, it explains the 'passive' conditions for action although it does not reveal the drivers able to transform collective action into contentious politics. Finding an answer to this problem is central to explain why I sustain that the 1990s represents a moment of disagreement. To be sure, my argument is that such 'activation' process occurs due to the formation of what constitutes the external limit to the networking practice which a) draws an empirical line upon which networking dynamics cannot further develop and b) it provides the necessary symbolic intensity to the constitution of the *other* in an antagonistic sense.

The external limit in the 1990s both in the cases of Argentina and Brazil is, as already suggested, the formation of 'anti-neoliberalism'. It is precisely the intersection between networking dynamics and 'anti-neoliberalism' as external limit what results in disagreement as a major critical juncture in the 1990s. Tracing back the reasons provided for the definition of 'friend' organisations in contrast to those perceived performing on the opposite 'site of things', the most common element given was: 'they [other organisations] are neoliberal'. It represented a limit that it could not be breached and equally tempered differences within

‘friend’ organisations with whom it was automatically possible to engage with in the form of common participation in campaigns, events, demonstrations, organisational linkages, developing of cross-organisational campaign, etc. In other words, networking becomes visible and active because of the presence of the external limit which in the 1990s was clearly represented by the configuration of anti-neoliberalism.

Hence, networking in its intersection with ‘anti-neoliberalism’ produces a sharp cut in networking expansion insofar as adding an extra node would imply stepping outside the established external limit. In addition, this critical juncture also results in a process of intensification of relationships which has one noticeable consequence, namely, the institution of the *other*. Although differentiating the other is something temporal, i.e., contingent to the production of ‘anti-neoliberalism’ in this case, its most noticeable feature needs to be found in its effect on the type of relationships it generates. More specifically, the emergence of the *other* supposes the transformation of consensual relationships between adversaries into antagonistic relationships between parts (Rancière, 2006).

Finally, networking dynamics resulted in the institution of two interlinked phenomena whose influence transcended the 1990s, i.e., a) the opening of *Fora* and b) de-essentialisation of organisations as key holders of identity and resources. What I called earlier ‘deliberation by default’ consisted in the process that implied the organisational *necessity* to coordinate, articulate and also negotiate common positions with partner organisations. Programs, strategies, long and short-term goals are more the result of the complex articulation processes rather than self-determining organisational ideals. One of the implications of this point is precisely what it has been stated in b), namely, the process of de-essentialisation of organisations as key drivers of collective action. The argument I am presenting in this thesis is largely grounded in the careful study of what constitutes ‘new organisations’. They are contemporary experiences evolving alongside ‘old’ type of organisations which proves the presence of a ceaseless movement seeking to capture *the* organisational model for socio-political transformation. This movement fails to achieve realisation insofar as it encounters *networking* dynamics taking place simultaneously which explains divisions and fragmentations taking place in the structuration of a second moment, analysed below. This apparent obstacle for planned, rational and preconceived social transformation meets structural limitations, on the one hand, but equally enables the development of an unmanageable and multiform contentious movement which, in the 1990s, disrupted in the

form of *disagreement*, i.e., following Rancière, voicing the voice of those not entitled to govern.

7.1.3 Demanding vis-à-vis ACE

It has been said that self-organising raises the grassroots expression of disagreement through the rejection of corporate arrangements and networking suggests ‘cross-organisational interdependence’ expressing disagreement via contentious deliberation outside institutional spaces. Demanding in turn expresses the *naming* process through which material objects are transformed into contentious practices. In other words, demanding as non-territorial space posits practical measures, policy initiatives, territory disputes, and material demands, expressing disagreement by questioning the ‘delegative’ narrative of the socio-political process (O'Donnell, 1994).

This vision assumes individual citizens as passive recipients disassociated from unaccountable state agents who are seen as the main generators of policy initiatives. The problem of this view is that it overstates the weight of electoral politics as the sole and fundamental mediation between the former and the latter. My argument does not negate the importance of electoral politics in post-transition contexts but additionally proposes to have a better look at the process resulting in the configuration of new contentious territories. Contentious new issues do not emerge from parliament decisions (at least not only or primarily) but, on the contrary, are the effect of a complex process of articulation from below which at certain point in time (the 1990s in this case) interrupts in the form of disagreement.

The analysis in chapter 5 precisely concentrates in proving this point by showing the ceaseless dynamic of de-territorialisation of territorialized demands and the subsequent institution of articulation practices across multiple activated issues. In order to briefly recall what it was argued in chapter 5 the following simple question needs to be raised: Demanding what? Grounding my observations on case studies analysed, I suggested that the context of post-transition in Argentina and Brazil produced a discursive formation of governing demands which I argued is being expressed in the form of the institution of adjectives such as ‘responsible’ and ‘irresponsible’. I put particular attention to the process of configuration behind ‘irresponsible’ demands as they represented demands and issues literally excluded of

the political discussion. This exclusion is thought as contingent rather than permanent insofar as the correspondence between issues and adjectives (or the *adjectivisation* of issues) is the result of fluid context-based struggles rather than rigid structural differentiation processes. In the context of the 1990s I noticed that organisations were not only demanding many things (both ‘responsible’ and ‘irresponsible’) but also that demands varied a great deal from each other.

Some of the major demands I have differentiated in connection to the organisations under scrutiny were: land redistribution, food sovereignty, housing, democratisation of trade unions, work, citizenship income, etc. In the context of the 1990s these demands remained underground and silenced because they fell under the nomination of ‘irresponsible’. The dominant discourse of fiscal discipline excluded all of them and turned their public enunciation unfeasible. However silenced and however underneath of the established criteria governing organisations’ demands, their (insubordinate) presence was apparent. These demands named the unnamed anchoring grievances in material problems. They expressed territorial problems connected to people’s everyday life which equally sought to change a situation perceived as unfair. They were material problems inasmuch as they were intrinsically connected to people’s wellbeing. This is what I distinguished as ‘lack of’ or the first component forming ‘irresponsible’ demands.

But what still remains unclear though is a) how these demands ‘connect’ to each other and b) why their accumulation eventually resulted in the production of disagreement. How did demands trespass/question the established frontier between ‘responsible’ and ‘irresponsible’? Points *a* and *b* are intrinsically interconnected as it could be read as follows. I argue that demands gained a degree of intense articulation because they shared an element in the development of a common ‘sense of injustice’. If the component ‘lack of’ divided grievances and claims, the component ‘sense of injustice’ enabled the possibility for articulation to take place. In other words, demands were not equal but equivalential. This reasoning follows Laclau and Mouffe (1985) understanding of the notion of over determination ruling the constitution of social relations. It ‘implies that they lack an ultimate literality which would reduce them to necessary moments of an immanent law. There are not two planes, one of essences and the other of appearances, since there is no possibility of fixing an ultimate literal sense for which the symbolic would be a second and derived plane of signification’ (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985: 97 and 98). The presence of the element of the ‘sense of injustice’ across

demands therefore is what precisely confirms articulation in practice undertaken within open objects and not a name given to the ‘fusion’ of closed formations.

Hence, why did the effect of demand accumulations result in disagreement? Up to this point I have explained what made articulation within heterogeneous demands feasible, namely, their open character. It is because they held an incomplete character that the relation of exteriority needs to be brought in order to finally understand the partial moment of structuration or, in other words, the creation of the critical juncture per se. As it has been repeatedly argued in this chapter the relation of exteriority in the 1990s was given by the constitution of ‘anti-neoliberalism’ as the discursive formation that simplified the political complexity and organised the political spectrum in two antagonistic sides. It is the intersection between the dynamic of demanding, as internal articulation practice, and ‘anti-neoliberalism, as constitutive relation of externality, where disagreement is produced in the 1990s in Brazil and Argentina.

Disagreement as the interrupting force produced in the 1990s is something that needs to be inscribed as something of the order of the effect. It is the phenomenon that transformed articulation practices into contentious politics. That said it would be simply incorrect to say that disagreement expressed literally activated demands. Instead, the process of hegemonic articulation that enabled disagreement was created upon the generation of equivalences which ‘create second meanings though parasitic on the first, subverts it: the differences conceal one another out insofar as they are used to express something identical underlying them all’ (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985: 127). The creation of disagreement therefore transformed demanding contents overwritten by the negative resonance of the external reference. It also amalgamated forces and performed contingent counter-power questioning the crystallised status quo, performed in the shape of neoliberal order.

7.2 Displacements, Legacies and Participation

‘A concept which denies any essentialist approach to social relations, must also state the precarious character of every identity and the impossibility of

fixing the sense of the 'elements' in any ultimate literality.' (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985: 96)

I argued that the 1990s represents the moment of *disagreement* resulting from the intersection between internal articulation, on the one hand, and contextual antagonism, on the other. The 2000s, in turn, represents the configuration of a different temporal and analytical moment resulting from, basically, a different articulation of factors, namely, internal differentiation, on the one hand, and contextual agreement, on the other. The effect of the latter resulted in the configuration of a second socio-political moment characterised not by disagreement but instead of *participation*⁴⁶.

This second moment, as a temporal and analytical formation, and like the first one, is the result of the crossroad between internal non-territorial dynamics and its particular relations of externality produced, in this case, in the 2000s. As it has been said elsewhere, this external formation could be summarised under the name of 'beyond government'. Although the meaning of *participation* is primarily grounded in elements forming the discursive complex of 'beyond governments', for the purpose of the argument of this thesis, its meaning is also importantly related to disagreement, that is to say, to what *it is not*. In other words, participation in this work means two things: a) displacement of disagreement and b) transformation of socio-political relations. Replicating the organisation of the first section, in what follows I explain the configuration of this second moment and its effects by exploring conflictual meanings emerging from each critical juncture.

7.2.1 Self-Organising vis-à-vis ACE

I argued that self-organising dynamic in the context of 'anti-neoliberalism' resulted in the constitution of the grassroots as a (de)territorialized space of homogenisation between trade

⁴⁶ Following Radical Democracy which is theoretically guiding this thesis, participation aims to analytically capture the complexity in the formation of this second moment, which is clearly different from the first one, as I explain in what follows. It does convey a degree of higher integration than disagreement. But it does not mean the sudden appearance of a universal public sphere (with the corresponding dissipation of the *particular*). On the contrary, it suggests a new moment in the complex structuration of order and (in)subordination dictating the politics of democratisation in the 2000s. This is why the notion of *displacement* explained earlier is essential. Displacement means reformulation but not dissolution of antagonistic conflict. Participation as used here should not be confused therefore with participatory ethos.

unions and social movement organisations. In addition, I stated that the politisation of grassroots (echoing disagreement) was apparent insofar as it challenged the dominant corporatist model of relationship with the state and equally opposed the argument based on ‘political apathy’ or ‘citizenship disenchantment’.

In turn, the formation of the second moment in the 2000s is the result of both continuity and, more importantly, also change. The 2000s show continuity insofar as the presence of the self-organising dynamic (*rhizhomatic* and *nomadic*) is still apparent; and it equally expresses change insofar as the formation of the relation of externality has moved from ‘anti-neoliberalism’ to ‘beyond governments’. As a consequence, the effect of the *new* intersection between ongoing self-organising dynamics, on the one hand, and ‘beyond government’, on the other, paves the way for the development of a process of *differentiation*; which marks a contrast with the process of *homogenisation* instituted in the 1990s.

The process of exchange and interconnectivity between social movement organisations and trade unions does not show signs of depletion but of critical reformulation in the new context. Governments in Brazil and Argentina instrumented policies which opened the process of wage negotiation in an environment of steady job creation. Policies such as the Minimum Wage (*Salário Mínimo*) in Brazil and the Council for Minimum Wage (*Consejo del Salario Minimo*) in Argentina reopened institutional spaces of negotiation between trade unions and the government. As a result wages are discussed on annual bases taking into account productivity as well as inflation levels. Opening institutional spaces for organisations (such as trade unions in this case) to participate in policy design represents a novelty in relation to the 1990s. These types of governmental initiatives were welcomed by trade unions that continued protesting in the streets but also now engaged in negotiations with the state. It is in this new context in which trade union officials declared that they did not feel that they were only ‘testimonial’ organisations but active participants of a process which they thought was advancing badly needed reforms.

Trade union engagement in negotiations with the state produced concrete results in the form of wage recovery incrementing workers’ purchase power. To some extent, the above involved the reintroduction of representational mechanisms of negotiations in which trade union elites regained previously lost legitimacy. However, unlike in the 1990s, the current situation unfolded in a context in which the grassroots remained active. The difference though is that

whereas in the 1990s the grassroots occupied the centre of the decision-making process; in the 2000s in turn they seemed subordinated to the margins. The result of the latter is the configuration of a *new* situation rather than a simple restitution of the (neo)corporatist model. The grassroots critically tensioned negotiations mechanisms, in turn narrowing down leaders' room for manoeuvre and instituting, as a consequence, tighter accountability mechanisms.

The process described above had significant implications in the type of relationship between trade unions and social movement organisations. The grassroots constituted a space for *homogenisation* between them insofar as the relationship with the exterior (antineoliberalism) was basically a relationship based on rejection and confrontation. The institution of spaces of (although contentious) regular 'interaction' (in the form of negotiation with the state) and not negative opposition with the relation of externality, led to a process of differentiation of roles and functions. In other words, the spaces for communal opposition is narrowed as a result of the opening of diverse negotiation mechanism in which each organisation seeks to achieve slightly different objectives. It is observable, as a consequence, that the intensification of internal deliberation mechanism is at the expense of horizontal and cross-organisational spaces for collective action.

The process of differentiation opened up lines of conflict between actors for instance, between the 'strategic centre' of operations and the local level. This was clear in the case of the MST (Caldeira, 2008) but also in the cases of CUT in Brazil and CTA in Argentina. The CUT process of engagement in negotiations with the state resulted in losing two significant supporting trade union streams (*Intersindical* and *Conlutas* counting for almost 20% of total members). In turn, the CTA's process of internal elections during 2010/11 led to a situation of near-rupture between two rival groups which disagreed on where the CTA should stand in relation to government policies.

Drawing again on the empirical evidence analysed in this thesis, Brazilian social movement organisations understood the new situation as result of the 'correlation of forces' (*correlação de forças*). This concept probably best captured the contentious meanings of self-organising in the new context. It is a concept that sits in between imagined spaces and real situations because it projects political transformation within a situational framework of opportunities and constraints. By expressing the idea of correlation of forces the MST stated that organisational features, such as the grassroots level, represented a pivotal decision-making

achievement though not being the only one accepted to advance the movement's goals. Multi-level participation including electoral representation was not only possible but desirable in a context in which they assessed the arrival of President Lula as a victory, although partial, of their own.

Finally, the critical juncture produced between self-organising and 'beyond government' in the 2000s, resulted in a process of a) increasing organisational separation of roles and function; b) internal divisions and external incremental cross-organisational specialisation; and c) consolidation of the grassroots as conditioning (though not determining) component of the organisational decision-making process. The latter occurs in a context in which the *rhizomatic* self-organising dynamic elicits a *nomadic* move departing from *homogenisation* towards the enactment of (participatory) *differentiation*.

7.2.2 Networking vis-à-vis ACE

I argued that networking was formed as a dynamic challenging mass organisation models for collective action, on the one hand, and, as opening deliberation outside institutional spaces, on the other. It equally questioned the impossibility of transformative collective action insofar as it expresses the form through which social fragmentation can be contingently overcome. In addition, I stated that the activation of this instituting underlying dynamic in the 1990s happened *in relation to* the formation of 'anti-neoliberalism' as constitutive outside. The production of this critical juncture in the 2000s shows signs of continuity and change. It reaffirms the ongoing presence of the networking dynamic (continuity) and equally depicts a different externality formation, namely, 'beyond government' (change). As a consequence, if *assemblage* was the emerging result in the 1990s, evidence suggests a tendency towards its displacement in the form of *dispersion* in the configuration of this second moment.

The 1990s reflected a particular type of networking established alongside the institution of an antagonistic frontier generated by the formation of 'neoliberalism' and 'anti-neoliberalism'. The formation of these two camps activated networking mechanisms, on the one hand, and built a clear cut line, on the other, instituting an external impassable limit for further networking practices. The construction of the second moment in the 2000s was built upon a different type of discourse formation which I summarised in the idea of 'beyond governments'

(*gobierno en disputa + rebaixamento de horizontes*). Precisely one of the central ideas cementing the formation of the latter is, as explained elsewhere, the ‘rupture to the dominant way of thinking’. The contextual dominant thinking in the 1990s was strongly associated with the ideas popularised by the so called ‘Washington Consensus’. Interviewees associated these ideas, economic and social policies with not only free market policies but also with foreign economic and cultural domination. It resonated with the idea of ‘market imperialism’, i.e., the institution of orthodox market friendly policies, on the one hand, and the radical loss of decision-making autonomy, on the other.

In extension to the latter, the recognition of alternatives and competing narrative like, for example, the one suggested under the idea of *Latinoamericanismo*, are observable. It highlights the (re)emergence of alternative global discursive framework rather than the full replacement of the dominating one. It explains, however, why activists from social movement organisations and trade unions frame the current moment as a ‘moment of rupture’. It is noticeable that *Latinoamericanismo* is the result of complex accounts blending local, national and regional narratives. That said the inscription of the current context as developing within a new set of regional circumstances is apparent.

In the Chapter Four, I empirically explored the transition outlined earlier through the observation of one campaign (FRENAPO) and the institution of one umbrella organisation (CMS). The networking dynamic occurring underneath the constitution of these events proved to be rigid insofar as the fixation was the result of the establishment of an oppositional external limit; and fluid, insofar as there was transformation in the configuration of the external limit itself. I showed how the networking dynamic connected nodes, established connecting patterns and equally disconnected other nodes. At the pinnacle of these events networking looked tight and rigid leaving governments outside the interconnectivity system. Any type of collaboration or interaction with governments implied ‘stepping outside’ the established frontier because governments (and therefore their public policies) belonged to the neoliberal realm and contentious action was the effect of ‘anti-neoliberal’ sentiment.

The formation of the relation of exteriority, it is been analysed, is the result of both struggles from below and the establishment of policies from above. Governments of Néstor Kirchner (2003) and Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (2003) are seen as strongly influencing the formation of this second moment something which is not recognised in their predecessors, viz, Fernando

de la Rúa in Argentina and Fernando Enrique Cardoso in Brazil. The differentiation is drawn largely based on the implementation of policies which general consent positively influenced governments' popularity. The introduction of social policies expanding social protection as well as the implementation of heterodox economic policies securing the creation and protection of jobs are some of the government initiatives which gained acceptance across social movement and trade union members. Equally, the reorientation of international relations from a US-centred approach towards a regional-centre strategy confirmed the change in direction and guaranteed stronger support.

'Beyond governments' as a result supposes a redefinition of the frontier dividing 'us' and 'them' which in turn affected the networking map of linkages and relations. One of the most significant features that needs to be highlighted is the transition from the exclusion of governments to their occasional integration as constitutive networking nodes. Their integration is partial and occasional because their participation in networking practices is based on concrete policy initiatives which in turn movements actively support or reject. Their support of many government initiatives is clear not only in the consent shown by street mobilisation but also in movements' involvement in multiple levels of participation including the appointment of their own personnel in government positions.

Finally, the analysis of this critical juncture performed in the 2000s reveals continuity and change; regularity as well as dispersion. It further reaffirms the inter-organisational interdependence leading to a situation of deliberation by default; contrary to organisational self-government and self-determination. Actions are negotiated through instituted networks which tend to strongly condition organisational capacity for the determination of collective action. In this sense, the crises of mass organisation as key locus for collective action is confirmed rather than questioned in this second moment. But such co-dependence which builds reciprocity and solidarity has been transformed in the passage from 1990s to the 2000s. Multifunctional networking dynamics spread, not steered by organisations' strategies but instead by the institution of an external relation which governed its dynamic by establishing clear limits. The complexity resulting from such new interaction suggests the emergence of a new situation of *dispersion* inasmuch as the past horizontal articulation moves towards triangular interaction which includes vertical linkages and ultimately configures a context of contingent collaborative participation.

7.2.3 Demanding vis-à-vis ACE

Demanding is the third constitutive dynamic which intertwined with the other two, at a particular point in time, forms a *democratic subjectivity*, i.e., the subject of disagreement. Demanding has been understood in this thesis as the dynamic through which a proliferation of struggles acquires a common *name* which in turn transforms ‘immanent’ material objects into contentious political struggles. I argued that in the 1990s the intersection between demanding, on the one hand, and its relation of externality, namely, ‘anti-neoliberalism’, on the other, produced disagreement over the constitution of the frontier between ‘responsible’ and ‘irresponsible’ demands (the demanding governing logic in post-transition context). In other words, the articulation of a group of heterogeneous ‘irresponsible’ demands stitching together their shared ‘sense of injustice’ produced a moment (1990s) of disruption which radically questioned established governing (and normalised) frontiers.

As section 2 of this chapter suggests, during the 2000s, the reconfiguration of a second moment differentiable from the 1990s is observable. To be sure, like the previous two dynamics anticipated, such reconfiguration is the result of a process of continuity and change; there is reproduction in the repetition of demanding dynamics, and change in the elements instituting the relation of exteriority (from ‘anti-neoliberalism’ to ‘beyond governments’). The reconfiguration of this third critical junction confirms the transition from a disruptive moment of disagreement to a new moment of conflictual participation.

The first element that needs to be highlighted is that throughout the 2000s, a process of proliferation (and visibilisation) of a new repertoire of demands is evident. Such a new repertoire is developed not only by the appearance of new material issues but also as a result of a process involving partial and total reformulation of ‘old’ contentious demands. A few already reviewed could be briefly recalled for the purpose of the argument. The demand for land in the case of the MST remains an ‘old’ and original claim. It remains as a clear contentious demand in this second moment insofar as it maintains visibility and equally resists indirect attempts for integration. Food sovereignty, in turn, constitutes a partially new demand insofar as its origin is inextricably related to the demand for land. In other words, according to our analysis, the politisation of food sovereignty is unthinkable in Brazil without

acknowledging the learning process resulting from the limitations encountered in the practice of encampments. Finally, I have reviewed demands which could be considered as ‘new’ because they did definitely not form part of the demanding repertoire observable in the 1990s. It is the cases of, for example, demands related to the protection of natural resources as well as to the de-oligopolisation of the media. Mobilisations against ‘open sky mining’ in Argentina and opposition to the construction of gigantic dams in Brazil opened, in the 2000s, a space for the interrogation of Ecology and Democracy which are inextricably entrenched (Blühdorn and Welsh, 2008). The call for greater democratisation of the media is something which gained particular attention both in Argentina and Brazil. Argentine Parliament passed a law long awaited by social movement organisation grouped under the Coalition for Democratic Broadcasting (*Coalición por una Radiodifusión Democrática*) establishing limits to media monopoly. In Brazil the collective Intervozes, Brazil Collective for Social Broadcasting (*Coletivo Brasil de Comunicação Social*) is struggling to achieve a similar goal. They understand that there is no democracy with mass media controlled by monopolies which largely respond to their own interests, undermining the plurality of voices.

In relation to the 1990s, the 2000s adds an element of complexity because it represents not only a moment of proliferation of demands (to some extent it was also the case in the 1990s) but also a moment of ‘resolution’ of some of them. This nuance represents a key feature inasmuch as it contrasts the perception of utter ‘irresolution’ observed in the 1990s. The FRENAPO was, for instance, a campaign in Argentina seeking the implementation of a plan of social protection for unemployed families. It represented a disrupted ‘irresponsible’ demand in the 1990s to which no ‘response’ was formally observed. The Argentine government instrumented over the 2000s a set of policies (child allowance and work programs for the unemployed) which although not literally based on universality successfully depoliticised the problem integrating some aspects and excluding others. Yet, what this example to some extent demonstrates is that the proliferation of demands featuring the 2000s runs parallel to the process of increasing complexity.

Besides the internal reconfiguration of demanding as a dynamic as such, the 2000s also produced alteration in its relation of externality, namely, the production of the discursive formation ‘beyond governments’. As it has been explained, the institution of the relation of externality also implies ‘policies from above’ (apart from struggles from below –seen above). An important comparative note needs to be added in relation to the subject matter. Unlike in

the 1990s, governmental policies are not rejected ‘in block’, i.e., are not rejected entirely but instead scrutinised individually in order to either oppose or equally support it. This change represents another central transformation in relation to the 1990s because, as a result, it narrows the gap between government policies and struggles from below. Along the same line, in Brazil ‘*rebaixamento de horizontes*’ represents the contextual environment of the 2000s. It means support for conquered achievements and also the determination to struggle for more, for what is lacking. But, more importantly, it implies that, unlike in the 1990s, it is possible to think of demands that to succeed do not necessary implicate toppling a reactionary government. Instead, there is a call for the restitution of state roles and functions.

The intersection produced between demanding, on the one hand, and ‘beyond government’, on the other, results in the pluralisation of new ‘lack of’ and the differentiation of the ‘sense of injustice’ (using the language I introduced in the corresponding chapter). The re-emergence of old and new demands, as it was mentioned, was evident. Although these demands also reveal the *Janus*⁴⁷ formation, their corresponding ‘sense of injustice’ means they fail to establish meaningful connections among each other. In other words, there is not creation of a collective ‘sense of injustice’ and as a consequence it is sensible to speak of a process of sectorialisation of demands in opposition to the equivalential logic dominating in the 1990s. Demands as a result of intersecting with their external relation tend to hold their positive meaning and therefore leave open the territory for the establishment of spaces of collaborative participation. In the 1990s, in contrast, demands tended to lose their positivity as they were overwritten by the negative ‘anti-neoliberalism’ governing the relation of exteriority. The result was the internal articulation and external antagonism. In other words, the new situation favours the logic of difference at the expense of the logic of equivalence (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985); it enhances the expansion (and pluralisation) of the political space (deepening democracy) at the expense of producing internal articulation and antagonistic simplification (disagreement).

Naming, as a consequence, is not neutral and it must therefore be carefully investigated. It helps to explain moments of fixation but also displacement and dislocation. To be sure, demanding vis-à-vis ‘beyond governments’ produces the displacement of disagreement into participation, i.e., the reconfiguration of socio-political relation. This preliminary conclusion

⁴⁷ According to the Roman mythology, it is the god of beginnings and transitions, represented by a two-faced image.

allows the following more abstract reflection: Does *participation* entail a movement from polyphony to cacophony? Partly, it does. It means that a new multiplication of names does not find the necessary floating signifiers to produce articulation which could eventually result in the writing of an internally harmonising and externally antagonistic composition. Although participation externally resonates to ‘harmonious movement’, it primarily conveys internally competing and rival heterogeneity of sounds and meanings which do not result in the production of new moment of disruption. Disagreement, however, it is neither excluded nor unlikely to emerge in the future. On the contrary, my accounts make what I consider a vital temporal-analytical distinction insofar as it outlines the existing elements which, activated in a new context, could eventually make disagreement reappear.

7.3 The Politics of Democratisation

The movement from Disagreement to Participation illustrates the *politics of democratisation* in post-transition contexts, namely, in contexts of ‘consolidated’ political democracies, as defined by Robert Dahl (1971) and studied in the region by O'Donnell and Valenzuela (1992). The study of the socio-political dynamics determining the conflictual path from 1990s to 2000s represents a democratic critique of democracy. Unveiling the formation of *democratic subjectivities*, as presented and developed in this thesis, captures the formation of the ‘post-transition democrat’ insofar as it expresses the ubiquitous subject practicing the rules of democracy in contemporary South American countries which, following Rancière (1999, 2006, 2011), I understand as the rules of enacting equality, instead of enacting ‘the rules of the game’. It represents the difference of researching democracy in the light of agreement or disagreement.

The notion of democratic subjectivities, as posited in chapter 1, accentuates *enacting equally* over *political regime*. Studying democracy from a regime perspective has been the dominating position established by the Transition School. They argued that it was precisely the consolidation of a democratic regime (a set of rules and principles accepted primarily by governing elites) that was the necessary condition for overcoming authoritarian rule. However, studying democracy from a regime perspective emphasises the idea of ‘segmented’ and ‘passive’ equality. Emphasis on the consolidation of political rights parallel to the

preservation of 'governing elites' paves the way for the segmentation of equality into political, social and cultural equality. This segmentation is what led scholars to rightly criticize transition from authoritarian rule as mere change in *form* at the expense of change in *substance*. In addition, the regime perspective reinforces the idea that democratic (regime) consolidation trickles down to democratisation of other dimensions of social life. Somehow, democratisation of political life would lead to the consequent democratisation of economy and culture as well. Following the ideas of Todd May (2008), I argue that the latter assumes a passive notion of equally shadowing the activating mechanisms likely to 'create' equality.

The study of democracy through the interrogation of the formation and evolution of democratic subjectivities provides the material to delve into the mechanisms of creation of equality. It assumes a notion of active equality insofar as it departs from thinking in terms of equality (re)distribution and engages with the processes of contentious action *performing* equality and producing redistribution as a consequence. I have given an account of the latter by describing the processes of production and reproduction of contentious dynamics embedded in territorial actors while equally disembedded in the production of non-territorial spaces. The identification of spaces of deterritorialisation departs from form/substance approaches to democracy and engages with *pragmatics* as a primary means to study socio-political action. Pragmatics assumes a gap between contingent signifiers and the system of signification (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 112) and therefore redefines limits between material and immaterial, form and substance, immanent and external.

As suggested in this thesis, democratic subjectivities appeared as a result of the intersection between internal dynamics and a relation of externality. Over the past 20 years they have become apparent resulting in the formation of two moments; caused by different combination of factors and as a consequence also expressing different political meanings. This is the movement I identified as the process of displacement from *disagreement* (1990s) to *participation* (2000s). The movement from the formation of one moment to the displacement and (re)formation of a second definite point in time was not only possible but equally governed by the existing gap between signifiers and system of signification mentioned in the previous paragraph. I argued that the central transformation occurred primarily at the level of the relation of externality (from 'anti-neoliberalism' to 'beyond governments') fundamentally influencing the intensity of the contingent moment of unity.

In terms of Laclau and Mouffe (1985), while the formation of the moment of disagreement in the 1990s tended to be dominated by the ‘logic equivalence’; the moment of participation in the 2000s tended to be governed by the ‘logic of difference’. In other words, the 1990s resulted in the simplification of the political space plus the production of antagonism which in turn favoured the process of articulation of heterogeneous interests, actors and demands. On the contrary, in the 2000s, there was an increasing expansion of the political space, problems, actors, interests and demands. The latter resulted in a situation of increasing complexity in which the relative position of socio-political actors, governments, trade unions interests groups was consequently redefined (now in terms of participation and not of disagreement).

There are two missing reflections at this point. The first refers to the interrelationships between the two moments and the second to the identification of the common underlying thread. The first refers to the ‘effects’ of disagreement on participation and the second relates to the title of this section, namely, the politics of democratisation.

In relation to the first point I have shown that the movement from moment *a* to moment *b* implied both continuity and change. The production of non-territorial spaces is more a ceaseless movement rather than a contingent event, i.e., it is understandable therefore not only in the production but also the (re)production of different dynamics of self-organising, networking and demanding. The fluid movement of these dynamics to a large extent explain the different relative position of case studies under scrutiny in this thesis. But what resulted was radically contingent and determined by the context was the relation of externality which I showed changed significantly from the 1990s to the 2000s. Having clarified the above, to what extent was the configuration of the moment of participation influenced by the configuration of disagreement a decade earlier?

The movement from *a* to *b* was more a conflictual passage rather than a chronological transition. As explained in the methods chapter, it was the formation of moments what constituted the dimension of *time* rather than *time* determining the constitution of democratic subjectivity moments. The 1990s produced a moment of activation of practices (grassroots, deliberation, demands) and creation of values (togetherness, solidarity, reciprocity, recognition) which years later resulted in the opening of new institutional spaces (participatory institutional spaces) as well as the establishment of new public policies. Can

we think of the latter without the influencing force of the former? In this sense, the enactment of *disagreement* questioned the established distribution of places (Rancière, 2006) and forced a process of *redistribution* towards a more egalitarian society. Mediation mechanisms have been either introduced or reformulated. The role of the state has been revisited. These transformations were the result of changing external conditions *in relation to* internal dynamics. The fundamental question of equality has not been answered but addressed - because it has no proper 'answer' but instead partial 'resolutions' resulting in contingent struggles.

The second point advanced earlier in relation to the underlying threads between the two moments represents the theoretical response to the first empirical question. To put it simply, it is the politics of democratisation in post-transition contexts that I have been talking about and what I argue explains not only the emergence of 'moments' but also the movement from one formation to another. The configuration of democratic subjectivities is associated with the production of disagreement and therefore to the emergence of those 'not entitled to govern'. In essence, this process elicits democratisation because it is grounded in the enactment of equality. Thus, the latter reveals the non-existence of 'ideal democrats' or 'desirable democratic subjects' or normative-ideal democratic institutions. It is a process rooted in an anarchic principle determining something that it is ungovernable. What it is at stake in the interrogation of politics of democratisation in post-transition contexts is both radical (un)certainly and equal radical (im)possibility. It is what this thesis interrogated retrospectively finding that the subject positions are temporarily constituted upon questions and conditions of their time located in a particular place. Such processes take place in contexts built by sedimentation of practices (historical legacies) but could equally result in innovation (in the form of disagreement and/or participation, for instance). The politics of democratisation resonates in the form of both open (from inside) and limited (from outside) movement which result in the subversion, questioning and challenging of the established order. The depth of such questions and challenges depends on temporal contexts and geographical territories expressing the political conflict and radically determining the limits and possibilities of deepening democracy.

7.4 Final Remarks

This chapter has highlighted key research findings and connected the different elements constituting the argument of this thesis. In what follows I draw some conclusions putting the politics of democratisation in relation to contemporary debates on democracy. In doing so, I identify this thesis' main contributions, and limitations as well as the need future research.

CONCLUSION: The Politics of Democratisation: Democratic Subjectivities in Post-transition Contexts

This thesis set out to explore democracy from an alternative theoretical paradigm exploring the process of production of politics through the constitution of spaces of disagreement or democratic subjectivities. I researched the institution of the latter in the complex formation of its constitutive elements in separate chapters. The meanings and implications emerging from democratic subjectivities' moment of unity were presented in Chapter 7. Within a context of dissolution of grand narratives, actors and subjects, my approach narrated democratisation in Brazil and Argentina's post-transition contexts as instituting a moment of structuration (horizontalising-deliberative-cross-organisational-activated-issue-based grassroots) challenging existing forms of domination (static-corporatist-formal-representative hierarchies). My thesis outlined practical rules of structuration (self-organising, networking and demanding) in the light of Radical Democracy rules of structuration (logic of difference and logic of equivalence). It also provided evidence of the moment of subversion emerging from the partial fixation of democratic subjectivities (against neoliberalism) as well as evidence initiating a moment of dislocation (post-neoliberalism) that eventually affected all constitutive elements. In doing so, it contends the political character of subaltern actors insofar as their actions express the political logic underlying the structuration of the social, ultimately affecting democratisation practices.

viii. Research Contributions

This research posits three main contributions.

Firstly, it provides an interpretation of contemporary democratisation in Argentina and Brazil within the Radical Democracy framework. The result is original, disconcerting and encouraging. It is original because it re-engages democratisation with politics as the void informing antagonistic conflict which in turn institutes the space for hegemonic struggle. This thesis suggests that democracy and democratisation are fundamentally intertwined with the dynamics cementing order and (in)subordination or, regimes of visibility and regimes of

invisibility, the constitution of dominant universals at the expense of subordinated particularities. But the originality of this thesis primarily lies in elaborating upon the ungovernable, the *anarchic* principle structuring the relationship between universal and particular. Engaging with the latter results disconcerting as it implies researching democratisation without having a clearly defined ‘democratising subjects’. It neither guarantees that discovered democratising subjects could remain being so in the future. In Rancière’s (1999: 39) terms ‘parties do not exist before the declaration of the wrong.’ The fact that researcher cannot anticipate the conditions in which *disagreement* eventually surfaces is nothing but disconcerting. It imposes retrospective investigation as the only method to produce political sociology. But, researching contemporary democratisation within Radical Democracy is also encouraging. It imposes limitations to social scientists’ own elaborations it equally raises the importance of the experience in deepening democracy. The notion of democratic subjectivity in this thesis precisely addresses empirical experience and puts it in relationship with the structuration and disruption of regimes of visibility. The result remains encouraging because it proves that the legacy of *anarchic* struggles creates spaces for claiming redistribution and generating greater equality, the process of deepening democracy under different names.

Secondly, this thesis makes a contribution to the debate on participation. It shares elements with the ongoing discussion within ‘participatory governance’, more prominent in Europe, and ‘participatory democracy’, more prominent in Latin America (Pearce, 2010b). It equally poses the presence of an additional dimension that critically interrogates the latter. The argument of this dissertation is that the politics of democratisation in the post-transition contexts of Argentina and Brazil needs to be understood as the displacement from disagreement to participation. Hence, participation in my thesis refers to ‘political participation’, i.e., collective action aligned with the production of disagreement in the structuration of antagonistic parties. This thesis shares the need to study democratisation beyond government-centred approaches integrating multiform mediations and alternative competing spaces. The notions of non-territorial dynamics such as self-organising, networking and demanding aim to give account to these contentious processes. Although sharing a post-structural stance, this dissertation equally departs from *Foucauldian* assumptions of total control through systems of governance of power as it critically integrates the notion of antagonistic conflict. Political participation is therefore not bound to be governed by a system of total governance but can contribute to the production of its radical

disruption. This thesis posits that it is the presence of ‘ungovernable’ tensions, expressed in the open constitution of democratic subjectivities that precisely dictates participation as democratisation, differentiating by definition its theoretical opposite, participation as administration. In the context of this thesis, therefore, we have to assume that achieved levels of participation (2000s), and its observable positive implications, are bound to be contingent and, eventually challenged by new contentious forces because democracy, in essence, opposes politics as administration.

Thirdly, this thesis contributes to refine and tighten some of Radical Democracy most interesting ideas. The elaboration of a system of related typologies providing clear relationships of *space* and *time* contribute to bridge the gap between radical abstract ideas and equally radical operational concepts. They fulfil the function of bringing new critical light (the enactment of equality) to the understanding of old problems (the creation of contentious collective action) and also integrate key aspects of contemporary events, actors and policies, currently under dispute in the South Cone, enhancing its critical and heuristic potential within the political sociology debate.

The above mentioned contributions have been interrogated throughout the seven chapters of this thesis:

Chapter 1 introduced Radical Democracy’s presuppositions in relation to existing debates on democracy challenging in particular dominant ideas of Transition School and discussing participative democracy. It forged a new approach questioning democracy as ‘passive state of arrival’ in suggesting democratisation as ‘active production of equality’.

Chapter 2 discussed the core and context of this investigation in the elaboration of a model that made explicit the type of interrelationship between the two. Text and context co-constructed the specificity of democratic subjectivities in contemporary Argentina and Brazil eliciting a particular performativity of politics. Case studies could not have been analysed outside their relationship against transition from authoritarian regimes, neoliberal backlash and the post-liberal moment. Equally, changing contextual references are unthinkable without accounting for the mobilisation, solidarities, recognitions, collaborations and dissents, coming from case studies dynamics.

Chapter 3 explored social protest across organisations suggesting grassroots activation as a common contentious element emerging from heterogeneous actors. I specifically engaged with the industrial relations debate positing limitations in focus and approach. Grassroots activation not only challenged multiple forms of hierarchies but equally defied old epistemological understandings of conflict involving workers, the state and the private sector.

Chapter 4 studied the effects of networks as empirical phenomena transcending the notion of fronts and coalitions and positing the emergence of a permanent contentious dynamic. I engaged with social movement literature and re-interrogated the effect of organisations' participation in networking practices. Organisations could become a contingent 'external resource' but they tended to lose their privilege position as locus of collective action as the result of such participation. Networking mechanisms activated deliberation by default challenging established representative bodies of formal democracy. Routine cross-organisational negotiation led to a process of recognition among heterogeneous actors. Networks explain an essential elements but not the totality of subversive action.

Chapter 5 scrutinised demands in relation to naming under which solidarity mechanisms were forged and performed. It proved both the contingent character and the radical possibility of politisation of demands. It warns, however, about the construction of legacies (sediments) which such demands tend to generate and against which new demands necessarily (re)construct their meaning.

Chapter 6 assessed the mechanisms through which complexity gained simplification, the way existing plural consensus was turned into contingent bipolar antagonism. This chapter related to functions of the state vis-à-vis practices of contestation in the production of a relation of an exterior. It proved not only the importance of governments in affecting the socio-political processes but also the limits within which their policies are generated and implemented.

Chapter 7 drew the different elements of this thesis together which resulted in the formation of a broader explanatory narrative. The configuration of two differentiable moments (disagreement and participation) within the post-transition period provided a fair account of democratisation in contemporary Brazil and Argentina.

ix. Limitations

The argument of this thesis is constructed upon the intersection between the inspiring but abstract ideas of political philosophy and, on the other hand, a traditional sociological research approach. I contend that the end product is original and the contribution both critically assesses ongoing topical debates as well as holding the potential to stimulate new, interesting ones. However, I am also aware of some of the limitations resulting from pursuing this research path.

Firstly, there is room for improvement in relation to the theoretical claims this dissertation puts forward. The development of typologies helps to understand case studies vis-à-vis complex processes of order and insubordination while it equally inspires more general reflections regarding contentious collective action and democracy issues within the region. Nevertheless, further elaboration of typologies in relation to theoretical debates on democracy would enhance their hermeneutic potential. As they stand, the explanatory influence of typologies is just enough to understand underlying dynamic instituting case studies as such. They remain limited, however, in relation to broader debates on democratisation. Expanding the implication of typologies beyond case studies requires further theoretical engagement this thesis only introduces in a limited manner.

Secondly, although the argument of this thesis introduces the dimension of time in the understanding of contemporary socio-political change, the engagement with the development of collective action from a historical perspective remains underexplored. Further emphasis and elaboration on the diachronic dimension of subaltern collective action is needed to make the argument more persuasive. I do not think that the latter could radically challenge the proposed line of thinking but I do think that it could add additional spatiotemporal illustrations, making the argument of the dissertation, in turn, more robust.

Thirdly, this dissertation leaves room for further interrogation of organisations in which it placed its focus on. This thesis does not aim to provide a detailed chronological description of organisations as such. Instead, it examined data across organisations in order to explore latent as well as explicit common logics and dynamics. The ‘history’ of these organisations has been written elsewhere and I used most of this literature throughout the argumentation. The complexity of the organisations I worked on, however, is immense which is why I believe

that my accounts are functional to the argument though partial in scope. A more detailed elaboration on the trajectory of individual organisations could enhance our understanding on democratisation dynamics vis-à-vis organisations' cycles.

Lastly, country differences remain subordinated to country commonalities. Although differences in contexts, institutional arrangements as well as in collective action have been mentioned throughout the thesis, I am aware that the strengths of the argument are primarily built upon highlighting commonalities rather than elaborating on differences. The qualitative-comparative methodological approach that guided this research remains to be applied to its full potential. In order to do that further engagement with subtle but complex differences need to be further studied and assessed in relation to the argument of this dissertation.

x. Future Research

This dissertation opens up multiple research spaces that I am keen on carry on investigating. My future research agenda will include a) investigations of sociological transformation vis-à-vis the production of democratic subjectivities and b) the expansion on theoretical reflections in relation to the study of processes of democratisation.

I aim to expand the scope of actors and issues considered in relation to the production of democratic subjectivities. When analysing 'demanding', this dissertation touched on the emergence of new issues in relation to the process of constitution of subjects of disagreement. The de-monopolisation of the media and control over natural resources, among other things, are some of the contentious issues currently permeating the construction of dissents in a region experiencing an economic boom. Learning about the subjects constructed upon issues becomes critical to an understanding of contemporary issues of development governing new dynamics of integration and exclusion.

By the same token, I do not understand empirical exploration disconnected from theoretical reflections. On the contrary, I assume their interdependence and co-construction. The

theory(ies) of democracy remains a theoretical battlefield between normativists and constructivists. I aim to participate in this debate by engaging with perspectives that bring practical experience to the centre of problematisations, in the understanding that the sources for deepening democracy, creating greater equality and deconstructing existing forms of exploitation and subordination, rest in the struggle for the (re)distribution of functions and places (Rancière, 2006). This struggle is empirical as well as epistemological. It happens on the streets and in universities.

Finally, my dissertation extracts lessons from a historical moment including regional upheaval. Putting such lessons in critical relationship with contemporary mobilisations and social protest in Europe is an intellectual endeavour I would like to pursue. The first impression indicates some striking similarities (economic reforms and governmental politics) as well as intriguing differences (societal responses). A cross-regional comparison from a radical democracy approach constitutes a pressing work, a contribution which could shed some light with regards to the common causes underlying the global politics of democratisation.

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APPENDIX

LIST OF INTERVIEWS

Interviews and ethnographic accounts undertaken in São Paulo (Brazil) and Buenos Aires (Argentina) between August 2009 and January 2010

Total number of formal in-depth interviews: 32, distributed as follows⁴⁸:

In Brazil (21):

Government Officials: 3

Jose Albino (20.11.2009): Mayor of *São Bernardo do Campo* city (PT), former CEBs organiser

Nilsa Correa (20.11.2009): Council of *São Bernardo do Campo* city (PT), former CEBs organiser

Rogério Ze (22.11.2009): professional staff of the *Ministério do Desenvolvimento Agrário*, São Paulo

Unique Workers' Center (*Central Única dos Trabalhadores*, CUT)

Rank and file: 5

Claudia (28.10.2009): CUT National, São Paulo

Rita: (28.10.2009): CUT National, São Paulo

Babu (18.10.2009): CUT National, São Paulo

Marco (18.10.2009): Teachers' Union, São Paulo

Marta (18.10.2009): Teachers' Union, São Paulo

Leadership: 3

Petasio Luis (12.11.2009): *Sindicato das Indústrias Gráficas*, CUT São Paulo

Spis (3.11.2009): *Sindicato dos Petroleiros*, CUT São Paulo

Joao Antonio de Moraes (3.11.2009): *Sindicato dos Petroleiros*, CUT São Paulo

The Landless Rural Workers' Movement (*Movimento dos Trabalhadores Rurais Sem-Terra*, MST)

Grassroots: 5

Fredy (7.11.2009): *Consulta Popular*, Escola Nacional Florestan Fernandes, Guararema

Armando (7.11.2009): Escola Nacional Florestan Fernandes, Guararema

Dora (8.11.2009): MST Nordeste

Talles Reis (8.11.2009): Nacional Florestan Fernandes, Guararema

Luis (8.11.2009) MST Minas Gerais

Leadership: 1

Yumar Mauro (10.11.2009): MST National board

Ethnographic accounts: 2

MST *Escola Nacional Florestan Fernandes*, 10-15 October 2009

Two-day national meeting in São Paulo corresponding to the *Coordenação dos Movimentos Sociais* (CMS), 23rd and 24th of November 2009

⁴⁸ Audio recordings and interview transcripts are available upon request..

Academic: 2

Dr. Glauco Arbix (3.08.2009): Universidade de São Paulo

Dr. Iram Jácome Rodrigues (7.08.2009): Universidade de São Paulo

In Argentina (11):

Government Officials: 2

Gustavo (2.12.2009): Professional staff of *Programa Familia*, National Ministry of Social Development

Guillermo (2.12.2009): Professional staff of *Programa Familia*, National Ministry of Social Development

Argentine Workers' Central (*Central de los Trabajadores Argentinos, CTA*)

Rank-and-file: 2

Ballester (4.12.2009): Centro de Militares por la Democracia Argentina, Buenos Aires city.

Ricardo (10.12.2009): CTA La Matanza, Buenos Aires province

Leadership: 1

Depetri (15.12.2009): CTA, Buenos Aires province

Land and Housing Federation (*Federación de Tierra, Vivienda y Hábitat, FTV*)

Grassroots: 3

Javier (14.12.2009): FTV La Matanza, Buenos Aires province

Oracio (15.12.2009): FTV La Matanza, Buenos Aires province

Adela (15.12.2009): FTV La Matanza, Buenos Aires province

Leadership: 1

D'Elia (12.12.2009): FTV national organiser and founder

Academic: 1

Dr. Arturo Fernández (17.12.2009): Universidad Nacional de San Martín

Code System Used in the thesis: Country + interviewee membership + number of interview in cluster

For example:

ARG:SM:N1 (Argentina/Social Movement/Number 1)

BRA:BU:N1 (Brazil/Businessman/Number 1)

SM: social movement organisation

TU: trade union member

BU: businessman

PO: politician

RE: religious organisation

ET: ethnographic notes

AC: academic